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Executive summary
By signing international investment agreements (IIAs), developing 
countries commit themselves to international rules that provide foreign 
investors with far-reaching legal protection and also, increasingly, free 
market access. The investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provision, 
which is a standard feature of most IIAs, puts pressure on states to 
comply with these internationally agreed-upon rules, or else they face the 
threat of being sued for compensation in costly international arbitration 
procedures. The number of such ISDS cases has risen sharply during the 
past 15 years and it is beginning to have serious repercussions for host 
countries and the international investment regime in general.
ISDS cases usually originate from a mismatch between a law or measure 
adopted at the national level and one or several relevant commitments 
made in an IIA. When concluding IIAs, host countries should therefore 
have an interest to ensure conformity between national laws and measures 
on the one hand, and commitments in IIAs on the other hand. This 
represents a major challenge, given the more than 3,000 treaties that have 
been negotiated globally to date and the complexities of the laws and 
legal systems involved. Nevertheless, despite these significant challenges 
and the magnitude of possible consequences from not properly handling 
the interaction between national laws and measures and international 
investment law, the literature on investment law and policy has paid 
surprisingly little attention to the question of how these two areas of the 
law meet and interact.
To fill this vacuum in the field of investment law and policy, this study 
examines how elements of IIAs are reflected and replicated in 
domestic laws and regulations governing foreign investment. Whereas 
previous studies tended to focus on either international or national 
investment law, this study’s contribution is to analyse both of them in 
parallel. In order to effectively accomplish this task, this study introduces 
a novel and unique pattern-matching technique that can be used to 
effectively examine the interaction between IIAs and national investment 
laws of a particular country. This technique is applied to the specific case 
of Indonesia through an in-depth examination of Indonesian investment 
law and policy at the international and national levels. To the knowledge 
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of the authors, this study is the first to provide focused empirical evidence 
on these issues by way of a detailed juxtaposition of a specific country’s 
national and international investment laws.
Innovative method
The study is conducted in four distinct steps: the mapping of all IIAs 
signed by Indonesia; their comparison with Indonesia’s national laws; an 
examination of individual and controversial measures in greater detail; 
and consideration of inter-ministerial coordination and stakeholder 
consultations related to investment issues. The value of this methodology 
is that it is quite holistic in examining investment law and policy, and it 
can provide insights on issues such as: consistency between domestic 
laws and regulations and international commitments; potential risks of 
inconsistencies; and implications for national policy space and economic 
development. The methodological approach used within this study is also 
quite straightforward and can be easily replicated for examinations of 
other countries and contexts.
The Indonesian case
This study applies a single-country case study design focusing 
on Indonesia’s investment law and policy. The Indonesian case is 
representative of a larger class of countries, as it has attracted substantial 
investment flows, signed a large number of IIAs over a long period of 
time and has been involved in a number of ISDS cases.
The study on the interaction of Indonesia’s IIAs and its national 
investment law focuses on four inter-related aspects.
Complex interactions between national investment law and IIAs
First and foremost, the nature of the interaction between Indonesia’s 
international investment law and national laws and measures is analysed 
for the purpose of developing an appropriate analytical framework. In 
domestic laws, this includes detailed examinations of laws governing 
investment matters directly (investment-specific laws) as well as laws 
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in other areas that have an impact on investments (investment-related 
laws). The initial finding is that the interaction between international 
and domestic laws is an extremely complex affair, as both differ 
significantly in structure and content. IIAs have the character of a 
network of treaties and a long-term dimension, whereas a domestic legal 
framework consists of a myriad of very different legal texts, including 
the Constitution, financial regulations, competition law, trade law, labour 
and human rights laws etc., and can be subject to regular revisions and 
amendments.
The challenge is to bring this variety of laws and legal regulations in 
conformity with each other and ensure formal consistency and coherence. 
This study’s in-depth examination of the interaction between international 
commitments and national law has shown that both are coherent in many 
respects, although several areas of divergence were also detected. The 
extent to which this divergence between international commitments and 
national laws is serious and could lead to investor-state disputes is hard 
to predict, but it is safe to argue that a certain degree of incoherence is 
unavoidable, and in many instances this is unlikely to cause harm.
Indonesia’s choice to have an “interlocking law” that functions as an 
interface between international commitments and national law is a 
promising way to face the challenge of complexity. This law is structured 
along the lines of IIAs, while attempting to combine the relevant issues of a 
large set of national laws into one legal text. The interlocking law, originally 
enacted in the late 1960s, has been revised once, in 2007, creating Law No. 
25/2007 concerning Investment. Although the overall system of national and 
international investment law remains very complicated, it could be argued 
that the interlocking law is effective in dealing with complexity, to some 
extent helping achieve consistency between international commitments 
and domestic investment laws. At the same time, the interlocking law 
functions as an intermediary where national and international laws “meet”. 
It reflects compromises that have been reached and is indicative of areas 
where policy space has been negotiated.
In addition, Indonesian IIAs include frequent references to Indonesian 
domestic laws and regulations, which could be an additional hedging 
strategy to deal with the uncertainties of complexity. Indonesia includes 
a standard provision in most of its BITs that refers to its domestic 
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interlocking law to establish applicability of the agreement. It is difficult 
to judge the legal significance of such references to domestic laws and 
regulations, but it is clearly a strategy to hedge against risks and to elevate 
the standing of Indonesian national laws whilst taking on international 
commitments.
Primacy of international investment law?
The second aspect of concern in this study is the direction of the 
interaction. Should national investment law form the basis for international 
commitments made in IIAs or vice versa? This study found evidence 
that the interaction between Indonesia’s international commitments 
on investment and its national laws in this area is bi-directional. 
Even though international rules are likely to have somewhat more clout 
in Indonesian national policy than the other way round, the fact that 
Indonesia is not a mere “price-taker” of international rules is noteworthy, 
as developing countries over the past decades often adopted IIAs without 
sufficiently considering their national legal systems for investment.
How to manage complex interactions?
The third aspect explored in this study is the governance mechanisms 
employed to ensure the consistency of government actions pertaining 
to foreign investments with international commitments. Serious 
coordination problems have been found to exist in some developing 
countries with regard to the ability of governments to adopt national 
legislation that is in accordance with their international commitments. It 
is not uncommon to have IIAs negotiated by a small group of specialists 
within single government branches, keeping other central or local-level 
government agencies, as well as various interest groups and stakeholders, 
out of the picture. This practice most likely elevates the possibility of 
policy mal-coordination and, by extension, the occurrence of ISDS cases.
This study finds that involving these groups in the policy process of 
ensuring consistency between international commitments and national 
investment law is a useful exercise. To advance appropriate governance 
of investment matters, Indonesia has introduced procedures of inter-
ministerial coordination and stakeholder consultations into the 
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process of rule-making on investment. Despite existing controversies over 
the effectiveness and impact of this process in Indonesia and elsewhere, 
the involvement of a variety of stakeholders on issues of investment law 
is probably an important and useful activity as part of the rule-making 
process, especially as it might help identify, at an early stage, potential 
areas where new measures could potentially trigger the emergence of 
ISDS cases. 
Combined with the process of negotiating IIAs with other national 
governments, such inter-ministerial coordination and stakeholder 
consultations form a “Bargaining Triad” of three distinct groups of 
actors that compete and collaborate in the process of forming investment 
law and policy. Such bargaining among potentially inconsistent inter-
governmental, inter-ministerial and stakeholder interests parallels the 
inconsistency in formal laws, rules and regulations. The power structure 
and inter-relationships within the Bargaining Triad are an important 
determinant of the nature and interaction of international and national 
laws and regulations. A government can manage these inter-relationships, 
for example by identifying a specified agency responsible for handling 
negotiations among these different sets of interests.
Implications for policy space
Furthermore, this study examines the implications of all this for national 
policy space and economic development. Policy space is considered, within 
this study, as the ability of a government to pursue public policy objectives 
that follow a clearly formulated development strategy. Quite often, such 
objectives are best advanced through the full commitment and adherence 
to standard practices in international law. But the idea of policy space 
implies that conscious divergence from such practices – in view of specific 
national contexts of economic development – may at times be justifiable. 
The conclusion of IIAs expands a country’s international commitments 
and can, in turn, limit a government’s policy space. In the specific case of 
Indonesia, some scope for the state to manoeuvre and make use of its right 
to regulate was discernible. It appears that the older IIAs limit policy 
space more significantly than recently negotiated IIAs. Older IIAs 
are vaguely drafted, and thus provide much discretion for international 
arbitration tribunals to favour the interests of foreign investors. More 
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recent IIAs feature a more balanced approach that incorporates a large 
variety of clarifications and limitations, which potentially enhance the 
regulatory flexibility of the governments concluding the treaty.
The actual utilisation of policy space, however, occurs within the 
realm of domestic investment-specific or -related laws and regulations, 
and especially the relevant implementing measures, which are often 
responsible for triggering ISDS cases. Policy space becomes a reality 
not through the mere existence of laws and regulations that seek to 
make use of available policy space, but through the possibility to 
implement and enforce these laws and regulations. This difference 
becomes apparent in the Indonesian case, where many development 
considerations are featured strongly in domestic law, but are practically 
absent from Indonesia’s IIAs. The dilemma, then, is that international 
commitments can restrict implementation and enforcement of national 
laws in practice, especially where the national law is more restrictive than 
the international commitments made. This study also suggests that policy 
space is more widely available with regard to facilitating measures.
Finally, a transparent and consistent approach to national legislation 
may be as important as the issue of consistency with international 
commitments. If policy space is not there, both the laws and the 
implementing regulations should reflect this. The state can draw on 
inter-ministerial coordination and stakeholder consultations to better 
determine how far it can go with any new measure, thereby achieving 
greater certainty about the kind of measures that still lie within the 
available policy space. This will allow the state to adapt new measures 
as optimally as possible to its development needs, whilst taking potential 
consequences into account, such as the emergence of investor-state 
disputes. Engaging with all members of the Bargaining Triad can help 
avoid readjustments and amendments to laws and regulations having to 
be made at a later stage. Governments should make sure that measures are 
implemented after they have been fully developed and the consequences 
and feasibility sufficiently examined, in order to avoid any backtracking 
that could reduce transparency and even lead to investor-state disputes. 
In other words, it is important to develop measures with due care and 
involving substantial amounts of time, with governments – as the ultimate 
decision-makers – always having the final say about a measure.
Friends or foes?
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1 Introduction
Over the past half-century, developing countries have been signing 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and preferential trade and investment 
agreements (PTIAs) in great numbers. Their main objective in signing such 
international investment agreements (IIAs)1 has been to attract foreign 
investments by providing multinational enterprises (MNEs) with attractive 
and stable investment frameworks. By signing IIAs, developing countries 
commit themselves to international rules that provide foreign investors 
with far-reaching legal protection and also, increasingly, free market 
access. The investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provision, which is a 
standard feature of most IIAs, puts pressure on states to comply with these 
internationally agreed-upon rules. Under such clauses, foreign investors have 
the possibility to sue governments for compensation in costly international 
arbitration procedures in cases of non-compliance with the agreed treaty 
provisions. ISDS cases have risen sharply during the past 15 years and 
are primarily affecting governments of developing countries. Because the 
ISDS clause is being invoked by foreign investors with increased frequency, 
IIAs are beginning to have serious repercussions for developing countries 
and their governments, calling into question the net value to a developing 
country of concluding IIAs.2
ISDS cases usually originate from a mismatch between a law or measure at 
the national level and one or several relevant commitments made in an IIA.3 
When concluding IIAs, host countries therefore have to ensure conformity 
between national laws and measures on the one hand, and commitments in 
IIAs on the other hand. Given the multitude of negotiated treaties (more 
than 3,000 globally) and the complexities of national laws and regulations, 
1 Throughout the text, we use the term IIA to refer to the overall group of bilateral and 
plurilateral treaties, BITs and PTIAs that establish rules for the protection, promotion 
and liberalisation of FDI. We use the terms BITs and PTIAs to address questions relating 
specifically to these treaties.
2 According to UNCTAD (2013b), 58 ISDS cases were initiated in 2012, which is the 
highest number of new cases filed within one year. The total number of known cases 
reached 514 at the end of 2012, of which 244 have been concluded.
3 ISDS cases may also result from specific contracts between states and foreign investors 
that are enforceable through the so-called umbrella clause found in most IIAs. As this 
study is concerned with investment treaties, examination of such contracts will not form 
part of it.
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ensuring such conformity is a major challenge that some developing 
countries are better able to handle than others.
Despite these significant challenges and the magnitude of possible 
consequences from not properly handling the interaction between national 
laws and measures and international investment law, the literature on 
investment law and policy is surprisingly silent on this issue. There are no 
“good practice” accounts on how best to manage the interactions between 
international and national investment law to minimise the risk of being sued 
by foreign investors. Instead, the literature is divided into two camps: one 
that has thoroughly examined international law on foreign direct investment 
and the global network of IIAs through a large number of studies; and the 
other focusing on national investment laws and regulations, in particular 
through the preparation of investment policy reviews. Accounts on how 
these two areas of the law meet and interact are rare.
The gap in the literature may also result from the fact that the interaction 
between international commitments and national laws is often insufficiently 
considered by governments in the process of negotiating IIAs. Poulsen 
(2014) shows that IIA policy-making in developing countries has hardly 
followed a rational approach, and policy-makers in these countries have 
insufficiently considered the risks involved when signing thousands of 
IIAs. As a result of ISDS cases brought against them, more and more 
governments of developing countries have now realised that they signed up 
to an especially constraining set of international rules that are enforceable 
through independent, third-party arbitration mechanisms (Poulsen / Aisbett 
2013). Two assumptions about the relationship between national laws and 
IIAs follow from Poulsen and Aisbett’s findings and from the rapid surge 
in international arbitration cases globally: IIAs have not necessarily been 
concluded on the basis of existing national laws, and the international 
commitments most developing countries have signed up to through IIAs 
have not sufficiently been translated into national laws and regulations.
On the basis of these initial considerations, the primary objective of this 
study is to examine the interactions between national and international 
investment laws and appropriate governance mechanisms that governments 
of developing countries can employ to minimise inconsistencies between 
the two bodies of law. To our knowledge, this study is the first to provide 
detailed empirical evidence on these questions. We employ an innovative 
pattern-matching technique and work within the context of a single-
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country case study design that allows intensive research of such a complex 
phenomenon. As we explain below, Indonesia’s investment policy offers a 
good case in this respect. Referring to the Indonesian experience, the study 
examines the following research questions:
1  How do international investment law and national laws and measures 
interact and how can those interactions be framed analytically?
In principle, international commitments and national legal systems should 
be coherently drafted, and it is quite intuitive to argue that national law 
should reflect international law and vice versa. However, international and 
national laws on foreign investment differ significantly in structure and 
content. International investment law has the character of a network in 
which each country signs a diverse set of treaties with its partner countries. 
Investment treaties tend to be short in content, focusing on international 
commitments in specific areas. Quite different from this, national 
investment laws consist of one or several investment-specific laws that 
deal explicitly with investment issues, plus an array of investment-related 
laws that regulate all kinds of issues, such as trade, industry, monetary and 
fiscal policy, labour, energy, environment, human rights and many more. 
In each investment-related law, there is at least one clause that addresses 
investment matters. Although investment-specific laws are more easily kept 
in conformity with international commitments because both focus on the 
regulation of investment, the challenge of conformity is much greater for 
investment-related laws that cover a much more diverse set of issues. It is 
thus important to know how international and national laws on investment 
interact in practice and how a link between these two bodies of law can be 
effectively achieved by governments of developing countries, in a way that 
also minimises the likelihood of ISDS cases.
2  To what extent does national investment law form the basis for interna-
tional commitments made in IIAs?
As with every other international institution or regime, IIAs constrain 
the ability of the contracting parties to adopt certain policy measures. 
The disciplines included in IIAs are sometimes considered – rightly or 
wrongly – to provide a more stable and favourable legal framework for 
foreign investors than national laws. Adopting international commitments 
into national law is considered to be a prudent approach if it improves the 
structure and content of national laws, enhances the domestic investment 
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climate and generally has a positive economic and development impact on 
the host economy. Hence, developing countries might find it necessary to 
revise national laws to reflect commitments made at the international level. In 
principle, a host state’s national law should provide at least the level of legal 
protection for foreign investors that is stated in the IIAs it has signed, and 
some far-reaching commitments made in IIAs could necessitate significant 
adjustments in national investment law. However, from the perspective of 
a host country, the commitments being negotiated in the context of IIAs 
should reflect the specific set of investment-specific as well as investment-
related policies that are envisaged as being instrumental and necessary to 
support the country’s broader development strategy. Because national laws 
usually play a larger role from a host country’s perspective, it is plausible to 
argue that they should form the basis for the international negotiations of 
IIAs. The question of whether national investment law forms the basis for 
international commitments made in IIAs, or whether the reverse effect is the 
case, is crucial for economic policy-making in developing countries.
3  What governance mechanisms should be in place to ensure conformity 
of national and international investment laws?
Foreign investment has a profound impact on a variety of economic 
activities in a host country. A number of disciplines of IIAs have a deep 
impact on national laws and might require alterations in areas that are 
much less related to investment, such as labour laws, the environment and 
human rights. Furthermore, changes in these public policy areas may result 
in a breach of IIA provisions, thus triggering ISDS cases. As a result, a 
wide range of stakeholders play a role in managing the above-mentioned 
interactions, including political entities at the central and local levels of 
government, business interest groups and civil society stakeholders in the 
countries concerned. It is thus important to identify whether and how these 
groups should be involved in the policy process of ensuring consistency 
between international commitments and national investment law.
Serious coordination problems have been found to exist in some developing 
countries with regard to the ability of governments to adopt national 
legislation that is in accordance with their international commitments. It 
is not uncommon to have IIAs negotiated by a small group of specialists 
within individual government branches – usually economic or foreign 
affairs ministries – while other government agencies involved with the day-
to-day regulation of foreign investments are neither made sufficiently aware 
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of the countries’ international commitments, nor are they consulted in the 
process of negotiating these commitments. Such a lack of appreciation of a 
broad range of government agencies on the national and sub-national levels 
elevates the risk for developing countries of being sued by foreign investors 
for not abiding by the set of rules found in IIAs.
We are interested in appropriate governance mechanisms that can be 
employed by host countries to ensure the consistency of government actions 
pertaining to foreign investments and international commitments. This 
latter issue is of particular importance because a large variety of behind-the-
border regulations, involving a number of government actors on the national 
as well as sub-national levels, can have a significant impact on foreign 
investment. Introducing efficient institutional frameworks of coordination 
and consultation among different sets of laws and regulations and various 
actors is a paramount governance challenge. We are thus also interested in 
the measures that developing countries can employ to avoid liabilities as a 
result of a mismatch of national and international rules.
4  What are the implications of IIA disciplines for national policy space 
and economic development?
If IIAs have a stronger impact on national law than vice versa, they might 
impose extensive constraints on the host country’s policy space. Assuming 
that a developing country’s national law reflects its broader development 
objectives, the IIAs it has negotiated should correspond with these goals. 
In short, drafting international and national investment law in a coherent 
way is not only important to avoid ISDS claims; more importantly, it is a 
prerequisite for host countries to use foreign direct investment (FDI) as a 
driver of economic development. This study thus contributes to the ongoing 
discussion of the effects of international economic treaties on developing 
countries’ policy space.
By analysing the Indonesian case, we develop an understanding of what 
our findings mean for developing countries’ policy space in the area of 
investment. By “tying themselves to the mast”, developing countries 
voluntarily relinquish some of their flexibility in devising policies and 
regulations that aim to support structural change towards higher value 
added economic activities. In other words, the conclusion of IIAs expands 
a country’s international commitments and, in turn, limits the government’s 
policy space. We analyse which IIA provisions are more effective in this 
Jan Knörich / Axel Berger
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)12
respect. A growing strand of research on economic development has 
emphasised the importance of policy space in the development context, 
arguing that developing countries need some flexibility to advance 
economic policy in support of their specific national economic development 
objectives. On a general level, we share this understanding; however, we 
also realise that there are abundant examples where policy space has been 
used to implement ineffective, or even detrimental, industrial policies. 
Assessments of the need for policy space and the effectiveness of industrial 
policies are inevitably context-specific. What we aim at in this study is to 
show which IIA provisions have a constraining effect on a host country’s 
policy space. We do not focus on the question to what extent – and in what 
way – this policy space should be used to promote a specific industrial 
policy in Indonesia. Governments of countries undergoing complex 
processes of economic transformation and development sometimes require 
the additional manoeuvrability in economic policy-making that is granted 
to them through policy space. In other circumstances, however, giving 
up policy space by pledging adherence to the norms of an international 
rules-based regime might be a preferable approach in view of a country’s 
development objectives.
This study is of relevance for researchers as well as policy-makers in 
developing countries and international organisations. For researchers, this 
study introduces an innovative and replicable methodological approach to 
examine the interaction between IIAs and domestic investment law. For 
policy-makers in developing countries, this study offers insights into good 
practices as well as challenges to ensure formal and practical consistency 
between international commitments and national laws and regulations. 
Its particular contribution can be found in the juxtaposition of national 
investment policy with international commitments. Such a juxtaposition 
fills an important gap in the literature on international investment law, 
which tends to focus either on IIAs or domestic policy. The results of this 
study, furthermore, provide findings that can be useful for international 
organisations such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) that regularly analyse the investment policy 
framework of developing countries but rarely deal systematically with the 
potential inconsistencies between national and international investment 
laws.
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1.1 Case selection
Given the lack of previous research on the consistency of host countries’ 
national and international investment policy-making, we employ a single-
country case study design. Within-case analysis is especially useful for 
intense research of the complexities of one particular unit with the aim of 
producing findings that are generalisable for a larger class of cases (e.g. 
Gerring 2007, 20). To produce findings that are generalisable, it is important 
to choose a case that is representative of a larger class of countries. In the 
context of the present research design, the country under research should 
have: (1) signed a larger number of IIAs over a longer period of time as 
most developing countries have done, (2) experienced a number of ISDS 
cases and (3) attracted substantial investment flows in order to ensure the 
relevance of IIAs to economic policy-making.
Indonesia represents an interesting case in this respect. Indonesia attaches 
great importance to FDI to spur economic development and is in an ongoing 
process of expanding its IIA network. Indonesia has a long history of 
negotiating IIAs, which dates back to the 1960s, and has signed more than 
50 IIAs on a bilateral and regional level. As with other developing countries, 
Indonesia signed BITs during the 1990s in great numbers and has started to 
shift its policy focus in recent years towards PTIAs that are negotiated on a 
regional level in the context of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). The Indonesian strategy of negotiating IIAs thus reflects the 
experience of many other developing countries.4 In the early days of its IIA 
negotiations, it followed a rather cautious IIA strategy. Specifically, since 
the 1970s, Indonesia has followed an IIA policy that includes safeguards 
allowing for the adoption of certain regulatory measures such as exceptions to 
the obligatory national treatment clause. In the 1990s, Indonesian IIAs have 
become more liberal by including, among other things, national treatment 
and market-access provisions. Indonesia is also a representative for the 
larger sample of developing countries, as it is experiencing ISDS arbitration 
4 Yackee (2008) shows that IIAs until the late 1980s did not entail ISDS provisions. Only in 
the 1990s did ISDS provisions become a standard feature of global IIA practice. China’s 
IIA approach is a case in point: China negotiated IIAs without comprehensive ISDS 
provisions in the 1980s and 1990s before it switched to an IIA approach that not only 
provided foreign investors with the right to sue host countries, but also entailed national 
treatment provisions (Cai 2006; Gallagher / Shan 2009; Berger 2011).
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cases brought against it by international investors at the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
FDI plays a crucial role for Indonesia. The Indonesian economy has enjoyed 
considerable FDI inflows, especially in recent years. Indonesian economic 
policy has recognised the particular importance of foreign investment for 
the country’s economic development. In particular, Indonesia’s most recent 
round of reforms since the country was hit by the Asian financial crisis 
in 1998, and the intensifying economic integration with the countries of 
ASEAN, has led to further policy steps in the direction of liberalisation. This 
is in stark contrast to some other countries in the region, most notably Japan, 
China, South Korea and other “Asian tigers”, where economic success is 
often attributed to state-led economic development and a domestic industrial 
policy that was characterised by only stepwise and controlled opening to 
international trade and investment.5 In terms of economic policy-making 
and governance structures, Indonesian experiences are noteworthy and can 
offer important lessons for other developing countries.
1.2 Methodological approach
In this study, we develop and employ a systematic methodology for the 
comparative examination of international commitments and national 
laws and regulations. As illustrated in Figure 1, this method consists of 
a stepwise approach: first, the analysis starts with a mapping of all IIAs 
that a country has signed; second, these IIAs are compared with national 
investment-specific and then investment-related laws; third, individual 
and controversial measures should be considered in more detail, and their 
potential implications discussed; and finally, the nature of inter-ministerial 
coordination and stakeholder consultations related to investment issues 
should be examined through empirical research.
Throughout these four steps, we develop and employ an innovative pattern-
matching technique to compare Indonesia’s international commitments 
on investment with relevant national laws and regulations. Our aim is to 
examine the interactions and consistency between the two, and evaluate 
5 Later chapters show, however, that Indonesia has recently begun to make attempts in 
shifting parts of its economic policy towards a pattern that resembles a more state-
directed approach.
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the processes and institutional structures involved in bringing Indonesian 
national and international rules in line with each other. To analyse the above 
questions, both the commitments made in IIAs and related national laws 
need to be examined in parallel. Thus, a broad range of legal texts related 
to Indonesia’s investment policy framework were collated and examined 
for the purposes of this study. Initially, the texts of Indonesia’s IIAs 
were gathered and mapped to allow for comparisons between IIAs along 
individual provisions and in order to evaluate the extent of the international 
commitments made by Indonesia. Next, the relevant national laws, 
regulations and measures – especially those related to investment – were 
identified, collected and examined. The Indonesian investment-specific 
laws were identified and their content compared with that of the IIAs. Other 
investment-related laws were collected and also matched with relevant IIA 
provisions and investment-specific laws. Legal texts and events in Indonesia 
up to late 2012 were considered for this study. Developments in 2013 and 
thereafter were not taken into account. 
It has generally been shown that many investors, in practice, do not consider 
the detailed clauses of IIAs, or sometimes even ignore their existence,6 
though they are more prone to pay attention to national law. This highlights 
the critical importance of national law, even in relation to international 
commitments. This entire approach made possible the creation of an 
overview of Indonesia’s entire investment policy framework that included 
both international treaties and national laws. One major contribution of this 
study is that it allows for a direct comparison of these two distinct areas of 
investment law.
6 In a recent survey, Yackee (2010), for example, found little evidence that IIAs are an 
important factor in investment decisions of US MNEs. For a similar finding, see also 
European Commission (2000). 
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Figure 1:  Method for comparison of international commitments with 
national laws
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The value of this methodology is that it is quite holistic in examining 
investment law and policy, and it can provide insights on issues such as 
consistency between domestic laws and regulations and international 
commitments, potential risks of inconsistencies, and implications for 
national policy space and economic development. The methodological 
approach used within this study is also quite straightforward and can be 
easily replicated for examinations of other countries and contexts.
Not all material was readily available, and a period of fieldwork in Indonesia 
was necessary in identifying and gathering many of the legal texts. The 
fieldwork was also used to gain more insight about the broader political 
economy dimensions surrounding Indonesian investment law that could 
not be determined from a mere analysis of legal documents. Fieldwork in 
Indonesia was undertaken in late July and early August 2012. In addition 
to the pursuit of legal texts and information about investment policy in 
Indonesia, meetings with a variety of relevant stakeholders and experts in 
Indonesia were arranged in order to triangulate the findings gathered through 
the analysis of IIAs and national investment law. Although government 
officials constituted the primary source of information, discussions were 
also held with academics, consultants, representatives of non-governmental 
organisations and chambers of commerce, and experts from foreign 
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institutions in Indonesia.7 Obtaining information from a mix of different 
stakeholders reduced the likelihood of selection bias. In all, 17 meetings 
with 24 people from 16 institutions were arranged, each lasting between 45 
minutes and 4 hours, summing up to a total of 25 hours of discussions. The 
primary purpose of these meetings was to source and confirm information 
about legal texts and other facts and insights related to Indonesia’s 
economic policy. These meetings with experts yielded important and useful 
information on issues such as Indonesia’s current economic and political 
situation, foreign investment in Indonesia, Indonesia’s legal environment for 
investment and intergovernmental relations among Indonesia’s ministries. 
Since the main purpose of the meetings was to gather and confirm available 
information rather than seeking opinions or individual viewpoints, most of 
the information provided in the meetings was verified and cross-checked in 
available textual sources. The identity of the experts is kept anonymous.8
As research on this study’s subject of interest is still in its infancy, such 
in-depth empirical work – combined with a broad examination of laws 
and legal texts for one country – promises to create the kind of data that 
is currently needed to gain further understanding about the subject. Future 
studies could then examine other countries and complement the present 
study’s findings.
2 International investment agreements and national 
investment law
This chapter provides the conceptual basis for the case study of Indonesia’s 
investment policy. We introduce the basic characteristics of international 
and national laws relevant to foreign investors. The subsequent section 
7 Meetings were held with staff from the following institutions: Indonesia’s Investment 
Coordinating Board (BKPM); the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs; Bank 
Indonesia; Bappenas; Bapepam-LK; the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; the Ministry of Trade; the Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
Indonesia; Definit (Yogyakarta); Kadin (Chamber of Commerce and Industry); the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development in Jakarta; the Universitas Trisakti; 
the Delegation of the European Union to Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam; the DEG 
Representative Office in Jakarta; and the German Embassy in Jakarta.
8 To guarantee anonymity, reference will be made to “experts” rather than providing the 
names and affiliations of the participants in the discussions. 
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describes the history and basic characteristics of IIAs as international legal 
instruments that are designed to offer foreign investors special rights vis-
à-vis the host state. We then go on to argue that IIAs potentially have a 
constraining effect on the policy space of host countries. The last section 
considers the different elements of IIAs and their relationship with specific 
or related national investment laws.
2.1 The global diffusion of IIAs
In light of the absence of a comprehensive multilateral investment 
agreement, FDI flows are governed by a dense network of more than 3,000 
IIAs. According to recent data provided by the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2013a, 101), this global network is 
made up of 2,857 BITs and 339 PTIAs, which are increasingly negotiated 
on a regional level. The global IIA network evolved along an S-shaped 
curve that is characteristic of policy diffusion processes (see Figure 2).9 
In the early days of the IIA movement, some European countries started 
to adopt BITs to protect their national MNEs’ investments in politically 
unstable developing countries. The first BIT was concluded by Germany 
and Pakistan in 1959. Other Western European countries followed suit 
and started to negotiate BITs with developing countries (Newcombe / 
Paradell 2009, 42–43). In this initial phase of the diffusion, no more than 20 
agreements were signed each year. At the end of the 1980s, the number of 
annually concluded BITs increased dramatically, mainly due to the adoption 
of BITs – being one element of liberal economic reforms in the Washington 
Consensus era – by Latin American and Central and Eastern European 
countries. In addition, during the 1990s more and more developing countries 
started to negotiate so-called South-South BITs among each other. With the 
turn of the new millennium, the number of newly negotiated BITs declined 
while investment rules are increasingly being incorporated in PTIAs (e.g. 
Hofmann / Tams / Schill 2013).
9 On the policy diffusion concept in general, see Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2008). 
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Figure 2: Annual and cumulative signed BITs and other IIAs, 1959–2012
 
Source: ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties (online: https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
FrontServlet; accessed 30 July 2013), UNCTAD, World Investment Report, various years.  
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One of the main characteristics of the global IIA network is that these treaties 
are relatively uniform with regard to their overall structure and content. 
Capital-exporting countries usually employ standardised IIA models in order 
to facilitate and simplify negotiations with host countries. In broad terms, 
the global IIA network can be distinguished into two types of agreements: 
one offering only investment protection, and the other adding a specified 
degree of investment liberalisation to complement investment protection. In 
what follows, we refer to the former as the “protection approach” and the 
latter as the “liberalisation approach”.
The protection approach is the most widely used and combines strong 
substantive investment protection in the post-establishment phase with 
comprehensive ISDS clauses. This approach has been invented and applied 
first and foremost by European countries. It is also used in most South-
South IIAs. IIAs that apply the protection approach establish international 
standards for the treatment and protection of foreign investors. Standard 
clauses in such IIAs oblige host states to treat foreign investors fairly and 
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equitably and to abstain from discriminative measures. Host countries, 
furthermore, commit themselves to provide compensation in the case of 
expropriation and to allow the free transfer of investment-related funds. 
Often, these treaties include so-called umbrella clauses that incorporate 
all contractual obligations of the host state vis-à-vis investors of the other 
contracting party into the treaty and make them enforceable through the 
ISDS clauses.
IIAs that follow the protection approach are rather short, often comprising 
not more than 10 pages, and their provisions are drafted in an open-ended 
and often vague manner. Importantly, these characteristics imply that 
foreign investors are provided with far-reaching legal protection, whereas 
these treaties are usually silent on the “rights” of host countries to regulate 
FDI and the responsibilities of the foreign investors.
A minority of IIAs follow the liberalisation approach, which combines 
investment protection in the post-establishment phase with market-access 
provisions that grant national treatment and most-favoured nation (MFN) 
treatment in the pre-establishment phase. This particular approach has been 
developed by the United States, which started to negotiate BITs in the mid-
1980s, and also served as a basis for Chapter 11 on investment of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Canada and a number of other 
countries such as Japan and Korea are applying the liberalisation approach 
in some of their BITs. Importantly, this approach is also used as a blueprint 
for the investment chapters of most PTIAs.
With regard to post-establishment investment protection, IIAs modelled on 
the liberalisation approach are more “balanced”, in the sense that they entail 
more elaborated and detailed legal language. These treaties provide more 
clarity with regard to the meaning of substantive provisions, and thus reduce 
the room for interpretation of arbitration tribunals. In addition, IIAs drafted 
according to the liberalisation approach increasingly include provisions that 
aim at raising the level of policy space for contracting parties to regulate 
FDI. Such provisions include, among other things, references to the 
international minimum standard and customary international law; exclusion 
of certain public policy fields (e.g. health, environment, social security); and 
possibilities to deviate from the free transfer of funds obligation in the case 
of financial crises. These attempts to enhance the clarity of IIA provisions 
and the exclusion of certain public policies from the coverage of the IIA 
were a reaction to the NAFTA countries’ experience with a number of high-
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profile arbitration claims that were brought against them (e.g. Vandevelde 
2009; McIlroy 2004).
Although the liberalisation approach, broadly speaking, provides more 
policy space for host countries to implement public policies than the 
protection approach in the post-establishment phase, this advantage has 
to be judged against the constraining effect of pre-establishment national 
and MFN treatment clauses. In contrast to IIAs following the protection 
approach, IIAs that follow the liberalisation approach include market-
access provisions that limit the ability of the host country to screen 
investments before they are made and to reverse market access in sectors 
that have been opened up to foreign investors. Of course, the market-access 
provisions granted to foreign investors in the pre-establishment phase are 
not unconditional, and the contracting parties usually attach schedules with 
exceptions to their IIAs. The level of restrictiveness with regard to the host 
countries’ right to admit foreign investments thus depends on these market-
access exceptions.
The discussion about the effects of IIAs on the policy space of host countries 
is so important because substantive protection standards included in these 
treaties are actually enforceable through third-party arbitral tribunals. In 
other words, foreign investors that would like to defend their rights against 
the host country can bypass national courts. What is more, in contrast to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), where only governments can launch 
dispute settlement procedures, MNEs can sue host countries directly in 
case of alleged breaches of substantive IIA provisions without having to 
rely on the diplomatic support of their national governments. In short, the 
de-nationalisation and de-politicisation of the dispute settlement system is 
a defining feature of the global system of IIAs. Apart from a small number 
of investment treaty claims brought to international arbitration before 
2000, the bulk of claims occurred afterwards (UNCTAD 2013b) and have 
triggered a debate about the legitimacy of the global IIA system (Franck 
2005). By extension, this debate is also about the constraining effects of 
IIAs on host countries’ policy space and the ability of the host state to 
implement development-friendly policies.
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2.2 IIA and host-country policy space
The discussion about policy space relates to the flexibility of governments to 
pursue certain policy measures against the background of their integration in 
international regimes. More specifically, policy space “focuses on the tension 
between international economic integration and the autonomy available 
to nation states to pursue policies that effectively support their economic 
development” (UNCTAD 2008b, 1). It can be sought for both broad 
economic strategy and for individual policies, and can be viewed specifically 
in the context of economic development or as a general desire of developing 
countries to rid themselves from too many external constraints (Page 2007, 
2). Examples of economies that have used policy space successfully in the 
past are mostly found in East Asia (UNDP 2009, 5) – Korea, Japan, China, 
Taiwan. In particular, many of these economies did not open their capital 
markets at an early stage of economic development and did not rapidly open 
up their domestic markets to foreign competition (UNCTAD 2004, 148–149).
It is argued that persisting market failures in developing countries require 
more state intervention for their resolution, but this possibility to intervene is 
increasingly being constrained by international efforts towards integration, 
policy harmonisation and policy consistency (UNDP 2009, 5–6). Integration 
always has the side effect that domestic flexibility to pursue national 
economic policy objectives is reduced, as countries are restricted in their 
use of policy measures because they have made legal commitments under 
international law. In other words, international economic relationships – 
established through multilateral, regional or bilateral treaties – minimise 
control over domestic policy, as foreign players exert some level of influence 
over domestic policy choices through the concluded treaties (Mayer 2009).
This is not to suggest that integration is always unfavourable to economic 
development – to the contrary, there are multiple benefits to integration, and 
the costs of integration may not always outweigh the benefits. Indeed, it is 
the actual intention of international rules to limit the freedom of individual 
states to manoeuvre (Page 2007), as states benefit when other countries 
are obliged to abide by the same rules and there is no “free rider” effect. 
International rules to which countries are “locked in” provide more certainty 
than domestic laws.
Thus, developing countries can reap certain benefits from economic 
integration, but at the same time, they may not be able to maximise the 
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economic benefits from pursuing development policies crafted to their 
individual national economic contexts and circumstances. Given this 
conflict between international integration and national policy flexibility, 
the challenge for developing countries is in maintaining the appropriate 
balance between the two. Countries have to evaluate the costs and benefits 
of international integration vis-à-vis national policy flexibility through an 
effort of conscious calculation. Ensuring that international agreements 
have sufficient safeguard clauses against the most severe effects of 
international obligations would be part of such a calculation. Integrating 
into international regimes in a sequenced manner, in line with a country’s 
economic development status prevailing at any specific time, will also help 
achieve such a balance (Mayer 2009).
It is important to point out that having policy space does not mean that 
appropriate use of it is made. In order to use policy space effectively, policy-
makers need to have a vision of a country’s economic future and be able to 
formulate clear development strategies in line with the specific domestic 
circumstances. Governments must have sufficient institutional capacity to 
proactively advance a national development strategy (UNCTAD 2008b, 3).
The policy space concept is a rather broad – and often underspecified – 
concept that encompasses a wide range of different policy fields. Policy 
space has been looked at in the context of macro-economic and monetary 
policies (UNCTAD 2008b; Mayer 2009), the WTO (DiCaprio / Gallagher 
2006; Page 2007) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (UNDP 
2009). Examinations of policy space under the WTO agreements illustrate 
how difficult it is to measure the concept. DiCaprio and Gallagher, for 
example, found that the WTO agreements significantly restricted the policy 
space of developing countries, although there was still room to expand 
policy space, and not all countries immediately adhered to all commitments 
(DiCaprio / Gallagher 2006, 799–800). By contrast, Page concludes that 
except for the impact of TRIPS [Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights] on technology transfer to and within developing 
countries, there is little evidence that WTO rules are constraining countries’ 
ability to follow developmental paths. (Page 2007, 4) 
She further acknowledges that “some rules may reduce potential freedom, 
but do not restrict current policies; it is impossible to measure their effect” 
(Page 2007, 4).
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A few studies have addressed the issue of policy space in the context 
of international investment law. They provide important insights with 
respect to select IIA provisions (Spears 2010; Romson 2012) or suggest 
strategies towards drafting development-friendly IIAs (UNCTAD 2012a). 
Gallagher discusses the lack of possibilities provided in IIAs to mitigate 
the consequences of financial crises through the introduction of temporary 
safeguards and other means (Gallagher 2011; 2010). With the notable 
exception of Manger, who provides an examination of how policy space 
constrains regulatory flexibility in specific service industries in Chile 
(Manger 2008), the literature falls short of providing concrete analyses 
of country-specific contexts. It also does not provide much in-depth 
consideration of relevant national laws. This study contributes towards 
filling these gaps in the literature.
Our aim is not to “measure” the policy space that a country such as Indonesia 
has left in light of its international commitments. Notwithstanding the 
conceptual difficulties to quantify the policy space of a country, we also 
doubt the practical relevance of such an approach. First of all, the content 
of IIAs is often drafted in a broad and often imprecise manner, which 
impedes the judgement of the concrete impact of a certain treaty clause on 
policy measures of host countries. Second, even though IIAs may appear 
as especially constraining on paper, their actual impact on a government’s 
ability to adopt certain policy measures depends on the enforcement of the 
rules and the pressure from dispute settlement provisions in IIAs. Despite 
the recent increase in ISDS cases, we assume that, in most cases, dispute 
resolution is considered by foreign investors as a measure of last resort.
Against this background, from a policy perspective it is more important 
to focus on the question of how host states manage the interactions of 
international and national rules for the governance of FDI with the aim of 
reducing liabilities vis-à-vis foreign investors and their home countries. 
It is therefore of importance to analyse to what extent states incorporate 
international commitments in national laws and regulations and how 
consistent both sets of rules are.
2.3 IIAs and national law
Before analysing the Indonesian case in depth, it is important to briefly 
consider the nature of the international framework governing investment 
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and compare it to the general characteristics of domestic legal frameworks. 
Although the international system of rules on investment is said to be fraught 
with inconsistencies and incoherence resulting from its nature as a network 
of treaties (the “spaghetti bowl” phenomenon), overall the organisation of 
each country’s IIAs is not as complicated as one might expect. At the core of 
a typical treaty is a set of practically identical formulations, so-called core 
elements (UNCTAD 2008a), found in most – if not all – of a country’s IIAs. 
These similarities stem from the above-mentioned common historic origin 
of IIAs and the fact that capital-exporting countries negotiate IIAs on the 
basis of model texts. Among the IIAs’ core elements are broad definitions 
of the covered investments and investors and provisions on expropriation, 
fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, MFN treatment, transfer of 
funds, and ISDS. Differences between a country’s IIAs originate primarily 
in three ways: first, through inclusion of additional non-core provisions, 
such as the prohibition of performance requirements, the inclusion of an 
umbrella clause or a denial of benefits clause, in some treaties but not 
others; second, by developing, in each treaty, nuances and variations of 
formulations, including those in core provisions, such as widening the scope 
of specific provisions to the pre-establishment phase, clarifying indirect 
expropriation or refining procedural aspects of ISDS; and third, by including 
treaty-specific exceptions, either schedules in annexes or exclusions of 
policy areas such as national security or the environment.
These individual variations are indeed a challenge to consistency and 
coherence, as different IIAs and different IIA generations provide foreign 
investors with different levels of legal protection. But, in effect, the 
differences found in the global IIA network are levelled off as a result of 
extensive investor definitions that allow foreign investors, through creative 
corporate restructuring, to assert their rights through multiple IIAs and by 
the possibility to “import” more-generous provisions through the MFN 
clauses. As a result of these characteristics of the global IIA system, Schill 
(2009) argues that we have a multilateral investment law on the basis of a 
bilateral treaty system. In other words, even though a country may have 
negotiated various IIA generations that may differ in their coverage and 
depth, the above-mentioned multilateralising elements create connections 
between them, resulting in a cohesive system, as displayed in Figure 3.
The bottom of Figure 3 also provides an illustration of a country’s domestic 
legal framework governing investment. It is organised quite differently from 
the framework for IIAs. Contrary to the “multilateralised” network that 
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characterises international investment law, the domestic legal framework 
consists of a variety of distinct and different bodies of law, many of them 
dealing with issues other than investment, but with the potential to affect 
some aspects of an investment. These laws exist side by side but are linked 
to each other in different ways, and may occasionally overlap. A distinction 
can be made between investment-specific and investment-related laws and 
regulations. Investment-specific laws are those that are enacted specifically 
for the purpose of governing investment matters. One example would be the 
laws governing investment approval. Investment-related laws are laws that 
are enacted for a broader or different purpose, such as land, labour, finance 
and capital, or even the Constitution. These laws have the potential to affect 
investments and have clauses dealing directly or indirectly with investments.
Figure 3:  Interactions of different IIA generations and various bodies of 
national law
 
Interaction
IIAs 3rd
generation
IIAs 1st
generation
IIAs 2nd
generation 
Constitution
Investment‐related laws
– labour, land, capital and 
finance, mining etc.
Investment‐specific laws
– investment approval 
etc. 
Source: Authors
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There is little doubt that the domestic legal framework governing investment 
is more complex than the international one, primarily because legal texts 
governing matters other than investment have an impact on investment 
rules and regulations. Coordinating these different laws and keeping them 
in line with one particular economic strategy is a challenge, especially 
as competing interests among relevant ministries responsible for drafting 
the different laws have to be considered. Moreover, this complexity in 
domestic law does not make it easier to negotiate and conclude appropriate 
international agreements in accordance with national laws. A particular 
strategy or approach might be required by a government wishing to bring 
international commitments in line with domestic rules and regulations. 
If such an alignment of international commitments – often negotiated in 
various generations of IIAs with different obligations – with the national 
legal system fails, the risk to host governments of being sued for breaches 
in IIA provisions is enhanced.
The degree of policy space available to a country depends on the nature 
of the interaction between international and domestic investment law and 
policy and the direction of policy-making. If we were to hypothesise the 
upper half of Figure 3 as non-existent, a country would have full policy space 
in the area of investment but would compromise on its level of integration 
with the rest of the world. Adding treaties in the upper part will have a 
limiting effect on policy space. This limiting effect should be particularly 
significant with the initial treaty as a country negotiates its first core IIA 
provisions and has to adapt domestic investment-specific and -related laws 
accordingly. In this initial phase, the direction of policy adjustment is clearly 
from international to domestic law, as the core provisions in IIAs can be 
considered as an unchangeable given to which national investment laws have 
to be adjusted. But further intrusion into policy space might diminish after 
this initial phase as the country negotiates additional provisions, nuances, 
variations, clarifications and exceptions in subsequent IIAs to conform to 
the particular demands of negotiating partners. Most countries are today 
in this latter phase, so the question is how these individually negotiated 
outcomes affect policy space. This will depend largely on two aspects: first, 
whether national law forms the basis for adding these additional provisions, 
variations, exceptions etc., or vice versa. Issues such as power differences 
between negotiation partners, negotiation tactics and the dynamics between 
domestic ministries play a likely role in determining such direction of rule-
making. Second, some of these additional provisions, nuances, variations, 
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clarifications and exceptions enhance a country’s policy space whereas 
others limit it further. For example, including exceptions for specific 
industrial sectors, national security, environmental or prudential reasons 
most likely enhance policy space, whereas adding an umbrella clause will 
limit it. In sum, the issue of policy space in the context of international 
investment law and policy is intricately linked with the drafting of national 
laws and regulations on investment. For this reason, we give the issue of 
policy space particular consideration within this study.
The remaining part of this section provides a condensed account of the main 
elements of IIAs, developing conceptually their link to national law. Our 
approach is to infer how the contents of each provision should be reflected 
in national laws and regulations. We do not strive for a detailed account 
of the legal intricacies of international investment law and refer to, among 
others, Dolzer and Schreuer (2008), Newcombe and Paradell (2009) and 
relevant UNCTAD publications (e.g. UNCTAD 2012a) instead. Throughout 
this section, we illustrate the differences between the protection and the 
liberalisation approach of drafting IIAs and their potential impact on host 
countries’ policy space. This difference is important for the following 
detailed case study, as Indonesia has signed IIAs according to both of these 
approaches.
2.3.1 Definitions
The definitions of investment and investor in an IIA allow states to specify 
the coverage of the treaty and to provide for exceptions and exclusions 
when necessary. Traditionally, IIAs negotiated on the basis of the protection 
approach cover any kind of asset in the definition of investment and provide 
an illustrative list of such assets. Due to the broad and open-ended nature of 
this investment definition, much policy space is yielded. IIAs modelled on 
the liberalisation approach adopt a different philosophy, as they provide a 
list specifying the kinds of investments covered by the treaty, thus allowing 
the contracting parties to tailor the treaty coverage to their specific needs, 
excluding those investment categories that they do not want to be covered.
In national law, rules on investment not only consider the situation of foreign 
investors, but also domestic investments and any foreign investments that 
are not covered by IIAs (such as foreign portfolio investments, when these 
are excluded from the definition of investment). Thus, national laws should 
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be broader – or at least equal – in scope with respect to the definitions of 
investment and investor. As a result, the definitions of investment and investor 
in IIAs and national law will differ, but if this difference is merely a result of 
the national rules covering more types of investments and investors, coherence 
in definitions between national and international rules might still be present 
for those foreign investments and investors that are covered by IIAs.
2.3.2 Admission
Most IIAs adopting the protection approach include an admission clause 
stating that investments are admitted in accordance with the host country’s 
laws and regulations. IIAs including an admission clause preserve a host 
country’s claim to regulate the entry of FDI. These treaties entail no market-
access rights of foreign investors and maintain the host countries’ rights 
to pursue autonomous industrial policies in the pre-establishment phase 
of an FDI project, that is, among others, the exclusion of specific sectors, 
screening procedures and equity conditions. Accordingly, absolute and 
relative standards of treatment of FDI are only in force once the investment 
has been admitted by the host-country government. In contrast, IIAs 
following the liberalisation approach include market-access provisions, 
restricting the host countries’ right to choose whether to admit foreign 
investments, which limits a government’s policy space. In other words, 
such pre-establishment provisions also cover potential investments and 
result in open access by foreign investors in the sectors not excluded in the 
treaty’s annexed schedules. The national treatment, MFN and compensation 
for losses clauses of such IIAs thus cover the pre- as well as the post-
establishment phase of an investment. Despite the market-access clauses 
included in these treaties, host states can negotiate the exclusion of sectors 
that they deem to be important in terms of industrial development.
In national law, there are a variety of laws and regulations governing 
admission. These include, in first instance, the approval procedure, but 
they can also regulate the acquisition of land rights or business licences. 
In admitting investments, governments are usually able to maintain broad 
discretion as to the approval requirements they have vis-à-vis foreign 
investments. However, if pre-establishment commitments have been made 
in some IIAs, the resulting limitations to such discretion must be reflected in 
national laws, especially those governing admission and approval.
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2.3.3 Treatment of investors and investments
Fair and equitable treatment (FET) is a concept largely reserved for IIAs. 
It is seen as an important prerequisite for attracting investments, as it 
provides some guarantee that the rule of law and some principles of good 
governance will be adhered to in the host state. An “unqualified” FET 
clause, which is adopted in the large majority of IIAs, gives the highest 
amount of protection to investors. As the FET clause may be understood 
as protecting the “legitimate expectations” of investors, countries may face 
limitations in their ability to alternate policies or implement new policies, 
because any new measures might be interpreted by ISDS tribunals as not 
conforming to those expectations. One possibility adopted in IIAs modelled 
on the liberalisation approach is to qualify the FET standard by referring to 
the minimum standard of treatment under customary international law, or 
even provide more specific clarifications or lists of what is included in the 
standard (UNCTAD 2012a, 51). Through such means, policy space can be 
enhanced by specifying and restricting coverage of the FET standard.
Translating the FET standard into national law is a challenge. For domestic 
law, committing internationally to apply FET to foreign investors means 
that any measure taken that may affect investments should conform to the 
general standard of FET. A large variety of laws and regulations issued by 
all kinds of ministries in many areas of economic policy-making could 
potentially violate the FET standard. Dolzer argues accordingly that the 
FET clause has a particularly deep impact on domestic legislation, “as it 
covers all phases of the investments and extends to all areas of domestic 
law affecting foreign investment” (Dolzer 2005, 964). Unfortunately, as the 
FET standard is quite elusive, it could be difficult for any policy-maker to 
judge whether a new measure is still within the standard and in line with 
the “legitimate expectations” of foreign investors. It is thus not surprising 
that FET is most often used in claims brought against governments in ISDS 
cases.
2.3.4 Non-discrimination
The purpose of provisions on non-discrimination is to provide for equal 
treatment of domestic and foreign investors, that is, national treatment, 
and foreign investors among each other, that is, MFN treatment. Both 
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these provisions have the purpose of providing a level playing field for all 
companies in the host country. They also reduce policy space by minimising 
the government’s ability to legislate in favour of specific companies and 
investors. Granting national treatment to foreign investments and investors, 
for instance, will reduce a government’s ability to protect certain domestic 
infant industries and companies from international competition.
There are possibilities to grant national treatment in IIAs while maintaining 
some degree of policy space. National treatment can be subordinated to 
domestic laws, derogations from national treatment can be allowed or 
national treatment can be excluded from certain policy areas, companies 
(e.g. small and medium-sized enterprises – SMEs), measures or sectors 
(UNCTAD 2012a, 50; APEC / UNCTAD 2011, 29). Indications that the 
pursuit of legitimate public policy objectives might lead to certain forms of 
non-discrimination could be included in an IIA (Spears 2010, 1058–1095). 
Another approach is to confine national treatment to “like” investors or 
“like circumstances”. However, the ultimate discretion on what constitutes 
such “like” investors or circumstances remains with tribunals, which can 
also decide on the extent to which they wish to consider legitimate public 
policy concerns in the context of national treatment (Spears 2010, 1057). It 
is possible to further clarify non-discrimination by adding to an IIA specific 
and detailed language on the nature of non-discrimination, including what 
specifically constitutes “like” investors or circumstances. Policy space is 
highest if national treatment is excluded from an agreement, as it leaves the 
government full discretion in treating domestic investors more favourably 
than foreign investors, and the government can introduce all kinds of 
measures in any sector, even if they are favourable to domestic companies. 
However, specifically for this reason, national treatment is of key importance 
for foreign investors and is considered particularly relevant for economic 
integration.
The MFN clause ensures that foreign investors obtain the best treatment 
that contracting parties grant to investors from third states. As mentioned 
above, the MFN provision leads to a levelling of the playing field for 
foreign investors and to enhanced coherence in international investment 
law-making. Due to the MFN clauses, which are a standard feature of most 
IIAs, it may be the case that IIAs are not discriminative vis-à-vis third 
parties. Schill (2009) argues that MFN clauses lead to a “multilateralization 
of international investment law” that is predominantly developed on the 
basis of bilateral treaties. Through the “multiplying effect” of the MFN 
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clause (Schill 2009), it is argued that foreign investors can import stronger 
treatment standards from other IIAs and can benefit from more-generous 
provisions that the contracting parties negotiated with third countries. 
While a debate is ongoing about whether such “treaty shopping” reflects 
the original intention of states negotiating MFN clauses, this characteristic 
of IIAs, of course, makes it difficult to assess the specific impact of an IIA 
on the host country’s policy space, as the foreign investor, through the MFN 
clause, can rely on the more preferential treatment that the host country 
granted to other foreign investors in other IIAs.
Even though there is less interest for the state to discriminate among 
foreign investors, carve-outs are made in the MFN clause. Almost standard 
is the clause that more-favourable treatment is offered to investors from 
member states of regional economic integration agreements of which the 
host country is also a member. Matters of taxation are typically excluded 
from MFN treatment. In addition, ISDS and other policy areas, sectors and 
enterprises can be excluded from the MFN clause.
Both national treatment and MFN treatment can be granted in the post-
establishment phase only, or in both the pre- and post-establishment phases. 
As mentioned above, the former approach reserves full policy space for the 
pre-establishment phase, whereas the latter approach will maximise market 
access for potential investors, but reduce the government’s policy space to a 
significant degree by granting national and MFN treatment to investments 
even prior to entry and establishment.
National laws have to be in conformity with the principles of national 
treatment and MFN treatment. For national treatment, this means that a 
wide range of laws and regulations – especially laws reflecting a country’s 
industrial policy or protecting certain enterprises, sectors and industries 
– must be in accordance with the rules and exceptions provided in IIAs 
in the pre- and post-establishment phases. More specifically, schedules in 
IIAs granting national treatment in the pre-establishment phase have to be 
in accordance with relevant domestic laws and regulations. The process of 
making sure that such conformity is present and adapting the schedules 
in pre-establishment IIAs accordingly commonly involves substantial 
communication among a wide variety of domestic ministries and agencies. 
The logistics involved in ensuring conformity with the MFN treatment are 
less complex, given that this standard only concerns equal treatment of 
foreign investors.
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2.3.5 Protection of investments
Full protection and security (FPS) is understood to refer to police protection 
and physical security of an investment, but it can go as far as to include 
economic, legal and other kinds of protection. All taken together, the FPS 
standard can inhibit a government to regulate in favour of development 
objectives. Clarifying the scope of this provision further can help retain some 
policy space for the host-country government, for example by specifying 
that FPS means physical security and be linked to customary international 
law (UNCTAD 2012a, 52).
In addition, host states usually offer protection from strife to foreign 
investors. Here again, further specifications of what is covered can be 
helpful in clarifying the liability of the state. The provision is particularly 
broad if national and MFN treatment are granted for determining the level of 
compensation in case of damages, but the level of compensation determined 
should not be seen as impinging to a significant degree on the government’s 
right to regulate.
In national law, protection and security is the responsibility of a country’s 
internal security apparatus and police powers. There may not be much 
legislation targeted at investors in particular, but when investors are 
threatened, it is the responsibility of the host state to protect them. This will 
be reflected in relevant national laws governing activities of the country’s 
security apparatus, including the police and the military. It is important that 
the laws and regulations in this field – and the security forces themselves – 
are strong enough to protect investments in case of security threats.
2.3.6 Expropriation
Probably the historically most important protection element in IIAs to 
investors is the protection against expropriation and nationalisation of 
their investments. Expropriation can be direct and indirect, with indirect 
expropriation referring to the gradual taking of an investment through 
regulatory measures. While outright expropriation is the exception rather 
than the rule today, many claims made in ISDS cases occur on the basis 
of allegations of indirect expropriation. Thus, if the scope of indirect 
expropriation is not further clarified in IIAs, a government may lose 
flexibility in regulating in the public interest because the risk of allegations 
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that such regulations constitute an indirect expropriation is higher. To 
overcome this problem, countries adopting the liberalisation approach in 
their IIAs clarify the scope of indirect expropriation by establishing criteria 
for indirect expropriations and specifying what kinds of measures do or do 
not constitute an indirect expropriation. Rules of compensation are again 
defined in IIAs in case of expropriation, but these should not have significant 
implications for a government’s regulatory policy space.
According to Dolzer, clauses on indirect expropriation have particularly 
strong relevance to domestic legal systems (Dolzer 2005, 957). National 
laws should specify property rights and the conditions under which the 
government is authorised to remove such property rights from the owners. 
In general, these should conform to expropriation provisions in IIAs. As 
measures in a broad variety of policy areas could end up being tantamount 
to an indirect expropriation, governments have to communicate this 
problem among ministries and agencies, ensuring that the issue of indirect 
expropriation is taken into account in drafting all kinds of legislation.
2.3.7 Transfer of funds
The provision on the free transfer of funds is also a core component of most 
IIAs, as it guarantees investors the possibility to transfer funds related to 
their investments – or profits made therefrom – back to the home country or 
to a third destination. IIAs taking the protection approach usually provide for 
the free transfer of most funds in and out of the country. However, countries 
need to take into account that, under certain circumstances, such as when 
balance-of-payment problems or other financial difficulties emerge in the 
financial system, such free transfer of funds could have substantial negative 
effects on macro-economic management (UNCTAD 2012a, 53). Therefore, 
IIAs with the liberalisation approach usually create exceptions for such 
circumstances, which provide the government with enhanced policy space, 
but only in situations where such policy space is needed, and only for a 
temporary duration.
There are various other possibilities to hedge further against such risks 
within an IIA. For example, instead of providing an illustrative list of what 
kinds of funds can be transferred, which is the common approach in IIAs, an 
exhaustive list could be provided. Reference can also be made to a country’s 
domestic laws and regulations; other exceptions, such as the requirement to 
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meet certain obligations in the host country prior to the transfer, could be 
stipulated. In domestic law, one would expect similar provisions in various 
legal documents governing financial matters, both allowing for the free 
transfer of funds and specifying exceptions to this rule when circumstances 
necessitate them.
2.3.8 Entry and sojourn of personnel
Many IIAs make provisions on the entry and sojourn in the host state of foreign 
personnel connected to an investment. Some also have specific provisions 
for senior management. Generally, setting immigration rules that are very 
open to the entry of foreign personnel will be seen by investors in a positive 
light. At the same time, the host state has an interest in enhancing domestic 
employment. For this reason, it is also hoped that foreign investors recruit 
as many domestic workers as possible. There is a general understanding that 
employment can improve the human capital of domestic workers, especially 
if the firms that are employing are from advanced economies. In light of 
these considerations, the state has an interest to retain some policy space on 
the entry and sojourn of personnel so as to balance immigration with local 
employment in a way that development objectives are met.
Domestic immigration laws control the entry and exit of foreigners to and 
from a country. Employment and labour laws specify the conditions on the 
employment of expatriates. These regulations need to be in conformity with 
concessions made on the entry and sojourn of personnel in IIAs.
2.3.9 Dispute settlement
ISDS clauses are a distinctive feature of IIAs. Whereas regional and 
multilateral trade agreements usually only entail state-to-state dispute 
settlement procedures, most IIAs provide for ISDS, enabling the foreign 
investor to sue a host country directly in front of trans-national tribunals. As 
a result, an investor need not rely on its home state’s willingness to defend 
its rights against the host state. ISDS provisions thus make the above-
described substantive provisions enforceable through a de-politicised and 
de-nationalised process of international arbitration.
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Once a case has emerged and an investor is willing to bring a claim to 
international arbitration, what is important for the state – from a development 
perspective – is to limit the damage, which includes financial costs, a loss 
in reputation and negative public perceptions about state actions. The 
state can limit damages through various approaches in IIAs. It can, for 
example, specify the conditions under which claims can be brought before 
international arbitration tribunals, such as by introducing time limitations 
within which an investor has to bring the case to arbitration after the case 
initially emerges, or by excluding some IIA provisions from recourse to 
ISDS. It is also possible to directly limit the amount of compensation that 
will be paid if an investor wins the case. Another issue is to make all of 
the ISDS procedures more transparent, for example by requiring that the 
meetings of the tribunal be open to the public (UNCTAD 2012a, 56–57). 
Finally, there are also possibilities to encourage or require the parties of a 
dispute to resolve their conflict amicably (UNCTAD 2010).
As mentioned, limiting the damages from ISDS is important from a 
development perspective, as the costs of arbitral proceedings and the award 
can be substantial. Governments might find themselves having to use 
valuable public funds to compensate investors rather than using these funds 
to support economic development. If international arbitration cases become 
too frequent and too costly, governments may start finding themselves in a 
situation of “regulatory chill”, in which they avoid drafting new measures 
for public and development purposes due to fear that such action might 
trigger another case. In this way, ISDS provisions in IIAs that are too broad 
might indirectly have a negative effect on policy space.
We might expect the availability of the ISDS option to foreign investors 
to be specified in domestic law. In addition to that, there will be extensive 
rules on domestic litigation that will also be relevant to foreign investors, 
as they might be required to initially seek remedies before domestic courts 
before pursuing international arbitration. Domestic courts and arbitration 
institutions will be involved in dispute settlement. There should be at least 
one agency with the responsibility of defending the state in ISDS cases.
2.3.10  Investment facilitation and promotion
Investment facilitation refers to the encouragement and promotion 
of investments in IIAs. Such provisions on investment promotion are 
Friends or foes?
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 37
usually non-binding in nature. Host states should have full policy space 
on how to promote investments, especially as long as the promotion is 
non-discriminatory and in accordance with other provisions of the IIAs. 
Examples of investment promotion are the organisation of events for 
investment promotion, the establishment of investment promotion agencies 
(IPAs) and the exchange of information on opportunities for investment. 
The establishment of institutions in the context of the IIA that monitor 
the agreement could also be considered as investment promotion. Finally, 
subrogation belongs to this category, since providing for the possibility to 
subrogate a claim helps promote investments.
Although voluntary commitments to promote investments can be included 
in IIAs, as is the case in some ASEAN treaties, what matters is the actual 
promotion activity that happens on the ground. It is primarily domestic laws 
and regulations and national institutions such as IPAs that determine the 
extent of promotion activities. Promotion can happen through agencies, but 
tax and financial incentives are also important in attracting investments. 
And there may be other means by which governments seek to encourage 
investments.
2.3.11  Investor obligations
It is possible to create obligations for investors in IIAs and domestic law, 
even if this practice is not very common beyond taxation and customs duties, 
due to concerns that such obligations could deter investors. “Obligations” 
can include the requirement of an investor to comply with the host country’s 
laws and regulations in order to be covered by the treaty. Investors can also 
be required to comply with international standards in a variety of areas and 
with corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards (UNCTAD 2012a, 58). 
Such obligations could help ensure that the activities of foreign enterprises 
are indeed conducive to economic development.
Technically speaking, investor obligations include taxation measures 
and customs duties. These are primarily governed in domestic laws and 
regulations, though many countries have concluded double taxation treaties. 
With various exceptions on taxation that typically exist in IIAs, countries 
tend to maintain considerable policy space in this area.
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Finally, there is the possibility to not include provisions that commit to the 
abolishment of investor obligations, which are often found in IIAs following 
the liberalisation approach. The provisions on performance requirements 
usually require states to get rid of local content, export and technology-
transfer requirements, and other investor obligations. Performance 
requirements, if existent, are further specified in relevant domestic laws 
and regulations. Not including provisions on performance requirements 
enhances policy space for the state, allowing it to maintain some of the 
performance requirements that can be important for economic development.
2.3.12  Scope and exceptions
There are several ways of further defining – and possibly limiting – the 
scope of a treaty. One possibility is to fix the temporal scope of the treaty by 
specifying the timeframe within which investments have to be made to be 
covered by the treaty, usually limiting coverage to investments made after 
entry into force of the agreement and up to several years after termination 
of the treaty. However, this approach is discriminatory without a significant 
reason. A more interesting approach is to exclude investment claims 
resulting from measures initiated or investments made before entry into 
force of the agreement. There may not be any need to replicate this issue in 
national laws and regulations.
More policy space can be attained through the introduction of general 
exceptions. General exceptions can be made with a variety of issues in mind: 
national security; economic security; the protection of the environment; 
public policy areas such as health, public morals, culture and human rights; 
financial crises etc. It is important to avoid the overuse of these exceptions, 
which can be done by stating that relevant measures will only be introduced 
in exceptional circumstances (UNCTAD 2012a). Some possible exceptions 
were already introduced in the relevant sections above, such as exceptions 
for situations where there is a crisis with the balance of payments or 
exceptions for taxation measures. Another typical area is national security, 
where exceptions can be self-judging – enabling the state to decide in which 
circumstances the national security exception should be invoked – and non-
self-judging, indicating that, ultimately, tribunals may decide on this issue 
(UNCTAD 2009).
Friends or foes?
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 39
Finally, there is the possibility to maintain certain reservations for specific 
measures, policy areas, industrial sectors or types of companies. Some 
sectors may be closed or only partially open to foreign investors, either for 
national security grounds – especially when these industries are strategic 
(e.g. telecommunications, banking, natural resources) – or because of 
development considerations (e.g. when certain industries are to be protected 
from too much international competition, or when it is hoped that capability-
improving cooperation by domestic firms with foreign investors is enhanced 
by partially limiting foreign entry). Some types of companies, such as SMEs 
or state-owned enterprises (SOEs), may receive some protection from the 
government of the host state for development or strategic purposes. There 
is also the possibility to limit the treaty’s application to only certain sectors, 
but this is not a very common approach, as IIAs tend to apply to all kinds 
of investments.
Such scheduling of sectors or protection of domestic enterprises should 
follow a clear development objective and should not inhibit foreign 
investments in a way that the gains made for development from limiting 
foreign investments become questionable. If properly and transparently 
conducted – with objectives of such scheduling clearly stated – the host-
country government can enhance its policy space to take measures 
favourable to certain reserved sectors or enterprises, which could make an 
overall development contribution to the national economy.
In national law, most reservations and exceptions need to be included in 
a negative list that specifies the activities and industrial sectors where 
reservations are maintained and explains any limitations in equity ownership. 
This list should be in conformity with the schedule attached to IIAs with 
pre-establishment provisions. Alternatively, providing a positive list is also 
an option.
3 Indonesia’s investment policy
In order to effectively understand how international rules and domestic 
regulations on investment interact, it is necessary to venture beyond the 
analysis of IIAs alone – as is generally the case in the literature at hand – and 
examine in detail how countries deal with this interaction. In this study, we 
conduct an in-depth examination of the investment laws of a single country, 
with the objective of understanding how international commitments on 
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investment are linked to national laws and regulations. We chose Indonesia 
as a case study for the following reasons. First of all, Indonesia has 
concluded a large number of IIAs – more than 50 bilateral treaties with 
advanced, developing and emerging economies, including Japan, Germany 
and the United Kingdom, as well as several regional treaties in the context 
of its membership in ASEAN. These regional treaties include the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) as well as trade agreements 
between ASEAN and China, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand 
that include provisions on investment. Secondly, Indonesia has received 
substantial amounts of FDI from many of its treaty partners. It is Indonesian 
policy that FDI should play a key role in its economic development. 
Thirdly, Indonesia’s status as a lower-middle-income country ensures that 
our analysis is relevant to issues of economic development. The study of 
Indonesia allows us to consider how the interaction of its international and 
national investment policies relates to its economic development progress. 
As mentioned, examining how investment rules and regulations affect policy 
space and economic development is a broader motivation for conducting 
this study.
The fact that Indonesia underwent ambitious economic reforms in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis also provides a unique opportunity 
to examine how a country reforms its economic policy towards greater 
openness while at the same time preserving policy flexibility. Since the 
crisis in 1998, and in line with the introduction of democratic institutions, an 
unprecedented number of laws have been introduced in Indonesia, including 
new laws on investment matters. In addition, several new institutions have 
been established (OECD 2010, 27–28). Liberalisation means giving up 
policy space; other countries in the region, most notably China, Japan, 
South Korea and some of the “Asian Tigers”, have – in the process of their 
economic development – taken a more cautious approach than Indonesia 
towards the issue of liberalisation. For an Indonesia that has already opened 
up to ASEAN countries and has far-reaching commitments with other 
countries in the region, including Japan, China, Australia and New Zealand, 
it is useful to consider how such decisions impact its domestic regulatory 
apparatus and policy space.
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3.1 Indonesia’s economic context and foreign investment
Indonesia is a developing country with strong economic fundamentals. The 
country’s economic future looks bright, even while the global economy is 
facing crisis and recession. As shown in Figure 4, growth in gross domestic 
product (GDP) reached a record 6.5 per cent in 2011. This growth is mainly 
attributed to strong domestic demand – especially private consumption – 
and investment. Inflation has been kept at reasonable levels, with consumer 
price inflation at 4.28 per cent in 2012 (Asian Development Bank 2013a). 
According to Figure 4, GDP growth slowed to 5.7 per cent in 2013, but 
slightly higher growth is expected in 2014 (Asian Development Bank 
2013b). Indonesia’s balance of payments tends towards the positive, even 
though recent months have shown a reversal towards a trade deficit, blamed 
on lowered demand for commodities in the world market. Indonesia has a 
fairly strong surplus in its capital and financial accounts from enhanced 
inflows of FDI and portfolio investments. The country’s foreign exchange 
Figure 4: GDP growth in Indonesia, 2005–2014 (%) 
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reserves are sufficient, having reached US$ 112.8 billion by 2012 (Indonesia 
Investments 2013b). There have also been strong efforts towards a prudent 
fiscal policy. The government debt-to-GDP ratio has been in continuous 
decline over the last decade, and was as low as 23.1 per cent in 2012, 
with a government deficit of only 1.3 per cent of GDP in 2011 (Trading 
Economies 2013). The banking system is stable, with the capital adequacy 
ratio at 17.9 per cent and gross non-performing loans at 2.1 per cent in 2012 
(World Bank 2013; Investors Relations Unit of the Republic of Indonesia 
2012). Based on these strong economic fundamentals, Indonesia has been 
projected to be among the top global economies in a few decades from now 
(Drysdale 2012).
Such a positive economic environment should attract substantial amounts 
of foreign investment to the country, and there are several other aspects 
that make the country attractive for investments. For example, Indonesia 
is abundant in natural resources and has a large potential market of some 
240 million consumers, many of whom are now becoming a part of an 
emerging middle class. This should induce both resource- and market-
seeking FDI, respectively. In addition, wages in Indonesia are particularly 
low (The President Post 2012), as Indonesia is currently benefiting from 
a demographic dividend, which could induce efficiency-seeking FDI if 
productivity per worker were enhanced. Indonesia’s economy and business 
climate have recently received more positive rankings than in the past. For 
example, various credit-rating agencies have improved their ratings for 
Indonesia, and Indonesia has also improved in the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Index, from rank 54 in 2009/2010 to 44 and 46 
in 2010/2011 and 2011/2012, respectively (World Economic Forum 2011, 
206). But in 2012/2013 Indonesia was again downgraded to rank 50 (World 
Economic Forum 2012, 13). Indonesia ranked 9th in A.T. Kearney’s 2012 
FDI Confidence Index, a significant upward move from the 19th rank it had 
occupied just two years earlier (A.T. Kearney 2012, 2). However, Indonesia 
occupied just the 24th rank in A.T. Kearney’s 2013 FDI Confidence Index 
(A.T. Kearney 2013, 3).
Thus, as the recent downgradings also show, there is still much room 
for improvement, with several important factors posing a disincentive 
to investment. These include very poor infrastructure, a lack of human 
capital and a weak legal system (Drysdale 2012). Bureaucracy and flagrant 
corruption are additional problems (World Economic Forum 2011, 207; 
Jakarta Globe 2012). One may also see the large number of SOEs, especially 
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in mining and energy sectors, as a factor that diminishes the attractiveness of 
Indonesia’s economy. Poverty and large-scale inequality are further problems 
that Indonesia will need to address. But the most recent downgradings are 
probably best explained by concerns about recent policy developments that 
complicate foreign investment in some sectors of the Indonesian economy, 
as discussed in greater depth in section 3.5 of this study. 
Statistics show that investors are ridding themselves of the caution that had 
prevailed for many years concerning Indonesia as an investment destination, 
due in part to an unfavourable investment climate (Suryo 2012). As shown 
in Figure 5, FDI in Indonesia was a mere US$ 6 billion in 2006, but it had 
more than doubled to US$ 14.9 billion by 2008 and more than quadrupled 
to US$ 25 billion in 2012 (Indonesia Investments 2013a). In addition to 
the aforementioned improvements to Indonesia’s economy, reforms to the 
investment legal system, discussed in further detail below, could be seen as 
being responsible for the increase in FDI since 2007.
Figure 5:  Realised foreign and domestic direct investment in Indonesia 
(US$ billion)
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However, Indonesia still lags behind many other Asian countries in terms of 
the amount of FDI it receives. For example, Indonesia received only 2 per cent 
of FDI flows from the European Union to Asia in the period between 2004 
and 2010, whereas other ASEAN economies received 26 per cent (Eurocham 
2012c, 9). According to Table 1, Indonesia still receives quite low amounts 
of FDI compared to its counterparts in ASEAN. This seems to indicate that 
Indonesia – the largest country in South East Asia – is not playing out its full 
potential and that there is much room for FDI flows to increase in future years.
Table 1: FDI inflows into ASEAN countries in 2011, % of GDP
Country % of GDP
Singapore 25.1
Brunei Darussalam  7.4
Cambodia  6.9
Vietnam  6.2
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.  5.8
Malaysia  4.3
Thailand  2.8
Indonesia  2.2
Myanmar  1.6
Philippines  0.6
Source: UNCTAD database
Table 2 shows the most important home countries of foreign investments in 
Indonesia. Apart from Singapore – which is in a special situation as an offshore 
financial centre – FDI in 2011 originated primarily from Japan, the Netherlands 
and the United States. Current FDI in Indonesia targets a variety of economic 
sectors, with the manufacturing, mining and transport sectors dominating 
in 2011 (KPMG 2013, 25). Large businesses tend to be more prominent as 
foreign investors in Indonesia, especially compared to foreign SMEs.10
10 According to the accounts of two experts.
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Table 2: FDI in Indonesia by home country in 2011
Country Investment value (US$ million)
Singapore 5,123
Japan 1,516
Netherlands 1,354
United States 1,488
South Korea 1,219
Malaysia 618
British Virgin Islands 517
United Kingdom 419
Taiwan 243
Germany 158
Hong Kong (SAR) 135
France 134
People’s Republic of China 128
Australia 90
Seychelles 80
Mauritius 73
Luxembourg 48
India 42
Switzerland 9
United Arab Emirates 7
Other countries 6,073
Total 19,475
Source: KPMG (2013, 25)
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There seems to be an overall agreement in Indonesia that foreign investment 
is beneficial for the country and important as a contributor to Indonesian 
economic development.11 This is reflected in government policy, which 
envisages growth of investment – especially private investment – as a 
potentially significant component of further GDP growth, next to export 
growth and in parallel with a diminishing role of consumption. The need 
for foreign financing is recognised as necessary, with FDI likely to make 
a more valuable development contribution than portfolio investments.12 
As Figure 5 illustrates, FDI has been much higher than domestic direct 
investment (DDI) in recent years, suggesting that attracting investment from 
abroad will be key to Indonesia’s economic progress. Thus, FDI is sought, 
encouraged and promoted with much intensity and some success, but amid 
fierce competition for investments with other regional economic players 
such as Malaysia and Thailand. As is discussed in further detail below, 
particular focus has recently been on encouraging and promoting FDI in 
infrastructure projects to address one of Indonesia’s main bottlenecks, that 
is, the need for more roads, railways, airports, bridges and energy supply in 
order to generate further economic growth.
Solid economic fundamentals, abundant natural resources and a large 
market should in themselves be sufficient attractions to foreign investors, 
possibly minimising the overall importance of a conducive legal or policy 
environment. In other words, Indonesia might be able to afford more 
policy space without deterring investments compared to other countries. 
At the moment, however, investors and other foreign stakeholders are still 
concerned about the overall policy environment and continue to demand 
improvements in Indonesia’s policy and regulatory environment despite 
favourable macro-economic conditions (Eurocham 2012b). Indonesia will 
have to find the right approach to attracting investments while pursuing an 
investment policy that is in line with the country’s economic development 
objectives.
11 Many of the experts consulted for this study confirmed this point of view. 
12 According to the comments of two experts.
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3.2 Indonesian international investment policy
Indonesia is an active participant in international treaty-making. It is a 
member of the WTO, an important member of ASEAN and an active 
participant in the non-binding liberalisation processes under the auspices of 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Indonesia recently pushed 
for further regional cooperation at the APEC summit in Bali in October 
2013. In addition, Indonesia is active in concluding a variety of free trade 
agreements (FTAs), some including investment provisions, and several 
other investment agreements at the bilateral level. There are also many 
double taxation treaties that have been concluded between Indonesia and 
other countries. Indonesia is a proud member of the G20, which has recently 
made significant efforts to prevent a backlash towards protectionism in trade 
and investment after the Anglo-American financial crisis of 2008.
3.2.1 Indonesian IIAs
Since the 1960s, Indonesia has been active in concluding various types 
of IIAs. As shown in Table 3, Indonesia has concluded and ratified BITs 
with more than 50 countries or economies, has an Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) with Japan and has concluded four agreements with 
investment chapters in the context of its ASEAN membership. Indonesia’s 
trajectory of concluding IIAs can roughly be divided into three generations, 
in line with Indonesia’s history of economic policy-making, and especially 
the progress in liberalising and opening-up the economy.
Table 3: IIAs ratified by Indonesia
Country or region Type of agreement Year of 
conclusion
Year of 
entry into 
force
3rd GENERATION – “Regionalisation” 
Agreement 
Establishing the 
ASEAN-Australia-
New Zealand 
Free Trade Area 
(AANZFTA)
PTIA, Chapter 11 2009 2010
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Table 3  (cont.): IIAs ratified by Indonesia
Country or region Type of agreement Year of 
conclusion
Year of 
entry into 
force
Agreement on 
Investment of 
the Framework 
Agreement on 
Comprehensive 
Economic 
Cooperation Between 
the People’s Republic 
of China and ASEAN
PTIA 2009 2010
ASEAN 
Comprehensive 
Investment 
Agreement (ACIA)
PTIA, developed 
from the ASEAN 
Investment Area 
(AIA) of 1998 
and the ASEAN 
Investment 
Guarantee 
Agreement 1987
2009 2012
Agreement on 
Investment under 
the Framework 
Agreement on 
Comprehensive 
Economic 
Cooperation among 
the Governments 
of the Member 
Countries of ASEAN 
and the Republic of 
Korea
PTIA 2009 2009
Guyana BIT 2008 --
Japan Economic 
Partnership 
Agreement (EPA), 
Chapter 5
2007 2008
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Table 3  (cont.): IIAs ratified by Indonesia
Country or region Type of agreement Year of 
conclusion
Year of 
entry into 
force
Russia BIT 2007 --
Finland BIT 2006 2008
Iran BIT 2005 2009
Singapore BIT 2005 2006
Bulgaria BIT 2003 2005
Germany BIT 2003 2007
Saudi Arabia BIT 2003 2004
Tajikistan BIT 2003 --
2nd GENERATION – “High tide”
Croatia BIT 2002 --
Philippines BIT 2001 --
Venezuela BIT 2000 2003
Algeria BIT 2000 --
Korea DPR BIT 2000 --
Qatar BIT 2000 --
India BIT 1999 2004
Mozambique BIT 1999 2000
Cambodia BIT 1999 --
Chile BIT 1999 --
Jamaica BIT 1999 --
Zimbabwe BIT 1999 --
Bangladesh BIT 1998 1999
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Table 3  (cont.): IIAs ratified by Indonesia
Country or region Type of agreement Year of 
conclusion
Year of 
entry into 
force
Czech Republic BIT 1998 1999
Thailand BIT 1998 1998
Sudan BIT 1998 --
Yemen BIT 1998 --
Cuba BIT 1997 1999
Mauritius BIT 1997 2000
Mongolia BIT 1997 1999
Morocco BIT 1997 2002
Romania BIT 1997 1999
Syria BIT 1997 2000
Turkey BIT 1997 1998
Jordan BIT 1996 1999
Pakistan BIT 1996 1996
Sri Lanka BIT 1996 1997
Ukraine BIT 1996 1997
United States Trade and 
Investment 
Framework 
Agreement (TIFA)
1996 1996
Uzbekistan BIT 1996 1997
Argentina BIT 1995 2001
Kyrgyzstan BIT 1995 1997
Spain BIT 1995 1997
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Table 3  (cont.): IIAs ratified by Indonesia
Country or region Type of agreement Year of 
conclusion
Year of 
entry into 
force
Suriname BIT 1995 --
China BIT 1994 1995
Egypt BIT 1994 1994
Laos BIT 1994 1995
Malaysia BIT 1994 1999
Netherlands BIT 1994 1995
Slovakia BIT 1994 1995
Turkmenistan BIT 1994 --
Australia BIT 1992 1993
Hungary BIT 1992 1996
Poland BIT 1992 1993
Sweden BIT 1992 1993
Tunisia BIT 1992 1992
Italy BIT 1991 1995
Korea, Republic of BIT 1991 1994
Norway BIT 1991 1994
Vietnam BIT 1991 1994
Japan BIT n.a.
Libya BIT n.a.
United Arab Emirates BIT n.a.
1st GENERATION – “Exploration”
United Kingdom BIT 1976 1977
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Table 3  (cont.): IIAs ratified by Indonesia
Country or region Type of agreement Year of 
conclusion
Year of 
entry into 
force
Switzerland BIT 1974 1976
France BIT 1973 1975
Belgium (and 
Luxembourg)
BIT 1970 1972
Denmark BIT 1968 1968
Germany BIT 1968 1971
Sources: UNCTAD country-specific lists of bilateral investment treaties – 
Indonesia; ICSID database of bilateral investment treaties; Embassy 
of the Republic of Indonesia in London – United Kingdom investment 
guide (http://www.indonesianembassy.org.uk/invest_guide_2-E.htm)
The first generation coincided with the beginnings of the Suharto era and 
the introduction of Indonesia’s first national investment-specific laws in 
1967 and 1968 for foreign and domestic investors, respectively. Following 
the introduction of these laws, about half a dozen BITs were concluded with 
some European industrialised countries such as Denmark, France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These BITs 
followed the typical brief format of most BITs concluded at that time – in 
line with the protection approach – and included provisions such as FET, 
MFN, expropriation, transfer of funds and in some cases national treatment. 
This period in Indonesia’s BIT programme could be characterised as 
“explorative”, because only very few BITs were concluded, and these BITs 
exhibited some variations in content and scope. What followed was a long 
period without the conclusion of any further BITs.
The second generation could be considered as the “high tide” of Indonesia’s 
BIT programme and coincided with a move in Indonesia towards further 
opening up. It began in the early 1990s and saw the conclusion of most of 
Indonesia’s BITs within a decade – a development that is in line with the 
global diffusion of BITs, as described in section 2.1. Because Indonesia 
negotiated on the basis of a model text, these BITs are fairly consistent in 
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structure, scope and content. With regard to the overall contents, these BITs 
followed the protection approach. In contrast to BITs of the first generation, 
probably the most striking feature of the 1990s BIT programme was that 
most BITs did not provide foreign investors with national treatment. The 
Asian financial crisis fell within this period of expansion of Indonesia’s 
BIT programme and hit Indonesia most severely of all countries, leading 
to large-scale outflows of capital. Although some BITs were still concluded 
at the turn of the century, the fast-paced negotiation of treaties that was so 
characteristic in the 1990s came to a halt a few years after the crisis.
Probably the most significant change in Indonesia’s international 
investment policy occurred together with the shifts in domestic politics 
that followed the crisis, triggered by the downfall of the Suharto 
government and by the requirements for economic and financial reforms 
imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a condition for its 
financial assistance. With the democrasi movement that culminated in 
the establishment of a democratic system of government came a series of 
far-reaching reforms of all parts of the economic system. This period of 
reformasi also led to a reconsideration of the country’s investment regime. 
In addition, rapid economic shifts in East and South East Asia also played 
a role. With China as an emerging economic power in the north, ASEAN 
countries were moving closer together, contemplating and signing a series 
of treaties for closer economic cooperation and liberalisation. ASEAN 
member states are working on the establishment of an ASEAN Economic 
Community by 2015, with the objective of developing a single market with 
free flow of trade, services and investment, together with considerations 
of equitable economic development and further integration into the global 
economy.13
Economic and political developments in Asia thus became the driving force 
behind Indonesia’s investment policy, which increasingly focused on the 
regional level. By the mid-2000s, Indonesia and Japan were in discussions 
about concluding an EPA with commitments on investment that were much 
more far-reaching than those found in previous Indonesian BITs. These 
discussions with Japan coincided with preparations for a new domestic 
law on investment to replace the laws of 1967 and 1968. Both the EPA 
and Law No. 25 concerning Investment (foreign and domestic combined) 
13 See ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint; online: http://www.asean.org/archive/ 
5187-10.pdf (accessed 05 Apr. 2013). 
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were finalised in 2007. By 2009, the member countries of ASEAN had also 
succeeded in concluding the ACIA, which entered into force on 29 March 
2012.14 Meanwhile, ASEAN has concluded FTAs with investment provisions 
with Australia and New Zealand, China and the Republic of Korea, which 
are implemented progressively. Except for the treaty with China, which only 
includes protection and promotion provisions (see Berger 2013, 22–24), the 
agreements signed under the umbrella of ASEAN offer pre-establishment 
rights and include far-reaching commitments on a variety of other issues, as 
is common in the liberalisation approach. ASEAN is currently planning and 
negotiating agreements with additional countries.15
This last phase also saw a modest continuation of Indonesia’s BIT 
programme, involving negotiations and renegotiation of about half a dozen 
BITs. Since the EPA with Japan – and in accordance with the general 
political trend – commitments made in these BITs were often wider than 
those found in BITs of the 1990s, going beyond protection and promotion 
and including provisions on national treatment. With accelerating trends 
in Indonesia towards liberalisation – including the granting of national 
treatment in the post- as well as the pre-establishment phase – the first- and 
second-generation BITs signed before 2000 increasingly appear outdated. 
As a result, a review of its BIT programme could become an important 
item on Indonesia’s future investment policy agenda. There is a general 
move towards more comprehensive economic cooperation agreements, 
also at the bilateral level. For example, negotiations with the European Free 
Trade Association for an EPA are under way,16 and there are discussions 
about a possible Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with 
the European Union.17 Such bilateral arrangements stand in competition to 
efforts made under the umbrella of ASEAN to conclude further agreements 
with other countries or regions, such as the European Union. 
There is a high degree of coherence between Indonesia’s model BIT 
and many of Indonesia’s BITs from the 1990s. Some divergences from 
14 See http://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2013/04/12/introduction-to-the-asean-
comprehensive-investment-agreement.html (accessed 05 June 2013). 
15 According to the accounts of three experts.
16 See http://www.efta.int/about-efta.aspx (accessed 10 Sept. 12).
17  Delegation of the European Union to Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam and ASEAN; online: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/indonesia/eu_indonesia/trade_relation/cepa/index_
en.htm (accessed 07 Nov. 2013).
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the model BIT within the 1990s treaties might be a result of individual 
negotiations, especially with industrialised countries. Although no new 
model BIT has been formulated, the old Indonesian model BIT can still 
serve as a background document in negotiations today.18 Hence, there is 
little evidence that Indonesia approaches individual countries differently 
when negotiating IIAs, except for possible differences in negotiating 
market access for specific sectors and services industries BITs are indeed 
concluded for political, economic and diplomatic reasons. Even today, 
the strengthening of diplomatic ties might form a rationale to conclude 
a BIT.19
International negotiations are usually conducted by the appropriate ministry 
responsible for the economic issues under negotiation, whilst involving 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries with a stake in the 
issues being negotiated.20 The Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board 
(BKPM) took over responsibility for negotiating BITs and the chapters on 
investment in ASEAN agreements in 2005.21 Within the BKPM, there is 
an institutional separation between those negotiating bilateral agreements 
and those working on matters of regional cooperation, which includes the 
ASEAN agreements.
Inter-ministerial consultations and coordination inform any negotiation 
process, as is elaborated in section 3.6 in greater detail. These internal 
consultations can be quite complex. There are scheduled meetings where 
opinions are sought from relevant ministries, such as the Ministry of Trade 
and the Bank of Indonesia, on draft texts and the matters being negotiated. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be involved in such inter-ministerial 
deliberations, directly or through an advisory role, helping to facilitate 
agreement. Furthermore, the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs is a 
key actor in dealings with ASEAN.22 In ASEAN negotiations on investment, 
policy agreement among various government agencies is a prerequisite for 
international negotiations to move forward. Overall, while the negotiator 
18 As suggested by one expert.
19 According to the accounts of two experts.
20 This description reflects the accounts of several experts. 
21 According to one expert.
22 This description of the consultation process reflects comments from several experts. 
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will have some discretion during the negotiation procedures, the ultimate 
policy authority is shared by various government agencies.23
To complicate matters, the process of concluding ASEAN agreements 
with outside countries is equally complex, given the need to accommodate 
the varying interests of 10 member states. A caucus among all members 
to develop a joint position is required before negotiations with external 
countries move forward. A schedule of commitments is used to incorporate 
national interests, although all member states have to implement and 
ratify the commitments within a specified timeframe.24 There are also 
occasional footnotes to the agreements to take account of country-specific 
idiosyncrasies or exceptions. But despite taking account of some national 
idiosyncrasies, negotiations under a multilateral framework such as ASEAN 
must necessarily require compromises at the international level that could 
spill over into national law.
This experience with ASEAN hence suggests that national laws are 
occasionally adapted in response to international commitments. Nevertheless, 
when proposals are made by other negotiating parties, conformity with 
domestic laws and regulations has to be ensured before agreeing to any 
particular text,25 implying that national laws inform the conclusion of 
international treaties. In Indonesia, for most international treaties to be 
ratified into domestic law, parliamentary approval is normally required,26 
and so the views of parliament are often sought during negotiations. Law 
No. 24/2000 on International Treaties provides more detail on the required 
procedures. In sum, it is probably safe to argue that Indonesian national laws 
and international commitments influence each other, though little evidence 
exists on the significance or magnitude of these kinds of effects.
Since the more far-reaching agreements following the liberalisation 
approach have all been ratified only recently, there is no experience yet 
regarding their impact. What is certain is that Indonesia’s recent shift in 
international investment policy will have an impact on its policy space. On 
the one hand, the enhanced commitments and market-access provisions 
23 According to one expert.
24 According to one expert. Extensions are possible.
25 According to one expert.
26 See http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Country-Report-Indonesia.pdf 
(accessed 05 Apr. 2013). 
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granted in these treaties will limit policy space in the pre-establishment 
phase. But on the other hand, many of these newer treaties include a wider 
range of clarifications, exceptions, specifications and definitions, which 
may help maintain or enhance policy space in the post-establishment 
phase. Unfortunately, this dichotomy makes it difficult to draw any final 
conclusions on this issue.
Similarly, empirical research remains inconclusive about how important 
international commitments on investment are in attracting FDI.27 It is 
plausible that, before making an investment decision, investors will verify 
whether a suitable IIA exists, but they are unlikely to thoroughly consider 
all the legal details in those agreements. They will pay much more attention 
to market factors and business interests. In addition, investors are likely 
to focus more strongly on the state of local laws and regulations, as these 
are the legal rules they will have to deal with on a daily basis. The degree 
to which these laws are enforced and whether the rule of law prevails in 
day-to-day business practice will matter to investors. This finding – that 
the detailed legal provisions of IIAs are less important to investors – may 
endow Indonesia with more flexibility in formulating the content of IIAs 
than previously thought. At the same time, particular scrutiny and care is 
required when drafting national law, as investors will review these laws and 
make decisions based on them. This kind of behaviour that investors seem 
to exhibit could be considered when future IIAs and national laws are being 
drafted.
3.2.2 Investor-state dispute settlement in Indonesia
When a country enacts measures or implements laws and regulations that 
are too far-reaching and do not match the commitments made in IIAs, 
there is a risk that investors may sue governments through international 
arbitration. In the context of Indonesia’s evolving network of IIAs, the few 
known ISDS cases it has encountered provide a curious picture. According 
to Table 4, two cases and a third consolidated case against Indonesia have 
27 See e.g. Yackee (2008; 2010) and Berger et al. (2011; 2013).
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been filed at the ICSID alleging a breach of an IIA.28 The consolidated case 
and a second case were filed within the last two years, but alleging a breach 
of one of Indonesia’s oldest BITs, namely the Indonesia-UK BIT of 1976. 
Both cases involved sectors that are in the spotlight of Indonesia’s economic 
policy towards foreign investment, namely mining and banking. Regarding 
the case in the banking sector, an award was rendered in mid-2013, whereas 
28 The oldest case brought against Indonesia at ICSID (Amco Asia Corporation and others 
v. Republic of Indonesia) did not result from an IIA, but from the breach of a lease and 
management agreement that provided for recourse to arbitration in case of a dispute. As 
individual agreements of the government with investors fall outside the scope of this 
study, there is no need to consider this case in further detail here.
Table 4: ICSID cases faced by Indonesia
Registra-
tion
Investor Treaty ICSID case 
no.
Subject 
matter
Outcome
June 2012, 
December 
2012
Churchill 
Mining 
and Planet 
Mining Pty 
Ltd
UK-Indone-
sia BIT of 
1976
ARB/12/14 
and 12/40
East Kutai 
coal mining 
project
Pending 
May 2011 Rafat Ali 
Rizvi
UK-Indone-
sia BIT of 
1976
ARB/11/13 Banking 
enterprise
Award ren-
dered on 16 
July 2013
January 
2004
Cemex 
Asia 
Holdings 
Ltd (Sin-
gapore/
Mexico)
1987 ASE-
AN Agree-
ment for the 
Promotion 
and Pro-
tection of 
Investments
ARB/04/3 Cement 
production 
enterprise
Settlement 
in the form 
of an award 
in 2007
February 
1981
Amco Asia 
Corpora-
tion and 
others
Lease and 
Manage-
ment Agree-
ment
ARB/81/1 Construc-
tion and 
operation of 
a hotel
Award in 
1990 after 
one annul-
ment
Source: ICSID website; Lamberti (2012); UNCTAD ISDS database;  
Vohryzek-Griest (2009)
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the other consolidated case in the mining sector is still pending. The third 
case was filed in 2004, alleging a breach of one of the ACIA’s predecessors 
from 1987. This case was terminated by settlement between the parties.29 
Disputes in Indonesia are handled by the Ministry of Law and Human 
Rights, and the relevant local government might also be involved.
This very recent surge of cases brought against Indonesia at ICSID puts 
Indonesia under pressure to ensure that its international commitments 
made under IIAs indeed conform to measures and laws being implemented 
domestically. It also shows that not only must the new agreements following 
the liberalisation approach and providing more balanced post-establishment 
rules be taken into account, but also the very old BITs following the 
protection approach that might have evaded equal consideration by current 
policy-makers. Most of these agreements are still in force and may be used by 
foreign investors to sue Indonesia. Furthermore, the MFN clause, which is a 
common feature – also of the new, more balanced agreements – might allow 
investors to “import” more-favourable rules included in older, potentially 
far-reaching treaties.30 As mentioned, Indonesia’s first agreements were at 
times more extensive in scope and content than BITs of the 1990s.
Moreover, as the number of IIAs continues to increase, so does the likelihood 
that claims will be filed against Indonesia. Although renegotiations do 
not appear much on Indonesia’s current policy agenda, an accumulation 
of disputes or a significant case could spark a round of renegotiations.31 
Both the fact that Indonesia has multilateral and bilateral agreements in 
parallel, and that the history of IIAs in Indonesia went through three distinct 
generations, is increasing the level of inconsistency between agreements, 
which further complicates policy-making on investment. The interaction of 
these very different IIAs between themselves and with national legislation 
thus determines, to some extent, the level of available policy space and the 
degree to which Indonesia may become exposed to international arbitration.
29 Other cases that illustrate Indonesia’s problematic experiences with international 
arbitration are Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan 
Gas Bumi Negara, or in short “Karaha Bodas v. Pertamina” (Rubins 2005) and CalEnergy 
v. PLN (Harianto 2012). There was some government involvement in both of these mining 
and energy cases. Mining is a sector where any future disputes are likely to emerge, given 
the existence of controversial rules, such as those determining divestment of ownership. 
30 On the importance of MFN clauses, see Schill (2009).
31 As was speculated by two experts.
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3.3 Indonesian national investment policy
Over the last decade, there has been a major shift in investment policy 
in Indonesia. This shift coincided with democratisation and the overall 
political and economic reform efforts that were undertaken after the Asian 
financial crisis. Hardly any areas of economic policy were left untouched, 
and an array of new laws and regulations emerged during this period. 
Overall, Indonesia is in favour of portraying itself as an exceptionally liberal 
developing country, especially compared to other regional players such as 
China, with its restrictions on capital account transactions and entrenched 
industrial policies; Japan, with its history of protectionist policies initiated 
by its Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; and Korea, with its own 
history of limitations on foreign investment. It is not clear whether the initial 
shift towards liberalisation was conscious or accidental, though the latter is 
not unlikely, given a certain loss of control after the Asian financial crisis due 
to reductions in presidential powers, the decentralisation of governance, and 
less central coordination and monitoring of ministries. The overall policy 
direction has remained, until today, tilted towards greater liberalisation. 
There is also no turning back, now that Indonesia is locked into the ASEAN 
integration process.32
Nevertheless, there exists a wide range of views within Indonesia’s diverse 
population on the role that the government should have in economic policy-
making and towards liberalisation of trade and investment. Differences 
in views exist within the government and among its ministries, between 
various stakeholders and scholars, and within Indonesia’s increasingly vocal 
civil society. For example, some are hoping for Indonesia to formulate a 
more elaborate industrial policy with a certain level of protection for 
specific industries, and with a cautious approach towards concluding further 
FTAs and creating a very open regime for foreign investment. Others, 
including most international stakeholders, see a successful economic 
future for Indonesia only in an intensification of efforts towards further 
liberalisation and economic integration. These stakeholders still see lots of 
areas where liberalisation is insufficient. While unpopular adjustments to 
regulations might be required in the short run in order to open up markets, 
to accommodate free trade and to increase transparency and competition, 
32 This description of Indonesian economic policy was derived from discussions with 
several experts in Indonesia. 
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proponents of this view would argue that in the long run, all stakeholders 
and communities will benefit. ASEAN is seen as a critical player in this 
process, with prosperity in Indonesia strongly tied to the success of ASEAN 
integration.33 Arguably, this entire issue is a subset of a more general and 
very typical ideological debate that goes beyond the scope of this paper. But 
it is pertinent to note that this is a subject of major debate within Indonesia, 
and that contemporary decisions on Indonesia’s international and national 
investment policies are set against this background of competing pressures 
on government. As a consequence, decisions on economic policy are often 
a result of compromises, though the general trend is currently towards more 
openness and as much attraction of investment as possible.
The process of economic reform that started in the late 1990s has not yet 
been completed, as new laws are still being drafted, and the implementation 
and enforcement of existing laws are not always complete. Many laws now 
have to be reviewed because they have not had the intended effect. As a 
result, there are persistent concerns among foreign investors about the state 
of Indonesia’s regulatory framework, including the enforcement of the 
rule of law and implementation of good governance principles (Eurocham 
2012a).
The Indonesian government has become well-known for its ability to produce 
a large amount of laws and regulations. Enacting laws and regulations 
to create legal certainty is, of course, important, but at the same time the 
existence of too many – and possibly conflicting – rules could actually reduce 
legal certainty. It has been argued that “Indonesia has a great inventory of 
laws/regulations which are often overlapping, inconsistent, or conflicting” 
(OECD 2010, 166). Therefore, it is important that an appropriate number of 
laws are put in place and that these form a coherent framework.
According to Law No. 10/2004 on the Establishment of Laws and 
Regulations, and subsequent laws, a hierarchy exists among the different 
kinds of legal texts that are produced by government agencies in Indonesia. 
The Constitution is the document with the highest standing, followed by the 
People’s Consultative Assembly Decision. Next in line is the Law, followed 
by Government Regulation, Presidential Regulation, Provincial Regulation 
and Regency/City Regulation. There are also Presidential Decrees and 
33 This diverse set of views on the role of government and liberalisation of the Indonesian 
economy was also reflected in the expert discussions conducted for this study.
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Ministerial Regulations, or Ministerial Decrees, but their standing in the 
overall hierarchy is not fully defined (OECD 2012, 12). It should be added 
that a law or act is a product of the government that must be proposed to 
parliament and is passed through legislation. Government regulations are 
less important and can be produced by ministries on the basis of the laws. 
They do not require parliamentary approval but have to refer to the law. 
Sub-regulations of a more technical nature are also issued when necessary.34
The National Legislation Programme is a formal process that has been put 
in place to govern legislation in Indonesia. Law No. 10/2004 concerning 
the Formulation of Laws and Regulations, together with Presidential 
Regulation No. 61/2005, specify the steps required in the formulation of 
laws and regulations, which include planning, academic study, initial drafts 
and parliamentary deliberations (OECD 2010, 169).
3.3.1 Economic policy strategy and investment-related laws
The overall direction of economic policy in Indonesia is guided by its five-
year plans, which are worked out by Bappenas, the National Development 
Planning Agency. The establishment of “Medium-Term Development 
Plans” is governed by Law No. 25/2004 on National Development Planning 
System. These guidelines are developed in cooperation with ministries, 
SOEs and local governments, in consultations with investors and other 
stakeholders (OECD 2010, 128). The development of these plans is an 
elaborate process involving the preparation of a variety of background 
papers and three separate books that lay out the specifics of the plan. 
They also specify budget allocations (Ministry of National Development 
Planning / National Development Planning Agency 2010). These five-year 
plans are part of a broader agenda, the National Long-Term Development 
Plan (RPJPM) 2005–2025, established by Law No. 17/2007.
The National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2010–201435 
focuses on economic development and people’s welfare; good governance; 
strengthening of the democratic system; law enforcement and eradication 
of corruption; and inclusive and just development (Ministry of National 
Development Planning / National Development Planning Agency 2010, 
34 According to one expert’s explanations.
35 Presidential Decree No. 7/2009.
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1–36). Subsequently, investment in the business sector is included as one 
national priority among 11 others (APEC 2011). In the area of investment, 
the establishment of one-stop services36 at the provincial and district levels 
has been an important part of the current plan, which endeavours to promote 
investment and achieve more regional balance of investment activities.37
In addition, the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, together with 
Bappenas, has developed a Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion 
of Indonesia Economic Development 2011–2025 (Coordinating Ministry 
for Economic Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia 2011).38 Although the 
Masterplan – also called MP3EI – concentrates on the development of 
various aspects of the Indonesian economy, such as innovation and human 
resources, it focuses strongly on infrastructure, addressing one of the key 
weaknesses of the Indonesian economy. Lack of infrastructure is considered 
to be the main factor holding Indonesia back in capitalising on its full 
potential for economic growth. There has been a neglect of infrastructure 
investment in the country for more than a decade. The Masterplan aims to 
develop six economic corridors within Indonesia and to increase national 
connectivity.39 It is quite specific regarding the type of projects and activities 
to be pursued. Coordination is sought between central and local governments 
on implementing these projects. Investment, both private and public, will 
play an important role in making these projects happen, with specific 
investments promoted at the central and local levels in specified areas and 
economic sectors through means such as investment incentives. Foreign 
investment is expected to significantly contribute to these efforts. The 
MP3EI also forms part of the other national development plans mentioned 
above. Revisions of laws and regulations to support activities in line with 
the Masterplan are anticipated (Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs 
of the Republic of Indonesia 2011).
36 According to BKPM, one-stop services refers to a “Service Mechanism in the Front 
Office (PTSP BKPM) to guide anyone who is looking for investment service assistance.” 
See http://www.bkpm.go.id/contents/general/117122/front-office-mechanism (accessed 
05 June 2013). 
37 According to one expert’s explanations.
38 Presidential Regulation No. 32/2011.
39 See http://www.eurocham.or.id/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&view= 
article&id=210&Itemid=154 (accessed 16 Sept. 2012).
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It is difficult to judge whether these various development plans jointly form 
some kind of coherent industrial policy. There are certainly elements of an 
industrial policy, but the plans may still be too broad and general to fully 
qualify as such. The focus is on the development of an overall strategy and 
policy direction and a discussion of future challenges. Investment forms a 
particularly important part of the development plans and the Masterplan. 
There is also a strong focus on economic growth within the Masterplan, 
but the broader sustainable development benefits for Indonesia and issues 
of sustainable investment are not widely addressed and could be given more 
elaborate consideration. 
3.3.2 Investment-specific laws and regulations
Similar to the three phases of development of international investment 
policy outlined above, Table 5 shows that Indonesian domestic law on 
investment also developed in three stages. The first phase, referred to here 
as the “oil boom era”, followed the enactment of Indonesia’s first investment 
laws, Law No. 1/1967 concerning Foreign Investment, and Law No. 6/1968 
concerning Domestic Investment.40 For the first time, these laws defined a 
legal framework for investors, but restrictions on foreign investment were 
substantial. For example, foreign investments were treated differently than 
domestic investments in areas such as the establishment of investments, 
which is why two separate laws were put in place. There was only a positive 
list of sectors open to foreign investment. Indonesia concluded its first few 
IIAs during this period.
The second phase, which lasted from the mid-1980s to the turn of the 
century, saw a slow process of opening up further to foreign investment. 
The positive list was turned into a negative list in 1986, and 100 per cent 
equity ownership was allowed in 1994. As shown above, Indonesia’s BIT 
programme saw its “high tide” during this phase.
The current third phase coincides with Indonesia’s ongoing major economic 
reform efforts. There has been another round of policy reforms on investment, 
probably with the most substantial changes to the investment legal framework 
since the first law on investment came into being. Internationally, Indonesia 
became involved in the ASEAN process of investment liberalisation and 
40 There were amendments and supplements to these laws a few years after their introduction.
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Table 5: Indonesia’s domestic policy on investment in three stages
Oil boom era  
(1970s to early 
1980s)
Liberalisation era  
(mid-1980s to 
2003)
Consolidation era  
(2003–present)
Overall 
goal
Economy relying 
on oil revenue
Economy seeking 
diversification
A more balanced economy, 
with various sectors 
contributing to growth
Policy 
process
 • Full 
government 
discretion
 • Government 
discretion
 • Rise of 
economic 
technocracy
 • IMF-mandated 
reform (from 
1997/98 
through 2003)
 • Various new laws and 
regulations
 • Policy transparency, 
involving stakeholder 
consultations
 • Decentralised 
administration
 • Reforms are internalised 
and extended
FDI 
policy
 • High FDI 
restrictions
 • Limited 
number of 
sectors open to 
FDI (“positive 
list” approach)
 • Strong 
divestment 
requirements
 • Transformation 
of “positive list” 
to “negative 
list” in 1986
 • Allowed 100 % 
foreign equity 
ownership from 
1994
 • Reduced 
divestment 
requirements
 • Reduced 
minimum 
initial capital 
requirement
 • Eased 
restrictions to 
expatriates and 
use of imported 
machinery
 • Incentives for 
export-oriented 
investment
 • Liberalisation adjusted to 
domestic conditions and 
capacity
 • Regular review of 
investment list
 • Equal treatment of 
foreign and domestic 
investors
 • Better investment 
services
 • Incentives
Source: Bahweres (2011)
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pursued more elaborate bilateral agreements, such as the EPA with Japan. 
Domestically, the most significant change was the replacement of the old 
and outdated laws of 1967 and 1968 with a new investment law, the Law 
of the Republic of Indonesia Number 25 of 2007 concerning Investment, 
which was signed on 27 April 2007 (OECD 2010, 63). The separate laws 
for foreign and domestic investors were merged into this new single law, 
thereby granting national treatment to foreign investments. There were 
a variety of other amendments to the previous laws in favour of foreign 
investments in areas such as incentive provision, dispute settlement, free 
transfer of funds and reduction of administrative burdens. Overall, the new 
law can be seen as more liberal and open to investments; a new negative 
investment list was developed that is shorter than the previous one, allowing 
foreigners to invest in sectors that had previously been banned (OECD 
2010, 45). There is also a lot of flexibility in reviewing and updating the 
negative list, which has been done twice since 2007. At the same time, the 
text of the law appears as a compromise between those who are in favour of 
liberalisation and those who take a more cautious approach. For example, 
specific CSR requirements are included in the law, such as an obligation to 
train local employees and adhere to environmental standards. There are also 
specific protections for SMEs.
A wide range of ministries were involved in the development of the new 
investment law, with the BKPM assuming a coordinating role in the process 
of development and implementation.41 This is reflected in the law’s structure 
and content, which not only addresses issues relevant to the BKPM, but 
also the Ministry of Trade; Bappenas and the Capital Market and Financial 
Institution Supervisory Agency (Bapepam-LK); the Ministry of Industry; the 
Ministry of Manpower; the Ministry of Mining; the Ministry of Agriculture 
and others. The enactment of a new investment law was important to get 
rid of the discriminatory separation of its predecessors and address the 
challenge of enhanced global competition for investment.
What is interesting about Law No. 25/2007 concerning Investment is its 
appearance as a kind of interlocking law that connects investment law with 
other areas of law in Indonesia, but it also provides a link to commitments 
made in IIAs. In fact, the basic structure of Law No. 25/2007 is not too 
different from that of IIAs, though the emphasis is sometimes on slightly 
41 This description of the process of developing the law reflects accounts from discussions 
with several experts in Indonesia. 
Friends or foes?
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 67
different issues. Table 6 roughly depicts Indonesia’s entire legal framework 
for investment. It reveals that most issues pertaining to investment are 
contained, to some degree, in all kinds of laws: from IIAs via Law No. 
25/2007 to investment-related national laws and regulations. Depending 
on the relevant national law, a variety of different government agencies are 
involved in respective rule-making on investment and the implementation of 
Law No. 25/2007. The entire framework is extremely complex; maintaining 
consistency and coherence across the different bodies of law is without 
doubt a serious challenge. It is also difficult to judge to what extent agencies 
maintain a right to regulate with respect to column 4, given the international 
commitments made in column 2 (from left).
As it stands, the Indonesian government has made substantial efforts towards 
improving the investment climate, including through regulatory means. The 
investment regime has become faster, simpler and less restrictive, making 
Indonesia more successful in attracting investments. There is a defined 
regulatory framework, with investment incentives, special economic zones 
and one-stop integrated services. Nevertheless, many in the business sector 
would like to see further reforms made (Eurocham 2011, 31–37; Eurocham 
2012b, 7–8). Some concerns remain about the implementation of these new 
laws, including law enforcement and better application of the rule of law.42
42 Several experts expressed this view. 
Jan Knörich / Axel Berger
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)68
T
ab
le
 6
: I
nd
on
es
ia
’s
 le
ga
l f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
Is
su
e
II
A
 p
ro
vi
si
on
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
5/
20
07
 
(I
nv
es
tm
en
t)
D
om
es
ti
c 
la
w
s,
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
pl
an
s
R
el
ev
an
t 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
In
te
nt
io
n,
 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
P
re
am
bl
e
P
re
am
bl
e
A
rt
ic
le
 3
 (
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 a
nd
 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
)
A
rt
ic
le
 4
 (
ba
si
c 
po
li
cy
 o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t)
 
G
en
er
al
 e
lu
ci
da
ti
on
D
efi
ni
ti
on
s
In
ve
st
m
en
t
A
rt
ic
le
 1
 (
ge
ne
ra
l 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
),
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
s 
1,
 3
A
rt
ic
le
 2
 (
ge
ne
ra
l 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
) 
w
it
h 
el
uc
id
at
io
n
L
aw
 N
o.
 8
/1
99
5 
(L
aw
 o
f 
ca
pi
ta
l 
m
ar
ke
t)
L
aw
 N
o.
 1
9/
20
08
 (
T
he
 S
ov
er
ei
gn
 
S
ya
ri
ah
 S
ec
ur
it
ie
s)
G
ov
er
nm
en
t R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 4
5/
19
95
 
(C
ap
it
al
 m
ar
ke
t o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n)
B
K
P
M
 
B
ap
ep
am
-L
K
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 F
in
an
ce
(B
an
k 
of
 I
nd
on
es
ia
)
In
ve
st
or
A
rt
ic
le
 1
 (
ge
ne
ra
l 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
),
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
s 
2,
 6
A
rt
ic
le
 5
 (
fo
rm
 o
f 
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
an
d 
do
m
ic
il
e)
   L
aw
 N
o.
 4
0/
20
07
 (
L
im
it
ed
 li
ab
il
it
y 
co
m
pa
ni
es
)
B
K
P
M
Friends or foes?
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 69
T
ab
le
 6
 (
co
nt
.)
: I
nd
on
es
ia
’s
 le
ga
l f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
Is
su
e
II
A
 p
ro
vi
si
on
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
5/
20
07
 
(I
nv
es
tm
en
t)
D
om
es
ti
c 
la
w
s,
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
pl
an
s
R
el
ev
an
t 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
A
dm
is
si
on
 
A
dm
is
si
on
 
cl
au
se
 / 
pr
e-
 a
nd
 p
os
t-
 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t 
A
rt
ic
le
 5
 (
fo
rm
 o
f 
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
an
d 
do
m
ic
il
e)
, 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
3
A
rt
ic
le
 2
1 
(i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
fa
ci
li
ty
)
A
rt
ic
le
 2
2 
(i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
fa
ci
li
ty
)
A
rt
ic
le
 2
5 
(c
om
pa
ny
 
le
ga
li
za
ti
on
 a
nd
 li
ce
ns
in
g)
, 
pa
ra
gr
ap
hs
 (
4)
, (
5)
A
rt
ic
le
 2
6 
(c
om
pa
ny
 
le
ga
li
za
ti
on
 a
nd
 li
ce
ns
in
g)
A
rt
ic
le
 2
7 
(c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ol
ic
y)
A
rt
ic
le
 2
8 
(c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ol
ic
y)
A
rt
ic
le
 2
9 
(c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ol
ic
y)
A
rt
ic
le
 3
0 
(o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
of
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t)
P
re
si
de
nt
ia
l R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 2
7/
20
09
 
(O
ne
-s
to
p 
in
te
gr
at
ed
 s
er
vi
ce
s)
 
R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
H
ea
d 
of
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t 
C
oo
rd
in
at
in
g 
B
oa
rd
 N
o.
 1
1/
20
11
 
(O
ne
-s
to
p 
sh
op
)
R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
H
ea
d 
of
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t 
C
oo
rd
in
at
in
g 
B
oa
rd
 N
o.
 1
2/
20
11
 
(I
nv
es
tm
en
t l
ic
en
ce
s)
R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
H
ea
d 
of
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t 
C
oo
rd
in
at
in
g 
B
oa
rd
 N
o.
 1
3/
20
11
 
(M
on
it
or
in
g 
an
d 
af
te
r 
ca
re
) 
M
ed
iu
m
-t
er
m
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t p
la
n 
(R
P
JM
N
),
 2
01
0–
20
14
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
5/
20
04
 (
N
at
io
na
l 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t p
la
nn
in
g 
sy
st
em
)
P
re
si
de
nt
ia
l R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 3
6/
20
10
 
(L
is
t o
f 
bu
si
ne
ss
 fi
el
ds
 c
lo
se
d 
to
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t a
nd
 b
us
in
es
s 
fi
el
ds
 o
pe
n,
 
w
it
h 
co
nd
it
io
ns
, t
o 
in
ve
st
m
en
t)
L
aw
 N
o.
 5
/1
99
9 
(P
ro
hi
bi
ti
on
 o
f 
m
on
op
ol
is
ti
c 
pr
ac
ti
ce
s 
an
d 
un
fa
ir
 
bu
si
ne
ss
 c
om
pe
ti
ti
on
),
 A
rt
ic
le
 4
B
K
P
M
 (
on
 b
eh
al
f o
f 
m
os
t m
in
is
tr
ie
s)
R
eg
io
na
l g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
K
P
P
U
N
at
io
na
l L
an
d 
A
ge
nc
y 
(B
P
N
)
Jan Knörich / Axel Berger
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)70
T
ab
le
 6
 (
co
nt
.)
: I
nd
on
es
ia
’s
 le
ga
l f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
Is
su
e
II
A
 p
ro
vi
si
on
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
5/
20
07
 
(I
nv
es
tm
en
t)
D
om
es
ti
c 
la
w
s,
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
pl
an
s
R
el
ev
an
t 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
G
ov
er
nm
en
t R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 
57
/2
01
0 
(M
er
ge
r 
or
 c
on
so
li
da
ti
on
 o
f 
bu
si
ne
ss
 e
nt
it
ie
s 
an
d 
ac
qu
is
it
io
n 
of
 
co
m
pa
ny
 s
ha
re
s 
th
at
 c
ou
ld
 r
es
ul
t i
n 
m
on
op
ol
is
ti
c 
pr
ac
ti
ce
s 
an
d/
or
 u
nf
ai
r 
bu
si
ne
ss
 c
om
pe
ti
ti
on
),
 C
ha
pt
er
 I
II
R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 
fo
r 
th
e 
S
up
er
vi
si
on
 o
f 
B
us
in
es
s 
C
om
pe
ti
ti
on
 N
o.
 1
0/
20
10
 
(N
ot
ifi
ca
ti
on
 f
or
m
 f
or
 m
er
ge
r 
or
 
co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n 
of
 b
us
in
es
s 
en
ti
ti
es
 a
nd
 
ac
qu
is
it
io
n 
of
 c
om
pa
ny
 s
ha
re
s)
 
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
2/
19
99
 (
R
eg
io
na
l 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t)
, A
rt
ic
le
 6
8,
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 8
4/
20
00
 
(R
eg
io
na
l a
pp
ar
at
us
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
gu
id
el
in
e)
A
ct
 N
o.
 5
 o
f 
19
60
 (
B
as
ic
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
fu
nd
am
en
ta
ls
 o
f 
ag
ra
ri
an
 a
ff
ai
rs
)
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
R
ep
ub
li
c 
of
 
In
do
ne
si
a,
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
3(
3)
Friends or foes?
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 71
T
ab
le
 6
 (
co
nt
.)
: I
nd
on
es
ia
’s
 le
ga
l f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
Is
su
e
II
A
 p
ro
vi
si
on
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
5/
20
07
 
(I
nv
es
tm
en
t)
D
om
es
ti
c 
la
w
s,
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
pl
an
s
R
el
ev
an
t 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
T
re
at
m
en
t 
F
E
T
A
rt
ic
le
 1
6 
(t
he
 r
ig
ht
s,
 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
 a
nd
 li
ab
il
it
y 
of
 
in
ve
st
or
)
Po
te
nt
ia
ll
y 
al
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t m
ea
su
re
s 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
Po
te
nt
ia
ll
y 
an
y 
ag
en
cy
N
on
- 
di
sc
ri
m
i-
na
ti
on
N
at
io
na
l 
tr
ea
tm
en
t
A
rt
ic
le
 4
 (
ba
si
c 
po
li
cy
 o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t)
, p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 
(2
)a
A
ny
 r
el
ev
an
t g
ov
er
nm
en
t m
ea
su
re
s 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
P
re
si
de
nt
ia
l R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 3
6/
20
10
 
(L
is
t o
f 
bu
si
ne
ss
 fi
el
ds
 c
lo
se
d 
to
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t a
nd
 b
us
in
es
s 
fi
el
ds
 o
pe
n,
 
w
it
h 
co
nd
it
io
ns
, t
o 
in
ve
st
m
en
t)
A
ny
 r
el
ev
an
t a
ge
nc
y
M
F
N
 
tr
ea
tm
en
t
A
rt
ic
le
 6
 (
tr
ea
tm
en
t t
o 
in
ve
st
m
en
t)
A
ny
 r
el
ev
an
t g
ov
er
nm
en
t m
ea
su
re
s 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
A
ny
 r
el
ev
an
t a
ge
nc
y
P
ro
te
ct
io
n 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n 
an
d 
se
cu
ri
ty
A
rt
ic
le
 3
0 
(o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
of
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t)
, p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 (
1)
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
R
ep
ub
li
c 
of
 
In
do
ne
si
a,
 A
rt
ic
le
s 
28
G
(1
),
 3
0(
4)
. 
G
en
er
al
 la
w
s 
on
 s
ec
ur
it
y
P
O
L
R
I 
T
N
I
C
om
pe
ns
a-
ti
on
 f
or
 lo
ss
es
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
R
ep
ub
li
c 
of
 
In
do
ne
si
a,
 A
rt
ic
le
s 
28
G
(1
),
 3
0(
4)
.
G
en
er
al
 la
w
s 
on
 s
ec
ur
it
y
P
O
L
R
I
T
N
I
Jan Knörich / Axel Berger
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)72
T
ab
le
 6
 (
co
nt
.)
: I
nd
on
es
ia
’s
 le
ga
l f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
Is
su
e
II
A
 p
ro
vi
si
on
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
5/
20
07
 
(I
nv
es
tm
en
t)
D
om
es
ti
c 
la
w
s,
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
pl
an
s
R
el
ev
an
t 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
P
ro
te
ct
io
n
E
xp
ro
pr
ia
ti
on
A
rt
ic
le
 7
 (
tr
ea
tm
en
t t
o 
in
ve
st
m
en
t)
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
R
ep
ub
li
c 
of
 
In
do
ne
si
a,
 A
rt
ic
le
s 
28
H
(4
)
P
re
si
de
nt
ia
l R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 6
5/
20
06
 
(T
he
 a
m
en
dm
en
t t
o 
P
re
si
de
nt
ia
l 
R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 3
6/
20
05
 o
n 
pr
oc
ur
em
en
t o
f 
la
nd
 f
or
 r
ea
li
zi
ng
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t f
or
 p
ub
li
c 
in
te
re
st
)
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
0/
19
61
 (
R
ev
oc
at
io
n 
of
 
ri
gh
ts
 o
f 
la
nd
 a
nd
 th
e 
ob
je
ct
s 
ov
er
 
th
e 
la
nd
)
A
ny
 r
el
ev
an
t g
ov
er
nm
en
t m
ea
su
re
s 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
C
ou
rt
s
A
ny
 r
el
ev
an
t a
ge
nc
y
Fr
ee
 
tr
an
sf
er
 o
f 
fu
nd
s
T
ra
ns
fe
r 
of
 
fu
nd
s
A
rt
ic
le
 8
 (
tr
ea
tm
en
t t
o 
in
ve
st
m
en
t)
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 (
tr
ea
tm
en
t t
o 
in
ve
st
m
en
t)
A
ct
 N
o.
 2
4/
19
99
 (
Fo
re
ig
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 
fl
ow
 a
nd
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
ra
te
 s
ys
te
m
)
B
an
k 
In
do
ne
si
a 
B
ap
ep
am
-L
K
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 F
in
an
ce
Friends or foes?
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 73
T
ab
le
 6
 (
co
nt
.)
: I
nd
on
es
ia
’s
 le
ga
l f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
Is
su
e
II
A
 p
ro
vi
si
on
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
5/
20
07
 
(I
nv
es
tm
en
t)
D
om
es
ti
c 
la
w
s,
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
pl
an
s
R
el
ev
an
t 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
Pe
rs
on
ne
l
E
nt
ry
 a
nd
 
so
jo
ur
n 
of
 
al
ie
ns
 / 
S
en
io
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
bo
ar
d 
of
 
di
re
ct
or
s
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
(m
an
po
w
er
)
A
rt
ic
le
 1
1 
(m
an
po
w
er
)
A
rt
ic
le
 2
3 
(i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
fa
ci
li
ty
)
L
aw
 N
o.
 1
3/
20
03
 (
M
an
po
w
er
)
G
ov
er
nm
en
t R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 3
1/
19
94
 
(A
li
en
 c
on
tr
ol
 a
nd
 im
m
ig
ra
ti
on
 
ac
ti
on
s)
G
ov
er
nm
en
t R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 
32
/1
99
4 
(V
is
as
, e
nt
ry
 p
er
m
it
s 
an
d 
im
m
ig
ra
ti
on
 p
er
m
it
s)
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
R
ep
ub
li
c 
of
 
In
do
ne
si
a,
 A
rt
ic
le
s 
26
 a
nd
 2
7
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 M
an
po
w
er
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 L
aw
 a
nd
 
H
um
an
 R
ig
ht
s
Im
m
ig
ra
ti
on
 O
ffi
ce
D
is
pu
te
 
se
tt
le
m
en
t
IS
D
S
A
rt
ic
le
 3
2 
(d
is
pu
te
 
se
tt
le
m
en
t)
L
aw
 N
o.
 3
0/
19
99
 (
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 a
nd
 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
so
lu
ti
on
)
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 
1/
19
90
 (
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t o
f 
fo
re
ig
n 
ar
bi
tr
al
 a
w
ar
ds
)
L
aw
 N
o.
 5
/1
96
8 
(S
et
tl
em
en
t o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t d
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
st
at
es
 
an
d 
na
ti
on
al
s 
of
 o
th
er
 s
ta
te
s)
O
th
er
 la
w
s 
on
 le
ga
l e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t a
nd
 
co
ur
t p
ro
ce
du
re
s
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 L
aw
 a
nd
 
H
um
an
 R
ig
ht
s
C
ou
rt
s
B
A
N
I
L
oc
al
 g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
Jan Knörich / Axel Berger
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)74
T
ab
le
 6
 (
co
nt
.)
: I
nd
on
es
ia
’s
 le
ga
l f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
Is
su
e
II
A
 p
ro
vi
si
on
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
5/
20
07
 
(I
nv
es
tm
en
t)
D
om
es
ti
c 
la
w
s,
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
pl
an
s
R
el
ev
an
t 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
fa
ci
li
ta
ti
on
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
pr
om
ot
io
n,
 
in
st
it
ut
io
na
l 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
, 
su
br
og
at
io
n
A
rt
ic
le
 1
8 
(i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
fa
ci
li
ty
)
A
rt
ic
le
 1
9 
(i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
fa
ci
li
ty
)
A
rt
ic
le
 2
0 
(i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
fa
ci
li
ty
)
A
rt
ic
le
 2
4 
(i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
fa
ci
li
ty
)
A
rt
ic
le
 2
8 
(c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 
of
 in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ol
ic
y)
, 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
(1
)f
M
as
te
rp
la
n 
(M
P
3E
I)
P
re
si
de
nt
ia
l R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 2
7/
20
09
 
(O
ne
-s
to
p 
in
te
gr
at
ed
 s
er
vi
ce
s)
G
ov
er
nm
en
t R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 1
/2
00
7 
(F
ac
il
it
y 
of
 in
co
m
e 
ta
x 
on
 c
ap
it
al
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
ce
rt
ai
n 
bu
si
ne
ss
 li
ne
s 
an
d/
or
 c
er
ta
in
 r
eg
io
ns
),
 a
m
en
de
d 
by
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 
62
/2
00
8;
 o
th
er
 im
pl
em
en
ti
ng
 
re
gu
la
ti
on
s 
ar
e:
 R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 
52
/2
01
1,
 M
in
is
te
r 
of
 F
in
an
ce
 D
ec
re
e 
N
o.
 1
30
/2
01
1
G
ov
er
nm
en
t R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 9
4/
20
10
 
(T
ax
ab
le
 in
co
m
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
in
co
m
e 
ta
x 
pa
ym
en
ts
 f
or
 a
 fi
sc
al
 
ye
ar
),
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
0
L
aw
 N
o.
 1
7/
20
06
 (
A
m
en
dm
en
t t
o 
L
aw
 N
o.
 1
0/
19
95
 o
n 
cu
st
om
s)
B
K
P
M
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 F
in
an
ce
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 T
ra
de
Friends or foes?
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 75
T
ab
le
 6
 (
co
nt
.)
: I
nd
on
es
ia
’s
 le
ga
l f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
Is
su
e
II
A
 p
ro
vi
si
on
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
5/
20
07
 
(I
nv
es
tm
en
t)
D
om
es
ti
c 
la
w
s,
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
pl
an
s
R
el
ev
an
t 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
Fi
na
nc
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
N
o.
 1
76
/P
M
K
.0
11
/2
00
9 
(E
xe
m
pt
io
n 
fr
om
 im
po
rt
 d
ut
y 
on
 th
e 
im
po
rt
s 
of
 
m
ac
hi
ne
s,
 g
oo
ds
 a
nd
 m
at
er
ia
ls
 f
or
 
th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
r 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f 
in
du
st
ry
 in
 th
e 
fr
am
e 
of
 in
ve
st
m
en
t)
L
aw
 N
o.
 3
0/
20
07
 (
E
ne
rg
y)
B
K
P
M
 R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 9
/2
00
9
O
th
er
 la
w
s,
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 d
ec
re
es
A
rt
ic
le
 3
1 
(s
pe
ci
al
 
ec
on
om
ic
 z
on
e)
L
aw
 N
o.
 3
9/
20
09
 (
S
pe
ci
al
 e
co
no
m
ic
 
zo
ne
s)
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 F
in
an
ce
 
In
ve
st
or
 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
(m
an
po
w
er
),
 
pa
ra
gr
ap
hs
 (
2)
, (
3)
, (
4)
 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
5 
(t
he
 r
ig
ht
s,
 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
 a
nd
 li
ab
il
it
y 
of
 
in
ve
st
or
)
A
rt
ic
le
 1
6 
(t
he
 r
ig
ht
s,
 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
 a
nd
 li
ab
il
it
y 
of
 
in
ve
st
or
)
A
rt
ic
le
 1
7 
(t
he
 r
ig
ht
s,
 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
 a
nd
 li
ab
il
it
y 
of
 
in
ve
st
or
)
A
rt
ic
le
 3
3 
(s
an
ct
io
ns
)
A
rt
ic
le
 3
4 
(s
an
ct
io
ns
)
L
aw
 N
o.
 4
0/
20
07
 (
L
im
it
ed
 li
ab
il
it
y 
co
m
pa
ni
es
)
L
aw
 N
o.
 1
3/
20
03
 (
M
an
po
w
er
)
L
aw
 N
o.
 3
2/
20
09
 (
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l 
m
an
ag
em
en
t)
L
aw
 N
o.
 4
/2
00
9 
(M
in
er
al
 a
nd
 c
oa
l 
m
in
in
g)
G
ov
er
nm
en
t R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 1
8/
19
99
 
(M
an
ag
em
en
t o
f 
th
e 
w
as
te
 o
f 
ha
za
rd
ou
s 
an
d 
to
xi
c 
m
at
er
ia
ls
)
G
ov
er
nm
en
t R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 7
4/
20
01
 
(H
az
ar
do
us
 a
nd
 to
xi
c 
su
bs
ta
nc
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t)
B
K
P
M
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 M
an
po
w
er
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
t
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 F
in
an
ce
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 T
ra
de
O
th
er
 a
ge
nc
ie
s
Jan Knörich / Axel Berger
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)76
T
ab
le
 6
 (
co
nt
.)
: I
nd
on
es
ia
’s
 le
ga
l f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
Is
su
e
II
A
 p
ro
vi
si
on
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
5/
20
07
 
(I
nv
es
tm
en
t)
D
om
es
ti
c 
la
w
s,
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
pl
an
s
R
el
ev
an
t 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
L
aw
 N
o.
 3
6/
20
08
 (
In
co
m
e 
ta
x)
L
aw
 N
o.
 3
3/
20
04
 (
Fi
sc
al
 b
al
an
ce
 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
ce
nt
ra
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t a
nd
 
th
e 
re
gi
on
al
 g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
)
L
aw
 N
o.
 1
7/
20
06
 (
A
m
en
dm
en
t t
o 
L
aw
 N
o.
 1
0/
19
95
 o
n 
cu
st
om
s)
In
do
ne
si
an
 C
us
to
m
s 
Ta
ri
ff
 B
oo
k
L
aw
 N
o.
 3
0/
20
07
 (
E
ne
rg
y)
O
th
er
 la
w
s,
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 d
ec
re
es
S
co
pe
T
im
ef
ra
m
e
A
rt
ic
le
 4
0 
(c
on
cl
ud
in
g 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
)
G
en
er
al
 
ex
ce
pt
io
ns
Friends or foes?
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 77
T
ab
le
 6
 (
co
nt
.)
: I
nd
on
es
ia
’s
 le
ga
l f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
Is
su
e
II
A
 p
ro
vi
si
on
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
5/
20
07
 
(I
nv
es
tm
en
t)
D
om
es
ti
c 
la
w
s,
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
pl
an
s
R
el
ev
an
t 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
L
aw
 N
o.
 3
6/
20
08
 (
In
co
m
e 
ta
x)
L
aw
 N
o.
 3
3/
20
04
 (
Fi
sc
al
 b
al
an
ce
 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
ce
nt
ra
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t a
nd
 
th
e 
re
gi
on
al
 g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
)
L
aw
 N
o.
 1
7/
20
06
 (
A
m
en
dm
en
t t
o 
L
aw
 N
o.
 1
0/
19
95
 o
n 
cu
st
om
s)
In
do
ne
si
an
 C
us
to
m
s 
Ta
ri
ff
 B
oo
k
L
aw
 N
o.
 3
0/
20
07
 (
E
ne
rg
y)
O
th
er
 la
w
s,
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 d
ec
re
es
S
co
pe
T
im
ef
ra
m
e
A
rt
ic
le
 4
0 
(c
on
cl
ud
in
g 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
)
G
en
er
al
 
ex
ce
pt
io
ns
T
ab
le
 6
 (
co
nt
.)
: I
nd
on
es
ia
’s
 le
ga
l f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
Is
su
e
II
A
 p
ro
vi
si
on
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
5/
20
07
 
(I
nv
es
tm
en
t)
D
om
es
ti
c 
la
w
s,
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
pl
an
s
R
el
ev
an
t 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
R
es
er
va
ti
on
s 
an
d 
sc
he
du
le
s
A
rt
ic
le
 1
2 
(b
us
in
es
s 
se
ct
or
)
A
rt
ic
le
 1
3 
(i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t t
o 
m
ic
ro
, 
sm
al
l, 
an
d 
m
ed
iu
m
 
bu
si
ne
ss
, a
nd
 c
oo
pe
ra
tiv
es
)
P
re
si
de
nt
ia
l R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 3
6/
20
10
 
(L
is
t o
f 
bu
si
ne
ss
 fi
el
ds
 c
lo
se
d 
to
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t a
nd
 b
us
in
es
s 
fi
el
ds
 o
pe
n,
 
w
it
h 
co
nd
it
io
ns
, t
o 
in
ve
st
m
en
t)
P
re
si
de
nt
ia
l R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 7
6/
20
07
 
(T
he
 c
ri
te
ri
a 
an
d 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t 
of
 c
lo
se
d 
bu
si
ne
ss
 li
ne
 a
nd
 o
pe
n 
bu
si
ne
ss
 w
it
h 
co
nd
it
io
ns
 in
 r
es
pe
ct
 o
f 
ca
pi
ta
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t)
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
0/
20
08
 (
M
ic
ro
, s
m
al
l a
nd
 
m
ed
iu
m
 e
nt
er
pr
is
es
)
G
ov
er
nm
en
t R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
N
o.
 4
4/
20
07
 
(P
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
)
L
aw
 N
o.
 2
5/
19
92
 (
C
oo
pe
ra
tiv
es
)
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
R
ep
ub
li
c 
of
 
In
do
ne
si
a,
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
3(
2)
M
as
te
rp
la
n 
(M
P
3E
I)
C
oo
rd
in
at
in
g 
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 E
co
no
m
ic
 A
ff
ai
rs
O
th
er
 a
ge
nc
ie
s
N
ot
e:
 L
aw
s 
ar
e 
su
bj
ec
t t
o 
fr
eq
ue
nt
 c
ha
ng
es
 (
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 th
e 
do
m
es
ti
c 
la
w
s,
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 p
la
ns
).
 T
he
 p
ur
po
se
 o
f 
th
is
 ta
bl
e 
is
 o
nl
y 
to
 il
lu
st
ra
te
 th
e 
li
nk
ag
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
va
ri
ou
s 
bo
di
es
 o
f 
la
w
. I
t d
oe
s 
no
t i
nt
en
d 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
 f
ul
ly
 c
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 
ac
co
un
t. 
Fo
r 
tr
an
sl
at
io
ns
, s
ee
: h
tt
p:
//
ru
le
bo
ok
-j
ic
a.
ek
on
.g
o.
id
/i
nd
ex
.h
tm
l
S
ou
rc
e:
 A
ut
ho
rs
Jan Knörich / Axel Berger
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)78
For the government, difficulties regarding central-local coordination 
are substantial, with local governments taking varying approaches to 
the implementation of national laws. Decentralisation and reductions in 
centralised powers formed part of Indonesia’s overall political and economic 
reform at the turn of the century. In this process, regional governments were 
given the authority to administer many investment-related matters, such 
as the issuance of business licences and some taxation matters. There are 
currently stark differences in regional policies towards investment; some are 
open whereas others are more restrictive.43 Although decentralisation might 
be useful to ensure that specific contexts and development requirements of 
individual regions are taken into account, it is important that the central 
government maintains effective coordination and oversight.44
3.4 Indonesia’s international vis-à-vis domestic  
investment law
The purpose of this section is to examine in greater detail the linkages 
between Indonesia’s international commitments on investment made in 
IIAs and its relevant national laws and regulations. The approach taken is 
to separately examine individual elements of IIAs and compare them with 
the relevant domestic investment-specific and investment-related laws. 
The information provided in Table 6 is used extensively throughout this 
chapter. We also consider the issue of policy space as well as potential risks 
resulting from inconsistencies and the use of particular provisions, laws and 
regulations.
3.4.1 Definitions
Almost all IIAs concluded by Indonesia, especially BITs, apply a broad, 
“open-ended”, asset-based definition of investment that includes an 
illustrative list, in line with the protection approach in investment treaties. 
This implies that foreign investments not covered by Indonesia’s IIAs will 
be very few in number, if there are any at all, thereby limiting the flexibility 
of Indonesia’s domestic laws to create particularities for certain types of 
43 This picture of central-local coordination reflects the views of several experts in Indonesia.
44 Decentralisation is covered in Article 18 of Indonesia’s Constitution.
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investment. Most of Indonesia’s IIAs provide that investments need to be 
conducted “in accordance with the laws and regulations” of the host state, 
or make use of a similar formulation. This kind of reference to domestic 
law may reduce risks by helping to limit the liability of the state to claims. 
The EPA with Japan exceptionally limits the definition of investment by 
providing that “a Party may, on a non-discriminatory basis, exclude portfolio 
investments.”45 Some IIAs provide that “any change in the legal form in 
which assets are invested or reinvested does not affect their character as 
investments.”46
Similar to the definitions on investment, the definitions for investor in 
most Indonesian IIAs are constructed broadly, without many exceptions 
or limitations. They focus on the distinction between “natural person” and 
“legal person” or “national” and “company”. Both are included within the 
definition, though the precise wording of the definitions differs between 
IIAs, and there may be individual nuances in the definition of the two for 
each contracting party. Some IIAs do provide limitations, including the need 
to have a substantial interest in the entity or investment,47 and the possibility 
to exclude investors from third countries or the host country itself.48 Other 
IIAs emphasise that legal person investors need to have “effective” or “real” 
economic activities in host or home countries.49 Certain IIAs try to add 
precision to the fact that investors must come from the other contracting 
party, for example by adding that a legal entity must be “actually managed 
from the territory of that Party.”50 A few Indonesian PTIAs include a 
separate denial of benefits clause,51 incorporating the possibility to deny the 
benefits of the treaty to certain kinds of investors. But despite the existence 
of clarifying sentences in some IIAs, the definition of investor in Indonesian 
45 Indonesia-Japan EPA of 2007, Chapter 5.
46 e.g. Indonesia-Morocco BIT of 1997.
47 Indonesia-Australia BIT of 1992; Indonesia-Denmark BIT of 1968.
48 Indonesia-Turkey BIT of 1997; Indonesia-Spain BIT of 1995; Indonesia-Australia BIT of 
1992.
49 Indonesia-Romania BIT of 1997; Indonesia-Morocco BIT of 1997; Indonesia-Turkey 
BIT of 1997.
50 Indonesia-Spain BIT of 1995.
51 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Article 19; ASEAN-Australia-New 
Zealand FTA, Chapter 11, Article 11; ASEAN-China FTA, Article 15; ASEAN-Korea 
FTA, Article 17; Indonesia-Japan EPA, Article 72.
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IIAs remains very broad overall. This broad approach reduces the policy 
flexibility of domestic legislators to some extent.
In domestic law, Indonesian Law No. 25/2007 covers only direct investments 
and excludes portfolio investments.52 The definition of investment in the 
interlocking law is thus not in full conformity with Indonesia’s IIAs. The 
BKPM has been responsible for direct investments since 1967, whereas 
portfolio investments, on the other hand, are covered by Law No. 8/1995 
concerning the Capital Market and have been managed under the auspices 
of the responsible agency, Bapepam-LK, since 1995.53 This includes stock 
exchange supervision, but excludes sovereign debt and government bonds, 
which are managed by the Ministry of Finance.54 This approach makes sense, 
considering the different natures of direct and portfolio investments, though 
international commitments on investments are being split off into two or 
more national laws, with different institutions assuming responsibility. The 
effects of such an approach are unclear, but so far it appears that it has 
worked in Indonesia.55 As this study is primarily concerned with FDI, its 
focus remains on Law No. 25/2007.
In Law No. 25/2007, investment is defined as “any kind of investment 
activity” rather than “assets”, and “for running business” within Indonesia,56 
which is a variation from the typical definition found in IIAs. National 
law emphasises that investments must be for an entrepreneurial purpose, 
which might reflect the intention of the creators of the law to emphasise 
the development role that investments can play. The national law defines 
investors as “any individual or corporation that makes investment in form 
of either domestic or foreign investors”, where a “foreign investor shall be 
any individual foreign citizen, foreign corporation, or foreign state making 
52 Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, Chapter I, Article 
2 and Elucidation to Article 2.
53 This was confirmed by one expert. At the time of preparation of this study, there were 
concrete plans to abolish Bapepam-LK and replace it with a different set of institutions.
54 See http://www.dmo.or.id/en/content.php?section=13 (accessed 19 Sept. 2012). 
55 It has been argued that “Indonesia tries to dampen short term capital inflows (‘hot 
money’) in favour of long term capital investment” (Vision Group 2011, 27). Whether the 
separation into two laws supports this approach needs to be further investigated.
56 Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, Chapter I, Article 
1, paragraph 1.
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investment within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia.” 57 Article 5(2) 
of Law No. 25/2007 also requires foreign investors to establish themselves 
as limited liability companies, in line with Law No. 40/2007 concerning 
Limited Liability Companies. This approach to the definition of investor is 
similar to the definitions “national” and “company” in the IIAs.
In line with our expectations outlined in section 2.3.1, the definitions of 
“investment” and “investor” in national law are broad, especially when 
Law No. 25/2007 is viewed in parallel with Law No. 8/1995. This reflects 
Indonesia’s international commitments in this area. The definition of 
investment covers both domestic and foreign investors, reflecting principles 
of national treatment. However, it is unclear whether the definition of 
investment in Law No. 25/2007 covers the same types of investments as 
in IIAs, given a more specified nature of the definition. The definitions in 
Indonesia’s IIAs are quite far-reaching, including investments and investors 
beyond activities for running a business. Thus, the apparent development 
intention in national law is not replicated in IIAs, illustrating a case where 
an attempt to extend the use of policy space is not replicated in international 
treaties.
3.4.2 Admission
Except for the PTIAs modelled in line with the liberalisation approach, that 
is, the ASEAN IIAs and the Indonesia-Japan EPA, Indonesian BITs usually 
include a separate admission clause. A standard formulation frequently used 
is: 
Either Contracting Party shall encourage and create favourable conditions 
for nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party to invest in its 
territory, and shall admit such investment in accordance with its laws and 
regulations.58 
Including such a reference to the host state’s laws and regulations might lower 
risks by reducing the liability of the state to some extent. Occasionally, there 
57 Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, Chapter I, Articles 
4 and 6.
58 Indonesia-Hungary BIT of 1992; see also Indonesia-India BIT of 1999; Indonesia-Jordan 
BIT of 1996; Indonesia-Laos BIT of 1994; Indonesia-Sri Lanka BIT of 1996.
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may be some additions made in older BITs,59 such as further clarifications,60 
a protocol statement61 or particular reference to an approval procedure.62 All 
admission clauses are limited to the post-establishment phase, though some 
other provisions do have pre-establishment clauses, as is discussed in later 
sections.
Law No. 25/2007 addresses admission issues in Articles 5, 21, 22, 25 and 
26. Articles 5(3) and 25 provide that investments must be made according 
to the law – referring again to domestic regulations – and as limited liability 
companies.63 The required permits shall be obtained and the one-stop 
integrated services (Article 26) used in the process of establishment. Details 
on licensing and services provision in areas related to the acquisition of 
land rights are clarified in Articles 21 and 22. Article 22(4) states that land 
rights can be withdrawn in particular cases such as when there is “damage 
to the public interest” or the land is used “in violation with the purpose and 
objective of such granting of land rights.” Ownership of land is regulated 
by Act No. 5 of 1960 on the Basic Provisions concerning the Fundamentals 
of Agrarian Affairs and, more broadly, Article 33, paragraph 3 of the 
Indonesian Constitution, which states that “the land, the waters and the 
natural resources within shall be under the powers of the State and shall be 
used to the greatest benefit of the people.”
There are further areas where the government attempts to make use of its 
regulatory flexibility to hedge against misconduct. For example, Government 
Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 57 Year 2010 concerning 
Merger or Consolidation of Business Entities and Acquisition of Company 
59 See Indonesia-Belgium BIT of 1970; Indonesia-Denmark BIT of 1968.
60 The Indonesia-Germany BIT of 2003 clarifies that “neither Contracting Party shall in any 
way impair by arbitrary or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal of investments in its territory of investors of the other Contracting 
Party.” The Indonesia-Spain BIT of 1995 includes a similar formulation and adds another 
provision: “Each Party shall endeavour to grant the necessary permits relating to these 
investments and shall allow, within the framework of its law, the execution of contracts 
related to manufacturing-licenses and technical, commercial, financial and administrative 
assistance.”
61 The Indonesia-Malaysia BIT of 1994 specifies in a protocol that national policies “in 
respect of the Republic of Indonesia shall mean the policies of Indonesia which have legal 
effect on foreign investment matters,” thereby excluding other policies.
62 Indonesia-Egypt BIT of 1994; Indonesia-Vietnam BIT of 1991.
63 See Law No. 40/2007 concerning Limited Liability Companies.
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Shares that could Result in Monopolistic Practices and/or Unfair Business 
Competition helps avoid mergers and acquisitions that distort competition. 
In particular, investors have to meet post-notification requirements as laid out 
in chapter III of this law.64 Pre-notification can also be done on a voluntary 
basis at the Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition 
(KPPU), in line with the Regulation of the Commission for the Supervision 
of Business Competition Number 10 Year 2010 concerning Notification 
Form for Merger or Consolidation of Business Entities and Acquisition of 
Company Shares (APEC 2010, 55).
In line with Article 29 of Law No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, the one-
stop-shop system was recently established under Presidential Regulation 
No. 27/2009 concerning One-Stop Integrated Service (PTSP), with the 
objective to further improve Indonesia’s investment climate and facilitate 
investment in Indonesia by reducing red tape and providing appropriate 
and convenient services.65 The time and number of administrative steps 
required for entering Indonesia as an investor, to seek investment approval 
and to obtain relevant licences was shortened as entry regulations and 
licensing procedures were streamlined. What was earlier a process to 
obtain a letter of approval was now transformed into a registration system, 
which reduced the processing time via PTSP from seven days to one day 
(APEC 2010). Most importantly, the BKPM was authorised by most other 
ministries and agencies to administer the approval forms, grant licences 
and issue approval on their behalf under the one-stop-shop system.66 There 
is now a four-step registration and permit system in place: (1) application 
to the BKPM,67 (2) review by the BKPM, (3) receipt of registration 
certificate or investment principle permit68 and (4) application for other 
licences related to the investment69 (APEC 2010). The Regulations Head 
of Investment Coordinating Board Nos. 11 (one-stop shop), 12 (investment 
64 See also part four of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 5/1999 concerning 
Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition.
65 See http://www4.bkpm.go.id/contents/general/16/ONE-STOP-SHOP (accessed 25 Oct. 
2013).
66 Ibid.
67 Recommendation from relevant ministries may be required in some cases (APEC 2010).
68 BKPM will cross-check the eligibility of the investment with the negative list (APEC 
2010).
69 These may include licences from local governments, such as construction or building 
permits, location permits or disturbance permit (APEC 2010).
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licences) and 13 (monitoring and after care) of 2011 deal with these issues 
further.
The coordination and organisation of investments among government 
agencies and between the central government and the regions is specified 
in Articles 27, 28, 29 and 30 of Law No. 25/2007. The BKPM is given 
a core role in the coordination and organisation of investments, though 
certain areas are outsourced to regional governments.70 There is currently a 
move, in line with the medium-term development plan, to establish one-stop 
services for business and investment licensing at the provincial, district and 
municipal levels. There are already several hundred one-stop shops across 
Indonesia, and a large majority of districts now have one-stop shops. There 
are also efforts to improve services in existing one-stop shops. Despite these 
local developments, foreign investors still have to get initial approval from 
the BKPM at the central level while domestic investors can approach either 
the provincial governments directly or the central BKPM.71 To support the 
one-stop-shop system, the National Single Window for Investment is being 
developed.72 It allows investors to file online applications for licences and 
obtain non-licence services from an electronic portal.73
Overall, there appears to be consistency of admission clauses in IIAs with 
Indonesian admission procedures and relevant domestic laws. Admission 
of investments is an area where the government retains some degree of 
discretion. Although an admission clause requests a government to admit 
investments, the obligation is on the investor to adhere to all the national 
laws and regulations governing admission. At the same time, it is important 
that admission procedures are swift enough not to deter investors. There is a 
balance to keep between regulatory procedures and the need to attract FDI.
70 Indonesian Law No. 25/2007, Articles 27, 28, 29, 30.
71 Several experts contributed to this description of the one-stop-shop system.
72 See http://www.nswi.bkpm.go.id/wps/portal/english/wps/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xLLM9 
MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3hDAwNPJydDRwMDJzcnA09fRy9TQ9NQIws_I_1wkA6 
zeAMcwNFA388jPzdVvyA7rxwAfZ9k9w!!/dl3/d3/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/# 
(accessed 20 Sept. 2012).
73 See http://www4.bkpm.go.id/contents/general/16/ONE-STOP-SHOP (accessed 25 Oct. 
2013).
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3.4.3 Treatment of investors and investments
The typical approach taken in Indonesian BITs is to grant FET twice within 
the treaty. First, FET is granted together with “adequate” protection and 
security in a provision on admission. Second, a similar, sometimes more 
detailed formulation using the term “fair and equitable treatment” is used 
within the MFN provision, frequently adding that contracting parties “shall 
not impair, by unreasonable or discriminatory measures, the operation, 
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal thereof by those 
investors.”74 This seems to be an idiosyncratic Indonesian approach, as it 
can also be found in the country’s model BIT. Probably due to negotiation 
outcomes, this twofold approach does not appear in all of Indonesia’s 
BITs, and much shorter FET provisions exist in some treaties.75 Normally, 
there are no further clarifications of the FET standard, which leaves room 
for interpretation by investors and arbitral tribunals. However, some of 
Indonesia’s third-generation IIAs, constructed in line with the liberalisation 
approach – in particular the ACIA of 2009, the ASEAN-Korea Agreement 
of 200976 and the ASEAN-China Agreement of 2009 – clarify FET as an 
obligation not to deny justice. These agreements also state that a breach 
of other provisions in the agreement or provisions in a different IIA 
will not constitute a breach of the FET article.77 This is repeated in the 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA), with a clarification 
that the FET standard does not go beyond what is required by customary 
international law. The new Indonesia-Finland BIT of 2006 and some older 
BITs78 refer explicitly to national laws by subjecting the FET standard to 
the host country’s laws and regulations. The Indonesia-Morocco BIT of 
1997 provides FET “subject to the strictly necessary measures to maintain 
the public order.”79 Overall, the newer IIAs offer more clarifications to 
the FET concept, potentially minimising the state’s risks of being sued in 
74 Indonesian model BIT, Articles II.2 and III.1.
75 “Investments of investors of either Contracting Party shall at all time be accorded fair 
and equitable treatment.” See Indonesia-China BIT of 1994.
76 Here, Indonesia is excluded from further clarifications limiting the scope of the FET 
clause.
77 ACIA of 2009, Article 11.
78 Indonesia-Norway BIT of 1991; Indonesia-Vietnam BIT of 1991; Indonesia-Poland BIT 
of 1992.
79 Indonesia-Morocco BIT of 1997, Article II.2.
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international arbitration. This may reflect a lesson learnt from the recently 
emerging case law, where a breach in the FET standard is often used as the 
reason for a claim.
The obligation to treat foreign investors fairly and equitably is a clause 
specific to IIAs that is, due to its comprehensive nature, difficult to 
translate into national law. Consequently, in Indonesian national law, Law 
No. 25/2007 does not explicitly mention FET. Reference is only made 
to foreign and domestic investors’ entitlement to “right certainty, legal 
certainty and protection certainty”, information transparency, “service”, 
and “various forms of facility according to the rules of law” (Article 14). In 
the law’s elucidation, it is pointed out that “right certainty” is only granted 
if the investor meets its own particular obligations. Here again, the main 
investment-specific national law on investment does not appear to be fully 
consistent with international commitments. This might be because FET, 
by nature, is supposed to specify the protection available, particularly 
to foreign investors, whereas many investment-related laws – and even 
completely different laws – could eventually be used to claim a breach of 
the FET standard.
3.4.4 Non-discrimination
Most Indonesian IIAs, especially the older BITs, omit provisions on national 
treatment entirely, and it is primarily the newer IIAs that incorporate national 
treatment provisions. Most notably, the ACIA of 2009, the AANZFTA, the 
ASEAN-Korea FTA and the Indonesia-Japan EPA provide for national 
treatment, in like circumstances, at the pre- and post-establishment phases 
of an investment. These agreements allow for reservations that specify 
when national treatment does not apply. Depending on the agreement, such 
reservations include existing measures made by central, regional and local 
governments, to be identified in a schedule where efforts should be made to 
phase out these non-conforming measures over time. Such reservations may 
also include the possibility to institute administrative formalities related 
to investments.80 This is coherent with Indonesia’s post-2007 policy on 
80 ACIA of 2009, Articles 5, 9 and 20; ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, Articles 4, 12, 
14 and 16; ASEAN-Korea FTA, Articles 3 and 15; Indonesia-Japan EPA, Articles 59 and 
64.
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concluding FTAs and EPAs that mix protection, promotion and liberalisation 
elements in line with the liberalisation approach.
In other post-establishment IIAs concluded by Indonesia, the national 
treatment provision, if existent, usually comes with a series of conditions 
and protocols. The ASEAN-China FTA, for example, excludes non-
conforming measures from the national treatment provision – an approach 
that is borrowed from China’s treaty practice.81 Other BITs offering national 
treatment include significant limitations and exceptions.82 For example, the 
Indonesia-Finland BIT of 2006 provides, only in the protocol, that:
The Government of the Republic of Indonesia, while recognizing the 
principle of national treatment of investments made by investors of the 
Republic of Finland in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, reserves 
the right to maintain limited exceptions to national treatment. This 
treatment shall in no case be less favourable than Law no. 1 of 1967, as 
amended in 1970, permits.83
Only a few newer BITs offer national treatment more broadly, with 
limitations being confined to some further clarifications84 or a reference to 
national laws and regulations by subordinating national treatment to the host 
country’s domestic laws.85
Overall, national treatment is an area where Indonesia maintains significant 
amounts of policy space. At the same time, national treatment is a core 
standard in IIAs, and its omission may substantially reduce the attraction 
of Indonesia as an investment location, which is probably why national 
treatment has increasingly found its way into Indonesia’s IIAs. It should 
be noted here that, even if national treatment is not generally granted, it 
is sometimes granted under other provisions of the treaty, such as under 
81 ASEAN-China FTA, Articles 4 and 6. See Berger (2013).
82 Indonesia-Argentina BIT of 1995; Indonesia-Belgium BIT of 1972; Indonesia-Denmark 
BIT of 1968; Indonesia-Switzerland BIT of 1974.
83 Indonesia-Finland BIT of 2006, Protocol. A similar, more extensive provision is 
established in the protocol of the Indonesia-Netherlands BIT of 1994.
84 Indonesia-Germany BIT of 2003; Indonesia-Singapore BIT of 2005; Indonesia-Turkey 
BIT of 1997, Article II, paragraph 2.
85 Indonesia-India BIT of 1999, Article 4; and to some extent, Indonesia-Italy BIT of 1991, 
Article 4, and Indonesia-Korea BIT of 1991.
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compensation for losses. This issue is examined further in the relevant 
sections of this study.86
Similar to the IIAs, Indonesian domestic law was averse to national treatment 
prior to 2007. As in Indonesia’s BITs, national treatment was previously not 
provided in domestic laws on investment, which were separated into two 
laws: one for domestic and one for foreign investment (see above).87 Law 
No. 25/2007 concerning Investment is a novelty in this regard, as it states 
that the government is “to provide the same treatment to any domestic and 
foreign investors, by continuously considering the national interest.”88 Such 
inclusion of national treatment could be considered as a real “watershed” 
in Indonesian investment policy (Wilson 2011). The phrase “continuously 
considering the national interest” is there to retain some regulatory flexibility 
for Indonesia. In its elucidation, the law clarifies that equal treatment “shall 
mean that the Government shall refrain from giving different treatment to any 
investors that have made investment in Indonesia, unless otherwise specified 
by the rules of law.”89 The formulation applies to the post-establishment 
phase of the investment, subordinating national treatment to Indonesia’s 
domestic laws and regulations. It also applies to possible discrimination 
among domestic investors. The thoughtful ways in which these provisions 
are phrased helps maintain some regulatory flexibility for the government, 
but it may function as a disincentive for foreign investors to invest.
One area where separation between foreign and domestic investors is 
maintained is investment approval. As mentioned before, screening 
mechanisms are still separate for foreign and domestic investors in the 
approval process supervised by the BKPM. Limitations on foreign equity 
ownership also exist in certain sectors, especially in the area of services 
(APEC 2010). Taxation is the same for foreign and domestic investors 
(OECD 2010, 21, 195), although there are exceptions in a few select 
86 e.g., see Indonesia-Cuba BIT of 1997; Indonesia-Czech Republic BIT of 1998.
87 One expert pointed out that, previously, the negative list was much larger for foreign than 
for domestic investors, and more incentives were given to domestic investors compared to 
those received by foreign companies. The issuance of approval documents also differed 
between the two.
88 Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, Chapter III, 
Article 4, paragraph (2) a. 
89 Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, Elucidation, 
Chapter III, Article 4, paragraph (2) a.
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sectors.90 All this should not contradict any pre-establishment commitments 
made in a few select IIAs, as these provide for the necessary reservations 
and carve-outs. There are still several non-conforming measures in place 
today, and some sectors may not yet have reached conformity with the 
national treatment principle. The schedules attached to the IIAs specify the 
sectors that are being carved out, and these are reviewed periodically.91
The shift towards national treatment as part of Indonesia’s investment policy 
was not sudden, as national treatment was incorporated into some treaties 
before 2007.92 Nevertheless, especially during this transition from omission 
of national treatment to its inclusion in IIAs, a large variety of regulations 
or measures – including those newly adopted by ministries and government 
agencies – could affect and violate the national treatment standard. Effective 
inter-ministerial communication and consultations will be important to 
ensure that any newly issued regulations are in conformity with international 
commitments in this area.
The other aspect dealing with non-discrimination is the MFN principle. 
Most Indonesian IIAs include a simple post-establishment MFN clause.93 
Exceptions for regional economic integration agreements are standard, 
and taxation exceptions are regularly included. In most cases, no further 
exceptions or limitations are provided.94 The ACIA of 2009, the ASEAN-
China FTA, the ASEAN-Korea FTA of 2009 and the Indonesia-Japan EPA of 
200795 even provide MFN treatment at the pre-establishment phase. Overall, 
the chance of unintended treaty shopping is quite high. The ASEAN-China 
FTA provides for non-conforming measures and limits recourse to dispute 
settlement to the base treaty, limiting the chances of treaty shopping in that 
area.
The wording on MFN treatment provided in national law is strongly in line 
with that typically found in IIAs. Article 6 of Law No. 25/2007 concerning 
Investment says:
90 According to one expert.
91 According to comments made by one expert.
92 Indonesia-Germany BIT of 2003.
93 A notable exception is the AANZFTA, which does not have an MFN clause.
94 In rare cases, more clarifications are added in a protocol, such as the Indonesia-Argentina 
BIT of 1995 and the Indonesia-Germany BIT of 2003.
95 ACIA of 2009, Articles 6 and 20; ASEAN-China FTA, Articles 5 and 6; ASEAN-Korea 
FTA, Articles 4 and 15; Indonesia-Japan EPA of 2007, Articles 60 and 62.
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(1)  The Government shall provide the same treatment to any investors 
originating from any countries making investment in Indonesia pursuant 
to the rules of law.
(2)  Treatment set forth in paragraph (1) shall not apply to investor of certain 
countries that have received privilege by virtue of an agreement with 
Indonesia.96
The formulation is akin to a post-establishment clause clarifying that 
investments must be undertaken in accordance with the law to enjoy MFN 
treatment. It is broadly in line with Indonesia’s post-establishment IIAs. 
An interesting element in the formulation on privileged countries is that 
reference is made to “an agreement”, which could mean IIAs, implying a 
motivation to avoid treaty shopping. The elucidation provides more clarity, 
suggesting that 
‘Privilege’ shall mean the one pertaining to custom union, free trade zone, 
common market, monetary union, institution of similar kind and agreement 
between Indonesian Government and foreign governments whose nature 
is bilateral, regional or multilateral with respect to certain privilege in 
organizing investment. 
It appears that bilateral agreements – which would include IIAs – are 
incorporated in this exception.
In starting to grant national and MFN treatment in the pre-establishment 
phase, Indonesia is significantly lowering its policy space in this area. In 
particular, such commitments made in multilateral treaties concluded by 
Indonesia might have a particular lock-in effect. More caution will now 
be required in enacting any national laws that could have a discriminatory 
impact on potential and actual foreign investments. The result is a reduction 
in policy space.
3.4.5 Protection of investments
As in Indonesia’s model BIT, most BITs refer to “adequate” or “adequate 
physical” protection and security,97 rather than the commonly used 
96  Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, Article 6.
97 The Indonesia-Norway BIT of 1991 provides for “equitable and reasonable treatment and 
protection.” The Indonesia-Spain BIT of 1995 refers simply to protection of investments.
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formulation of “full” protection and security. Some BITs do not provide 
for this standard at all, whereas others do provide for “full” protection 
and security without further clarifications.98 These discrepancies might 
be a reflection of negotiation outcomes. The newer ASEAN agreements 
also offer full protection and security, but provide that “full protection 
and security requires each Member State to take such measures as may be 
reasonably necessary to ensure the protection and security of the covered 
investments.” 99 The AANZFTA also limits the concept to customary 
international law standards.100 These are attempts to clarify the extent of 
full protection and security that are typical for agreements following the 
liberalisation approach.
Most Indonesian IIAs offer investors compensation for losses owing to a 
range of causes. They often provide a list of such causes, such as “armed 
conflict, revolution, a state of investor emergency, revolt, insurrection 
or riot.”101 Most IIAs also offer non-discriminatory treatment in such 
circumstances, with reference usually made to national and/or MFN 
treatment. These include the ASEAN agreements and the EPA with Japan,102 
but also many BITs. Some BITs do not offer national treatment, which is in 
accordance with the model BIT.103
In national law, Indonesia addresses the issue of protection and security in 
a general manner in Law No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, providing 
that “Government and/or regional government shall provide business 
98 See Indonesia-Finland BIT of 2006; Indonesia-Germany BIT of 2003; Indonesia-Thailand 
BIT of 1998; and Indonesia-Japan EPA of 2007. Some very old BITs also provide for 
“full” protection and security, such as the Indonesia-United Kingdom BIT of 1976.
99 ACIA of 2009, Article 11.
100 ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA of 2009, Article 6. The same is done in the ASEAN-
Korea FTA; however, Indonesia is excepted from this provision.
101 Indonesian model BIT, Article V. The Indonesia-Mozambique BIT of 1999 and the 
Indonesia-Czech Republic BIT of 1998 provide even further detail on the nature of these 
causes.
102 The ACIA of 2009, Article 9, only provides for non-discriminatory treatment; all the 
other ASEAN agreements provide for national and MFN treatment.
103 e.g., the Indonesia-Finland BIT of 2008, the Indonesia-Germany BIT of 2003, the 
Indonesia-Malaysia BIT of 1994 and the Indonesia-Sweden BIT of 1992 only offer MFN 
treatment; the Indonesia-India BIT of 1999, the Indonesia-Ukraine BIT of 1996, the 
Indonesia-Kyrgyzstan BIT of 1995 and the Indonesia-Hungary BIT of 1992 offer both 
national and MFN treatment.
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certainty and security in the implementation of investment.”104 As there is 
no mentioning of “full” or “adequate” protection and security, the degree 
of protection and security to be provided could be interpreted as more 
limited compared to the IIAs, unless “business certainty and security” is 
interpreted as being akin to “adequate” protection. Compensation for losses 
is not covered at all in Law No. 25/2007, illuminating another difference 
between IIAs and national laws. Here again, policy space is being sought in 
national law, although Indonesia would be expected to fulfil its international 
commitments in this area.
The Constitution provides that “every person shall have the right to 
protection of his/herself, family, honour, dignity, and property, and shall 
have the right to feel secure against and receive protection from the 
threat of fear.” 105 Article 30 of the Constitution refers to the Indonesian 
National Military (TNI) and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) as the 
responsible organs to protect and maintain public order and security. 
3.4.6 Expropriation
The ASEAN agreements all have elaborate provisions on expropriation. 
In these treaties, much effort is put into specifying what constitutes an 
indirect expropriation, and frequent use is made of annexes. In all four 
ASEAN agreements, the expropriation article does not apply to the issuance 
of compulsory licences granted in line with the TRIPS agreement in the 
area of intellectual property rights. The annex of the ACIA of 2009 further 
specifies that “an action or a series of related actions by a Member State 
cannot constitute an expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or 
intangible property right or property interest in a covered investment.” 106 
The AANZFTA of 2009 includes a very similar clause in its annex.107 In the 
annexes of the ACIA and the AANZFTA, measures of indirect expropriation 
have to have the same effect as measures of direct expropriation to be 
considered as such, and whether an expropriation has indeed occurred has 
to be examined on a case-by-case basis. Here, a measure that reduces the 
104 Indonesian Law No. 25/2007, Article 30, paragraph (1).
105 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Article 28G, paragraph (1). 
106 ACIA of 2009, annex 2, paragraph 1.
107 AANZFTA of 2009, annex on expropriation and compensation.
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economic value of an investment is not necessarily considered tantamount to 
expropriation. Other aspects must be considered, such as the government’s 
breach of a prior written commitment, the nature of a measure and whether 
it affects the investor disproportionately to the public benefit derived from 
it. Measures of general application that are for legitimate public welfare 
purposes do not constitute expropriation.108 The ASEAN-China FTA 
includes an exception for expropriation of land, which shall be determined in 
domestic laws and regulations.109 This vast amount of hedging with respect 
to the expropriation provision may be a result of recent ISDS cases that have 
emerged on the basis of this provision, and resembles the more elaborate 
formulation of provisions typically found in the agreements following the 
liberalisation approach.
However, the expropriation provisions in Indonesia’s BITs are much more 
general. No BIT clarifies in detail what is meant by indirect expropriation. 
Instead, some BITs refer to domestic laws and regulations, probably intended 
as a risk-mitigation strategy to reduce the potential exposure to international 
arbitration. Several BITs provide for the possibility to undertake a legal or 
administrative review of measures,110 and the Indonesia-Japan EPA of 2007 
additionally refers taxation measures, which may count as expropriation, to 
be handled in first instance by domestic courts.111 The Singapore-Indonesia 
BIT of 2005 also refers expropriation of land to domestic legislation. It is 
interesting to note that some BITs grant national or MFN treatment in the 
context of expropriation.112
Article 7 of Law No. 25/2007 handles expropriation, which can only be 
undertaken according to the law. The government is required to pay the 
108 ACIA of 2009, annex, paragraphs 3–5; AANZFTA, annex on expropriation and 
compensation, paragraphs 3–5.
109 ASEAN-China FTA of 2009, Article 8, paragraph 4.
110 Indonesia-Singapore BIT of 2005; Indonesia-Germany BIT of 2003; Indonesia-India BIT 
of 1999; Indonesia-Mozambique BIT of 1999; Indonesia-Czech Republic BIT of 1998; 
Indonesia-Thailand BIT of 1998; Indonesia-Romania BIT of 1997; Indonesia-Hungary 
BIT of 1992; Indonesia-UK BIT of 1976.
111 Indonesia-Japan EPA of 2007, Article 65, paragraph 4, together with Article 73. Certain 
tax measures in Indonesia are excluded.
112 The Indonesia-Belgium BIT of 1970 grants national and MFN treatment and the 
Indonesia-Germany BIT of 2003 only MFN treatment to foreign investors in this context. 
The Indonesia-Vietnam BIT of 1991 brings up fair and equitable treatment in the context 
of expropriation.
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market price as compensation. In situations of disagreement, the case can 
be reviewed by “another judicial or independent party” (APEC 2010). 
If the case remains unresolved, the issue of compensation can be settled 
by arbitration.113 The revocation of land rights is dealt with in Presidential 
Regulation No. 65/2006, which is the amendment to Presidential Regulation 
No. 36/2005 on Procurement of Land for Realizing Development for Public 
Interest, and in Law No. 20/1961 on the Revocation of Rights of Land and 
the Objects Over the Land. Indonesia’s Constitution provides that “every 
person shall have the right to own personal property, and such property may 
not be unjustly held possession of by any party.”114 Compared to Indonesia’s 
international commitments through IIAs, national law appears much less 
specific on the issue of indirect expropriation but is overall consistent with 
international obligations. It is worth adding that many government measures 
– implemented by various ministries and agencies – could eventually be 
considered as tantamount to expropriation. Coordination among ministries 
and agencies is therefore also important in this area of investment law.
3.4.7 Transfer of funds
The ASEAN agreements have very detailed transfer of funds provisions.115 
Although they provide the usual illustrative list on what types of transfers 
can be undertaken, implying that other kinds of transfers could also be 
understood as falling under the free transfers provision, there are some 
clarifications and exceptions. One exception in all these agreements is 
the requirement for conformity with the rights and obligations that each 
ASEAN member state has towards the IMF. All ASEAN agreements also 
have balance-of-payments exceptions, allowing for temporary derogation 
from the free transfer of funds when certain specified conditions are met.116 
The ACIA of 2009, the ASEAN-China FTA, the ASEAN-Korea FTA and 
also, to a more limited extent, the Indonesia-Japan EPA allow the delay 
or prevention of transfers when laws and regulations that have general 
113 Law No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, Article 7, paragraph (3).
114 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Article 28H, paragraph (4).
115 ASEAN-China FTA (Article 10, paragraph 2) even includes an MFN clause, to be applied 
to transfers in similar circumstances.
116 ACIA of 2009, Article 16; ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, Article 4, paragraph 3; 
ASEAN-China FTA, Article 11; ASEAN-Korea FTA, Article 11.
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application are applied in good faith. An exhaustive list of relevant areas 
is provided, which include issues such as law enforcement, bankruptcy, 
securities trading, taxation, social security and the requirement to fulfil 
formalities (e.g. of central banks).117 The ASEAN-China FTA also specifies 
that transfers should comply with formalities specified in domestic laws and 
regulations, as long as these are not contradictory to the obligations under 
the agreement.118 Overall, these are efforts that provide the Indonesian 
government with more legislative flexibility under specified and often 
temporary conditions.
The transfer provisions in Indonesia’s BITs are not as elaborate. Although 
the Indonesian model BIT suggests the use of an exhaustive list, actual BITs 
do not follow this approach. In terms of clarifications, some BITs protect 
the rights of creditors,119 whereas many others refer to domestic laws by 
allowing transfer within the scope of a country’s laws and regulations.120 The 
Indonesia-Finland BIT of 2006 specifies a maximum possible delay of six 
months for a transfer.121 Some BITs grant MFN treatment with regard to the 
provision on transfer of funds.122 There are further variations in Indonesia’s 
oldest BITs. An interesting variation can be found in the Indonesia-United 
Kingdom BIT of 1976, which includes an exception for “exceptional 
financial or economic circumstances.”123
Domestically, Law No. 25/2007 equally provides a non-exhaustive list of 
funds that can be transferred and repatriated. Such repatriation is to be 
undertaken in accordance with the rules of law. There are some exceptions, 
such as for the protection of the rights of creditors, related to taxation, 
117 ACIA of 2009, Article 13, paragraph 3; ASEAN-China FTA, Article 10, paragraph 3; 
ASEAN-Korea FTA, Article 10, paragraph 2.
118 ASEAN-China FTA, Article 10, paragraph 4.
119 Indonesia-Australia BIT of 1992.
120 e.g. Indonesia-Finland BIT of 2006; Indonesia-Thailand BIT of 1998; Indonesia-Cuba 
BIT of 1997; Indonesia-Mongolia BIT of 1997; Indonesia-Uzbekistan BIT of 1996; and 
Indonesia-Egypt BIT of 1994. In the Indonesia-Malaysia BIT of 1994, the term “national 
policies” is added. The Indonesia-Mozambique BIT of 1999 adds that the use of these 
laws should not impede on the investor’s rights.
121 This period is only three months in the – very elaborately formulated – Indonesia-Spain 
BIT of 1995.
122 Indonesia-Finland BIT of 2006; Indonesia-Thailand BIT of 1998; Indonesia-Romania 
BIT of 1997; and Indonesia-Sweden BIT of 1992.
123 Indonesia-United Kingdom BIT of 1976.
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to prevent the state from any loss or when legal liabilities still have to be 
settled.124 This is broadly in line with Indonesia’s BIT programme. Indonesia 
does not restrict the transfer and repatriation of funds connected to foreign 
investments, but there are some limitations that help guard some policy 
space.
Indonesia has been using a floating exchange rate regime, based on supply 
and demand for its currency, since 1997. Bank Indonesia may, however, 
intervene in the foreign exchange market if fluctuations become exaggerated 
(APEC 2010). As the transfer of capital forms a part of the capital account, 
the central bank is responsible for governing and regulating the movement of 
funds as part of its macro-prudential policy. The government continuously 
monitors the movement of funds.125 Given Indonesia’s currently sound 
economic fundamentals, the emergence of balance of payments or other 
financial problems is unlikely. Indonesia is committed to the free flow of 
capital at any time without discrimination regarding the source or amount 
of capital.
3.4.8 Entry and sojourn of personnel
Only very few of Indonesia’s IIAs have provisions on personnel. The ACIA 
of 2009, the Indonesia-India BIT of 1999, the Indonesia-Turkey BIT of 
1997, the Indonesia-Sweden BIT of 1992 and the Indonesia-Australia 
BIT of 1992 provide that entry and sojourn of personnel relevant to the 
investment should be allowed.126 The Indonesia-Germany BIT of 2003 has 
a respective clause in its protocol, suggesting that “prompt consideration” 
should be given to applications for entry. The Indonesia-Spain BIT of 
1995 and the protocol of the Indonesia-Netherlands BIT of 1994 provide 
that the issuance of permits or licences for the employment of foreigners 
should be facilitated. Many of these BITs, and the ACIA of 2009, refer to 
domestic law by subjecting the entry of aliens to the host state’s laws and 
regulations.127 Finally, the Indonesia-Turkey BIT of 1997 permits investors 
124 Indonesian Law No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, Article 8, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, and 
Article 9.
125 According to the accounts of two experts.
126 In the case of the Indonesia-Australia BIT of 1992, this includes senior personnel.
127 Indonesia-Germany BIT of 2003; Indonesia-India BIT of 1999; and Indonesia-Australia 
BIT of 1992.
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“to engage managerial and technical personnel of their choice, regardless 
of nationality.”128 Similar provisions are incorporated into the ACIA and the 
ASEAN-Korea FTA. However, in these two agreements, the host state can 
influence the national composition of members of the board of directors.129 
The ACIA provides further detailed reservations on these matters.130 
Overall, this limited occurrence of provisions on personnel in Indonesia’s 
IIAs allows Indonesian authorities considerable regulatory flexibility on this 
issue.
Quite to the contrary, Law No. 25/2007 is very specific on the issue of 
manpower. Article 10 states that Indonesian nationals should be prioritised 
in recruitment activities, though experts from foreign countries with specific 
knowledge and in certain positions can be employed in accordance with 
the law. In other words, companies can employ expatriates, but only if the 
expertise they have is not available domestically (APEC 2010). Companies 
are further required to “improve the competence of workers of Indonesian 
citizen through work trainings” and to “provide trainings and transfer of 
technology to workers of Indonesian citizen.” 131 Article 11 of Law No. 
25/2007 deals with the resolution of disputes between foreign companies 
and domestic workers, advocating out-of-court proceedings in first instance. 
Article 23 specifies immigration procedures, allowing the entry of foreigners 
in relation to investments and facilitating the provision of relevant licences 
and permits. There are clear specifications on the possible length of stay, 
extensions and changes of residential status. This latter article is broadly in 
line with the provisions in the few IIAs that deal with the entry of personnel, 
whereas Articles 10 and 11 appear to venture further beyond.
Other investment-related national laws also deal with the issues of manpower 
and immigration. Article 23 of Law No. 13/2003 concerning Manpower 
distinguishes between domestic and overseas manpower placement; 
according to Article 34, overseas manpower placement shall be regulated by 
law. Chapter VIII of this law deals with the assignment of expatriates, which 
requires a licence,132 and an expatriate assignment plan needs to be drafted 
128 Indonesia-Turkey BIT of 1997, Article II, paragraph 3(b).
129 ACIA of 2009, Article 8; and ASEAN-Korea FTA, Article 7.
130 ACIA of 2009, Article 9.
131 Indonesian Law No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, Article 10.
132 Indonesian Law No. 13/2003 concerning Manpower, Article 42, paragraph (1).
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for approval.133 Expatriates can only be employed in certain positions and 
for limited time periods.134 Requirements for transfer of know-how and 
training of Indonesian personnel are also specified in Article 45 of this law:
(1) Employers of expatriates shall:
a.  Appoint manpower being Indonesian citizens as counterpart of the 
employed expatriates for the transfer of technology and expertise from 
the said expatriates; and
b.  Organize education and training for the Indonesian manpower as 
meant in letter a according to the qualification of positions assumed by 
the expatriates
(2)  The provision as meant in paragraph (1) shall not apply to expatriates 
assuming the position of executive directors and/or commissioners.135
The Ministry of Manpower appears to have been deeply involved in 
drafting relevant sections of Law No. 25/2007. Whereas the Ministry of 
Manpower handles issues relating to the employment of foreign personnel, 
the immigration authorities, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights and 
the Ministry of Justice handle immigration issues more generally, which 
are determined through government regulations.136 Articles 26 and 27 of 
the Indonesian Constitution deal with citizenship and residence in a more 
general fashion.
In sum, domestic law is much more specific than IIAs on the issue of 
entry and sojourn of foreign personnel. This might be an indication that 
Indonesia maintains considerable policy space in this area. Domestic law 
appears to push for an enhancement of the development contribution of 
the entry of foreign personnel, requiring in particular the training of local 
workers and the transfer of technology and know-how. These expectations 
are enshrined in various bodies of Indonesian domestic law, especially Law 
No. 25/2007 together with Law No. 13/2003 concerning Manpower. The 
133 Indonesian Law No. 13/2003 concerning Manpower, Article 43, paragraph (1).
134 Indonesian Law No. 13/2003 concerning Manpower, Article 42, paragraphs (4)–(6).
135 Indonesian Law No. 13/2003 concerning Manpower, Article 45. In the elucidation to this 
article, it is specified that such appointments of staff for “accompanied” training should 
eventually allow domestic employees to replace the expatriates.
136 e.g. Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 31/1994 concerning 
Alien Control and Immigration Actions of the Republic of Indonesia, and Government 
Regulation No. 32/1994 concerning Visas, Entry Permits and Immigration Permits.
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questions remain as to what extent such requirements for training are – and 
can be – enforced, and what exactly such training should consist of to make 
it different from what foreign investors have to do out of necessity. Such 
efforts to enhance the development contribution of investment are, however, 
interesting – their effectiveness and value should be explored in further 
detail in future research.
3.4.9 Dispute settlement
There are two types of ISDS clauses in Indonesian IIAs. The first kind 
of clause, used by the ASEAN agreements and the Indonesia-Japan EPA, 
includes very comprehensive and detailed provisions in line with the 
liberalisation approach to investment treaties. The second kind, used in 
Indonesia’s BITs, consists of relatively short and general ISDS provisions 
following the protection approach. It is clear that, overall, the more elaborate 
ISDS provisions include more clauses that aim at reducing the potential 
damages to the host state from investors’ claims.
As shown in Table 7, the ACIA of 2009 has the most elaborate ISDS 
provisions, comprised of a whole section in the agreement. The provision is 
limited to certain investors and recent cases, and it applies only to specific 
IIA provisions. Alternatives to arbitration, such as conciliation, are actively 
encouraged in line with ASEAN’s and Asia’s general preference for such 
dispute-resolution methods. There are other interesting clauses, such as on 
submission of expert reports and transparency. Overall, these provisions 
are there to create certainty for the host state on the possible implications 
of the ISDS clause. Some clauses also help mitigate damages, such as 
through the encouragement of alternatives to arbitration. The other ASEAN 
agreements and the Indonesia-Japan EPA also have elaborate provisions. In 
particular, the ISDS provisions in the AANZFTA of 2009 and the Indonesia-
Japan EPA of 2007 are very complex. This shows that in the newer PTIAs, 
much hedging of risks is done in the drafting of the ISDS provision to limit 
uncertainty and potential damages.
Again, the picture is much different with BITs. The standard Indonesian 
BIT, in line with the model BIT, provides for amicable settlement prior to 
arbitration, and then specifies that if no agreement is reached, disputes can 
be referred to international arbitration (especially applying ICSID rules, and 
also those of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) or 
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in many cases also conciliation. Only some BITs have additional provisions 
of some sort. The Indonesia-Denmark BIT of 1968 and the Indonesia-
Switzerland BIT of 1974, on the other hand, have no ISDS provision at 
all. Interesting are formulations in a few bilateral agreements that refer to 
domestic laws. The Indonesia-Japan EPA of 2007 and some BITs provide 
that 
the disputing Party shall carry out without delay the provisions of the award 
and provide in its Area for the enforcement of the award in accordance with 
its relevant laws and regulations.137 
The Indonesia-Morocco BIT of 1997 states that 
the arbitral tribunal shall base its decision on the national law of the 
Contracting Party involved in dispute in whose territory the investment 
was made, including the rules relative to conflicts of law, the provisions of 
this Agreement.138 
Similarly, the Indonesia-China BIT of 1994 provides that 
the tribunal shall adjudicate in accordance with the laws of the Contracting 
Party to the dispute, the provisions of this Agreement as well as generally 
recognized principle of international law accepted by both Contracting 
Parties.139 
Indonesia has ratified the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 and the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States of 1965. 
The ICSID Convention was ratified by Law No. 5/1968.
In Indonesian investment-specific domestic law, dispute settlement is 
found in Article 32 of Law No. 25/2007 concerning Investment. Here also, 
amicable settlement outside of the court system is suggested as the first step 
prior to any adjudication. If this fails, the law states that disputes should be 
settled by arbitration, alternative dispute resolution or the courts of justice. 
Foreign investors are particularly privileged in this article, as they are entitled 
to settle the dispute through international arbitration, which is an avenue 
137 Indonesia-Japan EPA of 2007, Article 69, paragraph 19. For similar formulations, see 
Indonesia-Morocco BIT of 1997, Indonesia-Turkey BIT of 1997 and Indonesia-Spain 
BIT of 1995.
138 Indonesia-Morocco BIT of 1997, Article VIII, paragraph 4.
139 Indonesia-China BIT of 1994, Article 9, paragraph 3d.
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explicitly not open for domestic investors.140 No further provisions are made 
on this issue. The domestic formulation for ISDS is hence akin to Indonesia’s 
model BIT and the short option outlined above. Detailed elaborations on 
procedure, limitations in scope and other matters are omitted. Overall, this 
is in line with Indonesia’s BITs, and hence consistency is sought here. But 
not much has been done to minimise any risks or damages for the host state.
More generally, dispute resolution in Indonesia is governed by Law No. 
30/1999 concerning Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution. 
Arbitration can be used as a method of settlement if both parties agree. The 
most popular arbitration institution in Indonesia is the Indonesia National 
Board of Arbitration (BANI), which is also Indonesia’s permanent court of 
arbitration, but there are also the National Mediation Centre, the Indonesian 
Institute for Conflict Transformation and the Capital Market Arbitration 
Board for areas related to capital markets (APEC 2010). The Ministry of 
Law and Human Rights is involved in handling cases that go to international 
arbitration. Moreover, in the Churchill Mining case, the local government 
of the East Kutai Regency also became party to the dispute.141 There is, of 
course, the domestic court system, which handles the legal cases that do not 
go to arbitration.
Given that most IIAs – with the exception of some recent agreements – 
and Indonesian national law only have very generic ISDS provisions, 
it seems that relatively little has so far been done to reduce any risks of 
possible claims. This might be explained by Indonesia’s relatively positive 
experience, as it has so far conceded few ISDS cases. However, as more 
cases begin to emerge, in line with recent developments, a policy shift in 
Indonesia with regard to ISDS may be a likely result.
140 Law No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, Article 32.
141 Presidential Decree No. 30/2012 concerning the Appointment of the Government of 
East Kutai Regency as a party in the international arbitration process at the Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes related to the request for arbitration for Churchill 
Mining.
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3.4.10  Investment facilitation and promotion
Out of all Indonesian IIAs, only the ACIA of 2009 and the ASEAN-China 
FTA of 2009 have explicit investment promotion provisions.142 The areas 
related to promotion covered in both of these agreements include organising 
events, meetings and exchanges to promote investments and to inform about 
relevant laws and regulations; creating a positive investment environment; 
and simplifying rules and regulations, which includes disseminating 
information on the regulatory environment. The ACIA of 2009 advocates 
the promotion of certain companies (especially SMEs) and activities (in 
particular the enhancement of business networks).143
In terms of the establishment of institutions that could, among other functions, 
support the promotion of investments, Indonesia recommends in most of its 
IIAs that consultations can be held at any time between the parties of an 
agreement.144 However, such provisions, when found in Indonesia’s BITs, do 
not resemble efforts of investment promotion, as no institutional framework 
is set up that involves regular meetings and discussions on promotion issues. 
Only the more elaborately crafted ASEAN agreements and the Indonesia-
Japan EPA of 2007 provide for such institutional arrangements.145 But 
even in these agreements, promotion is not explicitly stated as one of the 
objectives of the institutions and committees to be established; nevertheless, 
these provisions allow for the possibility to consult on other matters or 
additional functions, which could potentially include promotion. In general, 
these institutions and committees are useful, as they enable a better exchange 
of information and may also function as a useful conduit of communication 
about potential investor-state disputes. Finally, subrogation clauses are very 
common in Indonesian IIAs.
Domestically, investment facilitation features strongly in Indonesian Law 
No. 25/2007 concerning Investment. Such investment “facilities” can be 
provided by government to investors for the expansion or establishment of 
142 ACIA of 2009, Articles 24, 25 and 26; ASEAN-China FTA, Articles 20 and 21.
143 ACIA of 2009, Article 24.
144 These provisions usually provide that the agreement can be amended at any time based on 
mutual consent of the parties.
145 ACIA of 2009, Articles 42 and 43; AANZFTA of 2009, Article 17; ASEAN-China FTA 
of 2009, Article 22; and ASEAN-Korea FTA, Articles 24 and 26; Indonesia-Japan EPA of 
2007, Article 75.
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investments. There are specific development-oriented criteria that have to 
be met to qualify for facilities. These include: large-scale employment of 
workers, infrastructure development, transfer of technology, partnering with 
SMEs, investing in remote regions, conducting research and development, 
being in a new industry etc. Such facilities are usually provided in the form 
of tax and fiscal incentives.146 The goal is to address Indonesia’s specific 
problems such as technological deficiencies (through the creation of 
backward and forward linkages with investors in key industries), the need 
for improvements in particular sectors, the need for promotion of pioneer 
industries and strong differences between regions in terms of economic 
development and attractiveness for investment.147 It is further clarified 
that facilities are given on the basis of Indonesia’s industrial policy.148 The 
Masterplan, with its promotion of infrastructure investment, fits with this 
policy.
In Law No. 25/2007, the BKPM is given the task of undertaking investment 
promotion.149 The BKPM functions as Indonesia’s official IPA, and it is 
known to be active and successful in the area of investment promotion, with 
its worldwide marketing of “remarkable” Indonesia through brochures, 
video commercials and other means. An expanding network of Indonesia 
Investment Promotion Centres overseas and other representative offices of 
Indonesia in other countries is used to provide information and advice on 
Indonesia as an investment location.150 In addition to investor- and project 
targeting, the BKPM’s current programme also includes assistance during 
the establishment phase and aftercare services (APEC 2010). These activities 
include assisting investors in solving problems, for example when there are 
conflicts with particular government agencies or regional governments.151
The previously mentioned administrative efforts to reduce red tape in the 
establishment process, including the implementation of PTSP and National 
146 Law No. 25/2007, Article 18. This law has more incentives than its predecessor.
147 According to the accounts of several experts. A large majority of foreign investment in 
Indonesia is actually made in Java and Sumatra (OECD 2010), as investors are quite 
unwilling to invest elsewhere in Indonesia. This is in part due to infrastructure and energy 
bottlenecks – a problem currently being addressed in Indonesia’s various development 
plans (see above).
148 Law No. 25/2007, Article 20.
149 Law No. 25/2007, Article 28.
150 See BKPM Regulation No. 9/2009.
151 According to one expert.
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Single Window for Investment, also function as investment promotion 
through the improvement of the investment environment. Government 
efforts to harmonise legislation, and indeed the creation of Law No. 
25/2007 concerning Investment as an interlocking law that is investment-
specific, also help improve the transparency of the regulatory framework on 
investment, thereby promoting investment.
The relevant taxation regulations are found in Government Regulation No. 
1/2007 concerning Facility of Income Tax on Capital Investment in Certain 
Business Lines and/or Certain Regions,152 which has been amended by 
Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 62 of 2008 
concerning Amendment to Government Regulation Number 1 of 2007 
concerning Income Tax Facility for Investment in Certain Business Fields 
and/or Certain Regions.153 The incentives in these regulations are in line with 
the facilities outlined in Law No. 25/2007, granting various tax allowances in 
labour-intensive industries, sectors that require technology transfer, natural 
resource industries etc., in line with industrial policy priorities (OECD 
2010, 97). At the time of research, Government Regulation No. 52/2011 was 
the main regulation for tax incentives, including lowered company income 
tax and accelerated depreciation and amortisation. In addition, there is a 
list of specific incentives for more than 50 sectors, for investment in special 
regions, and for particular corporations and cooperatives.154 One purpose of 
this incentive scheme is to attract direct investment; it is possible that the 
recent increases in direct investments are partially a result of such policies.
Indonesia also provides incentives by reducing customs duties or providing 
waivers on the payment of customs duties for investments meeting certain 
specified requirements that have a positive effect on development. According 
to the Regulation of the Finance Minister Number 176/PMK.011/2009 on 
the Exemption from Import Duty on the Imports of Machines, Goods and 
Materials for the Establishment or Development of Industry in the Frame 
of Investment, certain kinds of imports of machines, goods, components 
and materials used to produce finished goods are exempted from customs 
152 See, in particular, Article 2.
153 There are continuous implementing regulations, such as Regulation No. 52/2011. See 
http://www.lowtax.net/asp/story/front/Indonesia_Extends_Tax_Incentives____53349.
html (accessed 25 Oct. 2012); http://www.makarim.com/news/LegalUpdates_item.
asp?modID=267 (accessed 25 Sept. 2012). 
154 According to one expert.
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duties for a specified period of time if they are not produced in Indonesia or 
if Indonesian products do not meet the necessary qualitative or quantitative 
specifications. Companies that are diversifying or expanding their capacity 
by a specified amount will also be exempt from import duties.155 As stated in 
the preamble of this regulation, the object is clearly development-oriented:
in order to increase domestic investment to strengthen the national economy 
which faces the global competition, it is necessary to grant an exemption 
from import duty on the imports of machines, goods and materials for the 
establishment or development of industry in the frame of investment.156
In more general terms, this is also specified in Law No. 17/2006 regarding 
Amendment to Law No. 10/1995 on Customs. Finally, Law No. 25/2007 also 
provides for selected services and support in the area of import licensing.157
In addition, Indonesia is making efforts to attract more investors by 
establishing special economic zones. Law No. 25/2007 clarifies that such 
zones should be established strategically with the economic development 
considerations of relevant regions in mind. Investment policy in these zones 
can be different from elsewhere.158 Law No. 39/2009 on Special Economic 
Zones enables zones covering large areas to exploit scale economies and 
encourage various kinds of economic activities (APEC 2010). Many zones 
targeting more remote regions of Indonesia are still in the process of being 
considered. There are also several specified free trade zones and ports, 
and bonded zones, where companies benefit from various tax- and other 
incentives, including reduced export and import tariffs – or none at all.159 
One such zone is the Batam Free Port and Free Trade Zone across from 
Singapore.160
155 Regulation of the Finance Minister Number 176/PMK.011/2009, Articles 2 and 4. 
According to Article 6, motor vehicle industries are not eligible for these benefits, except 
for component industries in this sector. See also Ministry of Finance Decree No. 154.
156 Regulation of the Finance Minister Number 176/PMK.011/2009, preamble.
157 Law No. 25/2007, Article 24. There are a variety of laws issued by the Ministry of Trade 
regulating imports. An illustration of the complexity of the matter can be found in Renti 
and Helmholz (2012).
158 Law No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, Article 31.
159 According to comments made by two experts.
160 Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 46/2007 on Batam Free Port 
and Free Trade Zone.
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This section has shown that the government has quite a lot of flexibility 
to facilitate and promote investment in areas that it considers important 
for development. Investment promotion and incentives are treated much 
more elaborately in domestic laws and regulations, and are not made into 
a commitment at the international level within IIAs. One disadvantage of 
providing facilities to investors is the burden on the government budget, and 
it is important to always review the costs of incentives against the benefits 
obtained from them. Accordingly, the Indonesian government frequently 
reviews whether fiscal incentives meet their intended objectives such as 
attracting investments; past experience in Indonesia has shown that tax 
incentives can be ineffective in promoting investment (OECD 2010, 196–
197). More generally, further research is needed on the extent to which the 
desired companies actually invest as a result of such promotion efforts.
3.4.11  Investor obligations
As mentioned above, Indonesian IIAs tend to require investments to be 
made in line with the host country’s laws and regulations. Other than that, 
there are no specific clauses dealing with investor obligations, except for a 
requirement in the ACIA of 2009 for the disclosure of information in certain 
circumstances.161 Indonesian IIAs include exceptions for taxation matters 
in various provisions, especially within the MFN clause, providing the 
necessary flexibility for national law to determine the appropriate levels of 
taxation. Only the ACIA of 2009, the AANZFTA of 2009 and the ASEAN-
Korea FTA include provisions on performance requirements, which are 
to be in line with the Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures 
(TRIMs) under the WTO. By not having more provisions on performance 
requirements, Indonesia might retain some legislative flexibility in certain 
policy areas such as local content or technology transfer.
Contrary to this absence of provisions on investor obligations in IIAs, 
Indonesian national law has quite a few relevant clauses. Article 10 of Law 
No. 25/2007 concerning Investment specifies requirements to prioritise the 
employment of Indonesian workers, to improve the capabilities of Indonesian 
staff through trainings and to transfer technology.162 Requirements beyond 
161 ACIA of 2009, Article 20.
162 Law No. 25/2007, Article 10.
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manpower issues are spelt out elsewhere in the law. Investors are required 
to manage their company in an appropriate manner, adhere to the principles 
of social responsibility, respect the cultures of Indonesian communities and 
comply with the rules of law.163 If these latter requirements are not adhered to, 
companies may be sanctioned through administrative warnings; restrictions 
or suspensions to their business; or revocation of their investment facilities 
or rights to do business. Other kinds of punishments are also possible.164 
Further liabilities of investors are specified, which include, among other 
things, a responsibility to preserve the environment and treat workers 
appropriately.165 This is in line with a general move in Indonesia to promote 
principles of responsible business conduct (OECD 2010, 209). 
So far, Indonesia has not properly enforced the obligations in this area by 
detailing implementation procedures, clarifying reporting requirements and 
determining the level of sanctions (OECD 2010, 218, 221). Nevertheless, 
specification of these obligations in the form of a law may be useful as an 
avenue to inform companies on the intent and desire of the government, 
indicating that government regulations and presidential decrees may 
follow if appropriate action is not taken voluntarily by companies.166 One 
example where enforcement is observable can be found in Law No. 40/2007 
concerning Limited Liability Companies on the issue of “environmental 
and social responsibility”.167 The law requires assessments of company 
performance on environmental and social responsibilities in their annual 
reports. Environmental and social responsibility is particularly required 
in the natural resources sector, where companies are asked to budget 
and calculate relevant costs.168 Article 95 of Law No. 4/2009 concerning 
Mineral and Coal Mining specifies that holders of mining permits must 
apply good mining techniques in line with respective principles, develop 
and empower the local community and mine at environmentally tolerable 
levels. The law gives concrete advice on what companies should do in these 
areas, such as the preparation of development and empowerment plans for 
local communities and an environmental impact assessment (known as an 
163 Law No. 25/2007, Article 15. 
164 Law No. 25/2007, Articles 33 and 34.
165 Law No. 25/2007, Articles 16 and 17.
166 According to the views of two experts.
167 Law No. 40/2007, Articles 1 and 74.
168 Law No. 40/2007, Articles 66 and 74.
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analisisdampaklingkungan or AMDAL). Preference should also be given 
to employment of local workers and procurement of domestic goods and 
services.169 More broadly, environmental protection and management is 
promulgated by Law No. 32/2009 concerning Environmental Management 
(OECD 2010, 211).
In certain industries, especially sensitive sectors, Indonesia still establishes 
performance requirements for investors. These include local content 
requirements in sectors such as machinery, electronics and automobiles, in 
line with a strategy of import substitution. There are also some domestic 
market obligations imposed in industries such as coal, oil, gas, mining and 
food, in order to ensure domestic availability of these resources (APEC 
2010).
Paying taxes can be considered an obligation of the investor, and as with any 
country, Indonesia has its own set of taxation laws. The Law of the Republic 
of Indonesia Number 26 of 2008 concerning the Fourth Amendment of 
Law No. 7/1983 concerning Income Tax was enacted in line with Law No. 
25/2007 and reduced corporate tax rates. Taxation differs between residents 
and non-residents. Residents, that is, companies incorporated or domiciled 
in Indonesia, have their global incomes taxed, whereas non-residents are 
taxed only on their Indonesian income (OECD 2010, 195). A foreign 
company classified as “permanent establishment” is taxed similarly or 
equally to domestic companies. Indonesia has concluded tax treaties with at 
least 59 countries and jurisdictions (APEC 2010).170
Customs duties on imports or exports are a different kind of investor 
obligation, which, apart from the incentive schemes mentioned above, 
also apply to foreign investors in Indonesia. Law No. 17/2006 regarding 
Amendment to Law No. 10/1995 on Customs regulates customs issues in 
169 Law No. 4/2009, Articles 95, 39, 106, and other articles.
170 The partner countries of Indonesian tax treaties are: Algeria, Australia, Austria, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, 
Korea DPR, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, 
Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, 
Uzbekistan, Venezuela and Vietnam (APEC 2010).
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Indonesia. Customs duties are specified in the Indonesian Customs Tariff 
Book.
It can be concluded from this that Indonesia has maintained some policy 
space in order to enact various kinds of investor obligations into law. The 
limited number of commitments in IIAs on performance requirements and 
the common use of taxation exceptions are largely in accordance with such 
regulatory flexibility. National laws and international commitments appear 
to be mostly coherent. The Indonesian government seems to be showing 
interest in enhancing the amount of investor obligations, with development 
objectives in mind, but remains cautious because such obligations could also 
deter investors. We can therefore observe that the Indonesian government 
has recognised the importance of keeping a balance between attracting 
investments and imposing obligations on investors in view of development 
goals. Investor obligations should be non-discriminatory in nature.
3.4.12  Scope and exceptions
Several ASEAN IIAs limit treaty coverage to investments established after 
entry into force of the treaty.171 However, any BITs previously concluded 
by ASEAN countries would remain in force to the extent that they cover 
older investments. Indeed, most Indonesian BITs cover investments made 
both prior and after the date of entry into force, taking a broad approach in 
terms of coverage. In rare occasions, disputes emerging prior to the entry 
into force of the agreement are excluded, reducing liability of the state.172 In 
most Indonesian IIAs, investors are allowed to maintain their rights under 
the agreement for more than 10 years after an agreement was terminated.
Reference is made to Indonesian Law No. 1/1967, the predecessor of Law 
No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, in practically all IIAs except for some 
recently concluded ones such as the ASEAN agreements.173 Indonesia, 
hence, provides an explicit reference to its domestic investment law in each 
IIA, and explicitly states that protection and coverage under the treaty only 
171 ACIA of 2009; ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, Article 2; ASEAN-Korea FTA, 
Article 1.
172 e.g. Indonesia-Mozambique BIT of 1999; Indonesia-Romania BIT of 1997; Indonesia-
Singapore BIT of 2005; Indonesia-Thailand BIT of 1998; Indonesia-Turkey BIT of 1997.
173 See also Indonesia-Germany BIT of 2003; Indonesia-India BIT of 1999; Indonesia-
Singapore BIT of 2005.
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applies to those investments established in accordance with this law or any 
subsequent law that replaces it. The Indonesia-Vietnam BIT of 1991 further 
specifies that investments must have been approved in order to be protected 
by the treaty.
As shown in Table 8, exceptions and reservations are only included in the 
pre-establishment IIAs formed within ASEAN and between Indonesia 
and Japan, that is, those agreements following the liberalisation approach. 
Because pre-establishment treaties lead to liberalisation of the host 
state’s investment regime, it is necessary to specify more clearly each 
non-conforming measure in an annex. Accordingly, Indonesia’s pre-
establishment treaties allow for some non-conforming measures with regard 
to individual provisions (such as national treatment or expropriation). There 
is the expectation that such non-conforming measures – specified further in 
long annexes to the agreements – should be phased out over time, implying 
efforts towards further liberalisation. Meanwhile, with the notable exception 
of a short clause in Article 12 of the Indonesia-India BIT of 2009, there are 
no such clauses in the post-establishment BITs or the Indonesian model BIT 
that follow the protection approach. It is worth noting in this context that the 
ACIA of 2009 applies only to the following sectors: 
(a) manufacturing; (b) agriculture; (c) fishery; (d) forestry; (e) mining and 
quarrying; (f) services incidental to manufacturing, agriculture, fishery, 
forestry, mining and quarrying; and (g) any other sectors, as may be 
agreed upon by all Member States.174
In domestic law, each law has its own specific temporal scope. Law No. 
25/2007, as most other laws, is valid from the date of its enactment. 
The previous laws of 1967 and 1968 then became invalid, though some 
implementing regulations that were based on them would still continue 
to be in force.175 There is little indication in domestic law about general 
exceptions. 
Indonesian national law applies to any investments in any sectors.176 At the 
same time, Indonesian national law declares certain business sectors to be 
partially or fully closed to investment if so determined by the government. 
This will be done in line with national interests. Sectors can be fully closed 
174 ACIA of 2009, Article 3, paragraph 3.
175 Law No. 25/2007, Articles 37, 38 and 40.
176 Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, Article 2.
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because of issues such as “health, moral, culture, environment, national 
defense & security.”177 Sectors can be partially closed if certain conditions 
or criteria are met, including 
protection of natural resources, protection of micro, small, and medium 
business, as well as cooperatives, supervision of production and 
distribution, increase of technological capacity, participation of domestic 
capital, and joint venture with companies appointed by the government.178 
Keeping certain sectors of the economy fully or partially closed to foreign 
investors can help enhance policy flexibility to pursue development 
objectives. Indonesia’s policies to allow only partial ownership in sectors 
where SMEs are omnipresent179 and to encourage spillovers through joint 
ventures and technology transfer are clearly geared towards enhancing the 
development impact of FDI. Keeping sectors closed is in line with admission 
clauses in BITs, as approval can be denied, but it has to be reflected in the 
schedules to the ASEAN agreements and the Indonesia-Japan EPA.
Indonesia provides a negative list that is continuously updated and has been 
recently streamlined in line with the commitments made under ASEAN. 
The list specifies which sectors are fully closed to investors and which 
foreign investors face limitations in equity ownership. The negative list can 
currently be found in Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia 
Number 36 of 2010 on List of Business Fields Closed to Investment 
and Business Fields Open, with Conditions, to Investment. A variety of 
considerations were made in preparing this list, including local content 
and local employment in certain sectors in line with an import substitution 
strategy, and domestic market obligations geared, for example, towards 
guaranteeing the availability of specific energy resources domestically 
(APEC 2010). Joint venture requirements are also found in the negative 
list (Eurocham 2011, 35). The negative list has been considered to be rather 
extensive by international standards, though this may be due to its high 
level of transparency (OECD 2010, 76). It is possible to take sectors off the 
negative list, but also to add sectors, as happened with telecommunication 
towers in 2008 (OECD 2010, 135). Presidential Regulation of the Republic 
of Indonesia Number 76 of 2007 regarding the Criteria and Establishment 
of Closed Business Line and Open Business with Conditions in Respect of 
177 Ibid., Article 12, paragraph (3).
178 Ibid., Article 12, paragraph (5).
179 Article 13 of Law No. 25/2007 further elaborates on the issue of cooperation with SMEs.
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Capital Investment specifies the criteria for closing sectors partially or fully 
to investment, which are consistent to those specified in Law No. 25/2007 
(see above). Article 17 of Presidential Regulation No. 76/2007 provides that 
the negative list shall be evaluated regularly and revised in accordance with 
national interests and in view of Indonesia’s economic development.180
The Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs has overall responsibility 
for the negative list, accepting requests from other agencies for the 
inclusion of certain sectors on the list.181 The preparation of the negative 
list is also informed by stakeholder consultations.182 Presidential Regulation 
No. 76/2007 further emphasises that compliance with international 
commitments and international agreements has to be maintained.183 Other 
relevant laws are Law No. 25/1992 on Cooperatives, Law No. 20/2008 on 
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, and Government Regulation No. 
44/2007 on Partnership. All this is in line with Article 33, paragraph (2) of 
the Indonesian Constitution, which states that “sectors of production which 
are important for the country and affect the life of the people shall be under 
the powers of the State.”
The legal changes made since 2007, especially the changes to the negative list, 
have opened up previously restricted sectors to foreign investment (OECD 
2010, 45). Because it is a negative list and not a positive list like before, 
Indonesia portrays itself as generally open for investments. At the same 
time, confusion persists about the direction and consistency of Indonesian 
investment policy, in particular regarding the future of the negative list. 
Although Indonesia appears to make use of its policy space to partially 
or fully close certain sectors to investment, it is less evident whether the 
negative list accurately reflects Indonesia’s economic development needs, 
and to what extent other concerns and stakeholder interests might have 
played a role in the development of the list. Quite certainly, some policies – 
such as those that protect SMEs, which constitute the large majority of firms 
in Indonesia – do appear to make a development contribution.
180 Presidential Regulation No. 76/2007, Article 5.
181 Presidential Regulation No. 76/2007.
182 According to one expert.
183 Presidential Regulation No. 76/2007, Article 6, paragraph (2).
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3.5 Recent Indonesian measures affecting investment
In order to examine how the nature of the international and national 
legal framework on investment relates to recent policy-making, this 
section briefly surveys regulatory changes between 2008 and 2011, and 
then discusses in greater detail selected policy developments that have a 
particularly significant impact on investors. Table 9 lists the most recent 
major national measures taken in Indonesia that affect investments.184 What 
becomes immediately apparent is that Indonesia has undertaken a large 
number of policy measures that are in line with its continuous reform efforts 
and in order to adapt national policy measures to changing conditions. Some 
measures are favourable to investments, whereas others seek to restrict 
investment; many of them – both favourable and restricting ones – appear to 
have been introduced with particular development objectives in mind. But 
to a certain extent, it seems that Indonesia is making too many changes in 
national policy.
Some of the measures exhibit a particular concern with issues of ownership 
and control, and laws regulating divestment are not uncommon. Equity 
restrictions on foreign investment are very common in Indonesia (OECD 
2010, 33). In accordance with this view, Indonesia ranked poorly in the 
OECD’s FDI restrictiveness index. Indonesia was the third most-restrictive 
country among those analysed in the index for 2012, after China and Saudi 
Arabia.185
This mixture between favourable and restrictive investments reflects the 
aforementioned rift in the Indonesian discourse on economic policy between 
a more liberal approach and an approach that favours a strengthened 
industrial policy and government intervention. New measures not only 
target investments directly – other investment-related fields, such as trade, 
have also been affected by new measures. Among the recent policies in the 
trade field are a ban on exports of rattan and other products, and a limit 
on the ports through which imports of horticulture products can enter 
Indonesia (Haswidi 2012). If a trend can be discerned from these policy 
developments, it would point towards an increase of trade barriers. The 
184 The list is not intended to be exhaustive.
185 OECD, FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, 2012; available at: http://www.oecd.org/
daf/internationalinvestment/investmentstatisticsandanalysis/ColumnChartImage%20
%202012%20FDI%20RR%20Index.pdf (accessed 28 Oct. 2012).
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aim of such measures is often to incentivise domestic production and value 
added, protect domestic industries and diversify domestic economic output 
by reducing the amount of imported parts and components.186
Regardless of whether the intention of such measures is nationalistic or 
developmental, there is a tendency to enact new laws and regulations but 
not follow them up sufficiently with implementing regulations (OECD 
2010, 27). Another phenomenon is that new measures are readjusted not too 
long after their initial enactment in response to negative reactions by certain 
stakeholders or the public. Uncertainties are created as a result of these shifts 
and changes, potentially having a negative impact on investor confidence.187 
This seems to indicate that many regulations are not enacted on the basis 
of a thorough and careful assessment of possible consequences, but rather 
only on the basis of the government’s views and procedures for decision-
making. Crafting national measures with a lack of care could, however, have 
consequences at the international level if international commitments are not 
sufficiently taken into account in the process of drafting the measure.
With regard to national measures, particularly noteworthy and controversial 
developments have occurred in the mining sector, where a surge of 
restrictive measures have appeared recently. The Government Regulation 
of the Republic of Indonesia Number 24 of 2012 regarding Amendment of 
Government Regulation Number 23 of 2010 regarding Conduct of Business 
on Mineral and Coal Mining Industry has created unease about its impact 
on foreign investors.188 In certain raw materials sectors, the law requires 
progressive divestment of foreign ownership in mining companies so that 
after a period of 10 years of production, an Indonesian government (central 
or local) or private entity will own at least 51 per cent of the company. 
Although such divestments are not new in Indonesia and have existed since 
the 1967 mining law, the magnitude of required divestments in Government 
Regulation No. 24/2012 is unusual. On the basis of the mining law issued 
186 According to the accounts of three experts.
187 According to the views of two experts.
188 See http://de.scribd.com/doc/102518581/Government-Regulation-24-2012 and http://
portal.djmbp.esdm.go.id/sijh/PP%20Nomor%2024%20TAHUN%202012.pdf (accessed 
27 Oct. 2012).
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in 2009189 and a subsequent regulation in 2010,190 the authorised foreign 
ownership ceiling was previously set at 80 per cent (OECD / UNCTAD 
2012, 16; Butt / Nottage 2012). The 2009 Mining and Coal Law also places 
a ban on the exports of unprocessed minerals from 2014 onwards, forcing 
companies to process more of the minerals locally. Already at the time of 
research, restrictions on the export of unprocessed minerals had been put 
in place. One restriction is the requirement to obtain permission from the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources to be allowed to export; the 
other is an export tax of 20 per cent (Tampubolon 2012). The new legal 
framework on mining, established in 2009, gives priority to local mining 
service companies, shortens the duration of licences and favours local 
refining and processing (OECD 2010, 80).
For foreign mining companies, such divestment requirements could be 
problematic. In addition to the general uncertainty surrounding such 
regulations – potentially necessitating renegotiation of investment contracts 
– 10 years may not be considered sufficient to generate enough investment 
returns to make the investment viable. The length of time needed to 
make a profit differs within the mining sector (Mishkin / Thomas 2012). 
Government advice is also not clear on the issue of contract negotiation. 
In the past, companies had difficulties finding a government or Indonesian 
enterprise with sufficient funds to purchase the stake to be divested (Butt / 
Nottage 2012). Problems for investors could also result from the export ban, 
as the timeline may be too tight for some companies to make the necessary 
adjustments, technological and otherwise.191
It is debatable whether these measures in the mining sector should be 
considered as reflecting the Indonesian government’s right to regulate. Only 
the future will determine to what extent such regulations might violate 
commitments made in an IIA, leading to an ISDS case. On one hand, 
admission clauses in investment treaties require that investments shall be 
made in accordance with Indonesian laws and regulations, which include 
this mining law, but on the other hand, the divestment requirement could 
be interpreted as a breach of a national treatment, expropriation or FET 
provision (Butt / Nottage / Williams 2012). It should be noted that many 
189 Mineral and Coal Mining Law No. 4/2009.
190 Government Regulation No. 23/2010. Divestment of at least 20 per cent was to occur 
within five years of operation (Harianto 2012).
191 According to the views of one expert.
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“contract of work” agreements signed by foreign mining investments in 
Indonesia already require divestments up to 49 per cent of ownership, so 
there might not be that much changing as a result of the law (Bachelard 
2012). Nevertheless, there are concerns that the law might be applied 
retroactively against investments that have been made under previous legal 
conditions.192 The government is now pursuing renegotiations of contracts 
with investors, to include issues such as raising the amount of local 
processing in Indonesia, royalties, divestment and enhanced local content 
requirements (Tampubolon 2012).
Indonesia is still in need for foreign financial, technological and other 
kinds of assistance in the mining sector, especially in areas such as offshore 
extraction. Hence, one likely intention of the government for introducing such 
a regulation was to progressively reduce this dependence by fostering more 
local capabilities and participation in the mining industry and enabling more 
national companies to undertake exploration, exploitation and processing of 
natural resources in Indonesia. The hope would be that, by pushing for local 
production and divestment in the mining law, resulting spillover effects and 
technology transfer would generate more local economic value added in 
primary industries, enabling Indonesia to export more products with higher 
value added. An improved performance in that sector would be intended 
as the ultimate outcome.193 Indonesian authorities have indeed mentioned 
that the encouragement of downstream metal refining and production within 
Indonesia was one objective of the barriers that were introduced (Nehru 
2012). According to the mastermind behind the law, Dr Simon Sembiring, 
the mining law intended to follow the Indonesian Constitution, which states 
that minerals are owned by the people (Bachelard 2012). Article 33 of the 
Indonesian Constitution also requires that the state maintains control over 
the country’s natural resources.
However, this step towards less openness could deter foreign investors and 
businesses. In addition, doubts have been raised about the effectiveness 
of these policy measures. Local processing will require large amounts 
of capital and energy that are in short supply, and downstream industries 
might also be uncompetitive in Indonesia. Effects on raw material prices 
in Indonesia could be unfavourable, and there will be little employment 
192 According to one expert.
193 This discussion of the Indonesian mining sector and government intentions constitutes a 
summative account of the views of several experts in Indonesia.
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generation as a result of local processing in the mining sector (Nehru 2012). 
As in the past, the mining industry forms an important part of the Indonesian 
economy today, contributing 17 per cent to Indonesian GDP and attracting 
a significant portion of FDI to Indonesia (Butt / Nottage 2012).194 Given 
the importance of this sector to the national economy, caution is required 
vis-à-vis investment policy-making in this sector, and the government 
should make sure that any new measures taken are indeed conducive to the 
country’s overall development goals.
The controversy over the mining law reflects the broader political debate 
about economic strategy that is currently being held in Indonesia. Part 
of this debate is also about how Indonesia should utilise and protect its 
natural resources.195 To some extent, the mining law resembles an attempt 
by the Indonesian government to make use of its policy space and right 
to regulate. However, it is not certain whether making use of policy space 
in this specific context will have a more positive impact on economic 
development compared to previous policies. At the same time, such 
policy decisions enhance Indonesia’s exposure to potential investor-state 
arbitration. Given the existing concerns about the new law, it is not unlikely 
that intense lobbying by interest groups and the business community could 
actually lead to adjustments to the mining law and relevant regulations. 
Unfortunately, the resulting lack of consistency and clarity would increase 
investor uncertainty about the legal environment in Indonesia.196 In addition, 
it is of importance that the implementation of new measures goes hand in 
hand with enhancements of legal transparency and consistency.197 It then 
becomes evident that making use of available policy space and the right to 
regulate can, in certain circumstances, be counterproductive.
Another question that emerges from the experience with the mining 
law concerns the way policy space should be utilised, whether through 
restrictions, as in the case of the mining law and the related export ban, or 
194 Indonesia’s performance in attracting export-oriented FDI has been relatively weak 
(OECD 2010, 31). 
195 According to the views of one expert.
196 According to the views of one expert.
197 Efforts in Indonesia to improve governance, including the reduction of corruption through 
initiatives such as the Law on Eradicating Corruption of 2001 and the establishment of a 
Corruption Eradication Commission in 2003 (OECD 2010, 26) are very important in this 
context.
Jan Knörich / Axel Berger
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)126
through incentives (e.g. through tax benefits). The nature of the latter might 
be preferable from the point of view of attracting investments, but political 
interest groups have a tendency to advocate more restrictive approaches. 
More generally, an extensive feasibility analysis of all the consequences a 
restrictive law could have should be conducted prior to its enactment. As is 
discussed in more detail below, broad stakeholder consultations are a useful 
avenue to conduct such an analysis.
3.6 Policy coordination of international commitments with 
national law
This in-depth case study of Indonesia’s investment law has demonstrated 
that the government is not short of capacity when it comes to issuing 
new laws and regulations, which happens with a relatively high degree of 
frequency. However, many of the laws lack implementing regulations, such 
as the CSR-related requirements in Law No. 25/2007 on Investment that 
have, for example, not found much obvious application in practice.198 This 
discrepancy between law and practice may be a result of compromises being 
made in the process of inter-ministerial coordination during preparation of 
the law. Other measures, such as in the mining sector mentioned above, 
are being questioned or altered under pressure from the public or lobbyists. 
This, on the other hand, may be a result of insufficient prior stakeholder 
consultations.
Both inter-ministerial coordination and stakeholder consultations are 
important procedures during the process of preparing a new law in the 
field of investment. Inter-ministerial coordination ensures that laws 
governing investment matters are in conformity with other relevant laws 
and international commitments, while also taking particular concerns and 
interests of individual ministries into account. Stakeholder consultations 
are important, as they help assess whether the law is useful and effectively 
achieves desired outcomes. They help avoid controversies over a law and 
take various concerns and interests of all members of society into account 
already during the drafting stages of the law. Indonesia has been thorough in 
its approach to inter-ministerial coordination. At the same time, the intensity 
of stakeholder consultations could be further enhanced.
198 According to one expert.
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3.6.1 Inter-ministerial coordination
To ensure that international commitments are consistent with national 
laws, coordination among government ministries is vital. This is especially 
important in the field of international investment law, as IIAs entail far-
reaching commitments that affect a broad set of domestic policy fields. 
In the field of investment law, inter-ministerial coordination helps ensure 
that no inconsistencies between bodies of law emerge that could eventually 
culminate in an international arbitration. Such coordination not only 
informs other ministries about new laws and regulations enacted and treaties 
concluded in the area of investment; it also allows ministries to influence 
national and international policy in the area of investment, as they might 
be substantially affected by any new laws and international treaties on 
investment, even if they are not directly responsible for such legislation. 
Achieving compromises among ministries is, of course, the major challenge 
in such processes, and an inability to compromise can seriously undermine 
efforts to establish a regime of international commitments that is in line 
with national laws. There are two types of inter-ministerial coordination: 
one involves coordination among the agencies of the central government, 
whereas the other involves relations between central and local governments.
Evidence from Indonesia suggests that coordination among government 
agencies in the area of investment is broadly implemented to the extent that 
formal linkages exist. In practice, however, coordination is still weak and 
does not always work. This is particularly the case in central-local relations, 
but can also be observed among ministries of the central government.199 
The government is still working on improvements in intergovernmental 
coordination among central government agencies and between central and 
regional governments (APEC 2010).
Institutional coordination on investment matters is sought through a variety 
of “coordinating agencies”. The most important one is the BKPM itself as a 
coordinating agency on investment matters. Its purpose is to coordinate with 
ministries in order to attract inward FDI to Indonesia. Individual agencies 
have authority over certain sectors of the economy, such as industry, energy 
or trade, and the BKPM coordinates the implementation of regulations on 
investment with them. The BKPM further arranges coordination of the 
199 According to the accounts of numerous experts.
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representative offices abroad with the Ministry of Trade.200 The Coordinating 
Ministry for Economic Affairs coordinates larger policy issues, including 
the development of the Masterplan, but it is also involved in investment 
matters.201 Its acting head, together with the president, functioned as head of 
the national team for export and investment (“PEPI”), an inter-ministerial 
body set up to promote export and investment through appropriate policy 
coordination. However, there were doubts about its actual performance and 
cost-effectiveness and lack of clarity about its institutional positioning.202
There are a few other agencies with coordinating functions relevant to 
investment. Bappenas, Indonesia’s planning and development agency, is a 
kind of think-tank ministry that specifies national policy, economic strategy 
and budgetary allocations and coordinates its decisions among ministries.203 
Bappenas also develops Indonesia’s five-year plans. The Ministry of Finance 
coordinates taxation matters with other ministries, including the BKPM, 
and concludes double taxation treaties. It also evaluates incentive schemes 
and other proposals in view of the government budget.204
Negotiations of trade and investment agreements also involve coordination 
among a variety of ministries and agencies, especially those dealing 
with economic matters, including the BKPM, the Coordinating Ministry 
for Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Industry 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The results of such inter-ministerial 
coordination, which can involve direct meetings among ministries, are then 
taken as the basis for international negotiations.205 Accordingly, negotiation 
delegation scan be made up of a mix of ministry staff, including from 
the BKPM, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Trade. 
Although the negotiator naturally has some discretion during the process of 
negotiations, the authority comes from prior consultations on policy among 
ministries. The parliament also has to be consulted during negotiations, as 
it is the body that has to discuss and eventually ratify treaties. And finally, 
200 According to the accounts of three experts.
201 According to the accounts of three experts.
202 See Kusnandar & Co. Solicitors, “To boost exports and invigorate investments”, 03 
July 2013; online: http://kusnandarlaw.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/to-boost-export-and-
invigorate.html (accessed 02 Nov. 2013). 
203 According to explanations made by two experts.
204 According to the explanations made by one expert.
205 Summative account based on comments made by three experts.
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implementation of international commitments also has to be coordinated. 
Given that, in contexts such as ASEAN negotiations, each member state has 
its own concerns in domestic law and its own national interests, negotiations 
involve large amounts of international and national coordination.206
Despite many laudable efforts to coordinate among central agencies of the 
Indonesian government, coordination can be hampered by differences in 
views among ministries on appropriate economic policy. Some ministries 
have conflicting interests that can inhibit effective policy coordination and 
result in incoherent policies. This can complicate international negotiations, 
especially in complex forums such as ASEAN.207
The existence of particularly elaborate provisions on specific issue areas in 
Law No. 25/2007 suggests that the ministries responsible for these areas 
have been more closely involved in the process of developing the law. The 
special provisions on technology transfer, manpower, SMEs etc., reflect this. 
However, in practice, many of the requirements for technology transfer and 
employee training in Law No. 25 are not enforced or implemented.208
The implementation of the one-stop-shop system, based on Presidential 
Regulation No. 27/2009 (one-stop integrated services), is a case where 
coordination among ministries has worked well. More than 15 ministries had 
to agree to the system and give up their authority to approve business licences 
and provide related services in the sectors for which they are responsible 
(OECD 2010, 93). These steps of the regulatory process for investment were 
centralised in the BKPM, allowing the BKPM to implement the system both 
centrally and locally, with municipalities and regions establishing their own 
one-stop shops.209 There is a tendency to move responsibilities for investment 
administration to the local level, whereas the BKPM refocuses more on 
investor services, policy formulation and coordination (OECD 2010, 32). 
The national single window as a continuation of this policy promises to 
further enhance these efforts towards coordination by automatising the 
licensing process.210
206 Summative account based on comments made by three experts.
207 Summative account based on comments made by several experts.
208 According to the accounts of several experts.
209 According to one expert.
210 See http://www4.bkpm.go.id/contents/general/16/ONE-STOP-SHOP.
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There is still a substantial need for more effective coordination between 
central and local governments. Greater regulatory decentralisation and 
shifting of competences to the local level211 has led to policy divergence 
among regional governments, which tend to have their own autonomous 
policy approaches and laws in line with specific provincial contexts and 
development needs. Regional governments have individual interests such 
as generating more local income. Thus, some local governments tend 
to be more favourable towards foreign investment than others, while 
investors continue to have to deal with local governments during the 
process of investment. Regional autonomy has in some cases resulted in 
conflicting laws and regulations at the central and regional levels as well as 
disagreements between central and local governments over the distribution 
of authority. National laws imposed by the central government are often 
implemented differently by regional governments, and local governments 
are not always able to comply with laws and regulations issued by the central 
government.212 In the worst cases, these differences can lead to ISDS cases.
Such problems are exacerbated by limited information provisions and mutual 
communication between the central and local levels. On one hand, regional 
governments might not always fully understand the larger implications of 
their regulatory decisions, including how they may impact on Indonesia’s 
international commitments.213 Capacities of local governments are naturally 
lower compared to the central government. The central government 
has recently been investing in capacity-building at the local level on 
investment matters (OECD 2010, 27–28, 171). On the other hand, the 
central government cannot always be fully informed about conditions at the 
local level, including what kind of development policy might be beneficial 
in particular local settings. Communication and exchange of information 
between central and local authorities is being enhanced to overcome these 
problems, despite the potentially high costs of such efforts.214 The separation 
of responsibilities between central and local governments is being clarified; 
information about central government laws and regulations is provided 
through organised meetings; guidance on the enforcement of such laws and 
regulations locally is being provided; and learning and exchange among 
211 See Law on Regional Autonomy of 1999. 
212 Summative account based on comments made by many experts. 
213 According to one expert.
214 According to one expert.
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local governments is being promoted (OECD 2010, 86, 96). Ensuring that 
local governments understand Indonesia’s international commitments is an 
important part of this process.
Some efforts are now under way to limit some of the regional regulatory 
autonomy that has evolved in the past as part of the democratisation 
process. Hence, despite overall efforts towards decentralisation, there are 
numerous instances where the central government intervened in local 
regulatory activities. Continuous efforts are being made to harmonise 
the regulatory framework, thereby ensuring conformity between central 
and local regulations and among regional regulations, including in the 
area of investment (APEC 2010; OECD 2010, 65, 171).215 Overall, this 
is a challenging process, but as long as these problems remain partially 
unresolved, the level of legal and business uncertainty for investors will 
remain elevated.
In sum, the issue of coordination has been recognised and broadly 
implemented in Indonesia. In fact, there may even be a tendency towards 
over-coordination in the central government, with a wide variety of 
coordinating agencies and ministries in place that deal with a multitude 
of related issues. This tendency towards over-coordination and overlap in 
coordination channels could also have, as a result, the counter-effect that 
coordination is less effective and becomes an unnecessary burden. It is 
possible that Indonesia has not yet found the most optimal approach to 
inter-ministerial coordination, resulting in weaknesses in the coordination 
process itself and making it harder to develop coherent policies through 
inter-ministerial procedures.
Even more challenging is the process of bringing together the results of such 
coordination with international commitments made in IIAs. International 
negotiations of investment treaties have to feed into the process of inter-
ministerial coordination, and inter-ministerial coordination, in turn, must 
inform international negotiations. Only if the relevant processes are 
managed smoothly will domestic laws and regulations be in conformity 
with international obligations, reducing the likelihood of ISDS cases.
215 See also Government Regulation No. 28/2007 on the Division of Roles between National, 
Provincial and Local Governments. 
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3.6.2 Stakeholder consultations
This study has repeatedly illuminated the complexities of managing the 
large variety of interacting laws and regulations on investment at the national 
and international levels. For governments, it is often a challenge to evaluate 
fully the impact and consequences of newly enacted laws and regulations. 
Thus, in order to avoid unnecessary controversies over new measures, it is 
important that governments consult not only among ministries, but also with 
all affected stakeholders about any new law or policy related to investment. 
Stakeholders include investors themselves and the business associations and 
chambers of commerce representing them, but also other firms, consumers, 
the public, civil society and non-governmental organisations. Whereas some 
stakeholders focus on business interests, others might be more concerned 
about the impact of investment on society and local communities. In 
addition to enabling governments to evaluate the possible consequences of 
new measures, stakeholder consultations allow for necessary adjustments to 
be made already before a new law enters into force, avoiding the potential 
need for corrections at a later stage. A likely result is an improvement in 
investor certainty, even when a government eventually does implement an 
unfavourable measure. In addition, consultations allow the government to 
explain its interests – and, in particular, its development objectives – and 
caucus among investors and other stakeholders about which kind of laws they 
think would be most suitable in view of these development considerations. 
In this way, even foreign investors will be involved in thinking about 
development issues and the role investment and investment rules can play.
To a certain extent, stakeholder consultations in the formulation of laws 
and regulations are compulsory in Indonesia, and according to Law No. 
10/2004, the public has the legal right to be involved in the process. A 
procedure is in place whereby an inter-ministerial committee circulates a 
draft version of a legal text through the internet and the media, inviting 
comments and opinions. Accordingly, the business sector and civil society 
groups have contributed to Indonesia’s recent efforts of regulatory reform 
in many policy areas, such as by providing analyses and recommendations 
(OECD 2010, 166, 169, 173).
In the area of investment, the Indonesian government also consults with 
a variety of stakeholders. Probably the most important contact points 
are business associations, with the Indonesian government and the 
BKPM engaging in consultations with domestic and foreign chambers of 
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commerce (OECD 2010, 30, 96). Of course, business associations such as 
the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (KADIN) have a particular set of 
interests that they seek to promote, but at times these may be associated with 
development, such as when it comes to the question of how local enterprises 
and small businesses can effectively benefit from foreign investments and 
improve their technological capabilities. Sometimes investors are directly 
consulted, as happened, for example, in the preparation of Law No. 25/2007 
concerning Investment and on other trade- and investment-related issues 
(OECD 2010, 28, 193). Other stakeholders consulted are trade unions 
and the Indonesian employers association. Foreign stakeholders are also 
consulted.216 To further improve the system, domestic stakeholders should 
be involved in discussions about negotiations of international agreements, 
and existing consultations could be widened to involve a broader number of 
stakeholders.217
Moreover, foreign stakeholders are themselves getting actively involved 
through various channels. For example, the European Chamber of 
Commerce (EUROCHAM) in Indonesia maintains contact with the 
Indonesian government on investment issues. Such engagement by foreign 
stakeholders may sometimes be coordinated among different countries, and 
even with domestic stakeholders.218
To some extent, there is lack of evaluation of the possible consequences of 
new measures prior to their entry into force, as illustrated by a lack of formal 
regulatory impact assessments (OECD 2010, 172). An occurrence in 2007, 
where the new negative list had to be issued twice after complaints were 
made by the public sector (OECD 2010, 77), may serve as one example. 
The mining law may be another illustration of this. It is argued that the 
feasibility of new measures is not being examined in sufficient detail, so that 
possible consequences of these measures are not being contemplated and 
anticipated sufficiently. New measures may be enacted before consultations 
have taken place, so that public discussion of a measure only emerges upon 
enactment. If pressure by public stakeholders opposing (parts of) a new 
law builds up, the government may be induced to review the measure. The 
ultimate consequence may be a trial-and-error process of rule-making that 
216 According to one expert.
217 According to the views of two experts.
218 According to the explanations made by two experts.
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increases legal uncertainty.219 Similarly, new laws are often enacted without 
the necessary implementing regulations in place (OECD 2010, 27). There 
are two formal mechanisms in place to review laws. The first is a judicial 
review mechanism in which the constitutionality of laws can be reviewed 
by the Constitutional Court in accordance with Law No. 24/2003 on the 
Constitutional Court. The other, more common approach is in line with Law 
No. 10/2004, providing for a revision mechanism within the parliament 
(OECD 2010, 184).
A tentative conclusion is that broader communication and consultation 
efforts by the government with stakeholders, the public and investors form 
an important part of effectively making use of policy space and regulatory 
flexibility. Investors should understand that, at times, the government has 
reasons to issue measures that are unfavourable to them. But what matters is 
the way in which the measures are developed; a government planning new 
regulations should consult and communicate with stakeholders – including 
the investors themselves or their representatives – prior to enacting the 
measures. This will decrease uncertainty among investors and increase the 
level of transparency of the government’s policy considerations. Changing 
conditions, which are a natural result of poorly crafted policies that require 
revisions, can deter investors. No doubt that such a process of stakeholder 
consultations can be costly, in particular in terms of providing sufficient 
human resources. But if conducted effectively, stakeholder consultations 
could end up economising funds, as measures would be introduced and 
implemented more swiftly. Therefore, establishing consistent procedures 
for “negotiated rule-making” is useful for governments in the process of 
developing or revising a regulatory framework on investment, and such 
procedures should also be attached to the negotiation of investment treaties. 
Because they are affected by the new rules, investors and other stakeholders 
can often detect problems with laws, regulations and international 
commitments better than the government. This includes detection of legal 
inconsistencies between central and local, national and international, or 
investment-related and -specific bodies of law. Any feedback provided 
by stakeholders is information the government can use to harmonise 
and optimise rules and regulations, including in the interest of economic 
development.
219 According to the explanations given by three experts.
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4 What can be learnt from the Indonesian experience?
This study dealt with four interrelated questions. First, how national and 
international investment laws interact; second, whether national law forms 
the basis for international commitments made or vice versa; third, what 
governance mechanisms should be in place to ensure conformity of national 
and international investment laws; and fourth, what the implications are 
for policy space and economic development. In this section, we summarise 
the findings generated from the Indonesian case study. The final section 
then considers to what extent these specific findings generate valuable 
insights for international investment law and policy-making. Furthermore, 
we conclude with recommendations for further research and some lessons 
learnt for other developing countries.
4.1 A matter of complexity
The international system of IIAs is complex in and of itself, and adding 
domestic investment-specific as well as investment-related laws and 
regulations as an additional layer multiplies this level of complexity. The 
Indonesian case offers two interesting solutions to deal with this complexity: 
first, the introduction of an interlocking law increases the coherence between 
international and national investment law; and second, a hedging strategy by 
including references to domestic laws and regulations in Indonesian IIAs.
In section 3.4 of this study, we provided a juxtaposition of international 
commitments and investment-specific and -related national investment 
laws. Table 6 in particular can be utilised as an analytical template for an 
illustration of the interaction between the two bodies of law. The challenge 
of complexity becomes immediately apparent in this table and has been 
highlighted repeatedly within many sections of this study. It appears that the 
multitude of bodies of relevant law makes the system unmanageable.
In fact, in comparative terms, the international system appears structurally 
quite well-organised, even if negotiated commitments towards individual 
treaty partners in IIAs often differ substantially in content. The system is 
well-organised because most IIAs include the same types of provisions, or 
“core elements” (UNCTAD 2008a), such as definition of investment, FET, 
national treatment, MFN treatment, transfer of funds, expropriation and 
dispute settlement. Only the details of such provisions – plus some additional 
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provisions such as general exceptions, transparency rules and sustainable 
development provisions – are responsible for the differences between these 
agreements. In the domestic system, however, investment-related issues 
are dealt with in a variety of bodies of law, including the Constitution; 
financial regulations; competition, trade, labour and human rights laws 
etc. The challenge is to bring this variety of laws and legal regulations into 
conformity with each other, with investment-specific laws and with the set 
of international commitments on investment that are organised in structure, 
but varying in content.
One particular source of such complexity may be differences in the time 
frames within which the IIA regime and national policies seem to operate. 
A country’s industrial policy may be in constant flux, in line with short- 
to medium-term economic trends and developments, though possibly with 
long-term goals in view. However, once concluded and ratified, IIAs are 
not easily changed and adapted; hence, they have a long-term dimension. 
It is important that governments nevertheless coordinate these two policy 
regimes sufficiently well, so that no significant problems emerge.
The overall challenge to ensure formal consistency and coherence is 
immense. One approach taken by Indonesia is to use an interlocking law 
that functions as an interface between international commitments and 
national law. This law is structured along the lines of IIAs, while attempting 
to combine the relevant issues of a large set of national laws into one legal 
text. The interlocking law, originally enacted in the late 1960s, has been 
revised once in 2007, creating Law No. 25/2007 concerning Investment. 
The interlocking law is effective in dealing with complexity and making 
investment law in Indonesia more transparent, although the system still 
remains incredibly complicated. At the same time, the interlocking law 
functions as an intermediary where national and international laws “meet”. 
It reflects compromises that have been reached and is indicative of areas 
where policy space has been negotiated.
The additional clarity and oversight provided by an interlocking law can 
also help achieve consistency between international commitments and 
domestic investment laws, although there is no guarantee that this will 
always be the case. This study’s in-depth examination of the interaction 
between international commitments and national law has shown that there 
are instances where both appear to be coherent, whereas at other points, 
divergence is quite common. The extent to which this divergence between 
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international commitments and national laws is serious and could lead to 
investor-state disputes is hard to predict, but it is safe to argue that some 
degree of incoherence is unlikely to be harmful.
Nevertheless, Indonesia has developed a hedging strategy in addition to 
the use of an interlocking law. The detailed mapping and examination of 
Indonesian IIAs in this study has shown that references to domestic laws and 
regulations in Indonesian IIAs are much more common than might have been 
expected, in view of the global IIA practice. References to domestic laws 
and regulations have been found in sections of Indonesian IIAs dealing with 
the definitions, admission, FET, national treatment, expropriation, transfer 
of funds, foreign personnel, ISDS and scope. Whereas such references are 
only found in some – or even just a few – IIAs in areas such as FET, national 
treatment, expropriation, transfer of funds, foreign personnel and ISDS, they 
are almost omnipresent in provisions dealing with the definitions, admission 
and scope. Indonesia even includes a standard provision in most of its BITs 
that refers to its domestic interlocking law to establish applicability of the 
agreement. It is difficult to judge the legal significance of such references 
to domestic laws and regulations, but it is clearly a strategy to hedge against 
risks and to elevate the standing of Indonesian national laws whilst taking 
on international commitments.
4.2 Direction of interaction 
This study found evidence that the direction of interaction between 
Indonesia’s international commitments on investment and its national 
laws in this area is bi-directional. This in itself is an important finding, as 
the negotiation of IIAs often has been rather detached from the evolution 
of national investment law and the broader policy goals formulated by 
governments of developing countries (Poulsen 2014; Poulsen / Aisbett 
2013). Traditionally, the negotiation of IIAs can be described as a one-way 
street where developing countries had to act as “price-takers” accepting the 
models put forward by industrialised countries (Elkins / Guzmán / Simmons 
2006).
That Indonesia is not a mere price-taker is evident. First, the procedures 
of inter-ministerial and stakeholder consultations practised in Indonesia 
suggest that international negotiations are informed by the outcome of such 
consultations. Negotiators are constrained by the requirements formulated 
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by domestic institutions. Second, Indonesia has for a long time used its 
own model BIT as a basis for its negotiations of IIAs, which include, as 
a unique feature, reference to the Indonesian interlocking law. Thirdly, 
domestic agencies and institutions have some power to “push back” against 
some issues being negotiated at the international level. As a minimum, they 
can lobby for the inclusion of certain industrial sectors or activities on the 
negative list and in the schedules of Indonesia’s treaties. More powerful 
agencies might also succeed in mandating the inclusion of some safeguards 
or require the addition of specific provisions in domestic law. Fourthly, as 
is discussed in further detail below, there has been some flexibility in the 
way international commitments are implemented and enforced in Indonesia. 
And finally, internationally negotiated commitments have to be ratified 
domestically by parliament, providing a domestic entity with ultimate 
discretion on the decision to adopt an internationally negotiated text.
Despite the above, international rules and commitments do impact on 
the nature and content of national laws and regulations. Firstly, the 
organisation of the Indonesian interlocking law is very similar to that of 
an IIA, suggesting that elements of an international legal text have been 
at least partially adopted into national law, both in terms of structure as 
well as content. Most notably, the newest version of the interlocking law, 
developed in 2007, includes issues such as national treatment, which cannot 
be found in the version from 1967. This suggests that some international 
norms typically included in IIAs have, over time, found their way into the 
domain of Indonesia’s national laws, especially as the Indonesian economy 
has continued on a successful road of development. Secondly, the success of 
many international negotiations, especially those conducted at multilateral 
forums such as ASEAN, is dependent on the willingness of states to 
compromise on a variety of sometimes controversial issues, which implies 
the necessity to alter national laws in order to conform to the compromises 
negotiated at the international level. More generally, it is hard to imagine 
that a country negotiating international treaties will not have to make some 
adjustments to national laws as a result of such negotiations.
Although the interaction between national and international investment laws 
is bi-directional, the examination of the Indonesian case study suggests that 
the influence of international practices and norms on Indonesian national 
investment policy is more significant than Indonesia’s influence on IIAs. 
Indonesia has adopted important international practices, such as national 
treatment, into its national investment policy, but there is little evidence 
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that the country has contributed significantly to forming and advancing 
international investment policy, at least not beyond the ASEAN regional 
context. What Indonesia does have is some power in international advocacy on 
issues such as further liberalisation and connectivity in the regional context, 
and the ability to “push back” international proposals that may be contrary 
to domestic interests or industrial policy. This latter aspect becomes evident, 
for example, in the transfer of certain far-reaching clauses on manpower 
issues from the investment law of 1967 into the new law of 2007, and the 
maintenance of an extensive negative list. This ability to “push back” has 
implications for the issue of policy space, discussed in further detail below.
4.3 Governance mechanisms matter
To advance appropriate governance of investment matters, Indonesia has 
introduced procedures of inter-ministerial coordination and stakeholder 
consultations into the process of rule-making on investment. This study 
suggests that these procedures have been put in place and are being used, 
but their degree of effectiveness and impact has been questioned, and there 
is a necessity to review and improve these procedures. Despite existing 
controversies over the process, the involvement of a variety of stakeholders 
on issues of investment law is probably an important and useful activity 
as part of the rule-making process, especially as it might help identify – 
at an early stage of the rule-making process – potential areas where new 
measures that are not in line with Indonesia’s international commitments 
could potentially trigger the emergence of ISDS cases.
Processes of rule-making that involve the participation of affected institutions 
and stakeholders are not new to the field of policy-making. Quite similar is 
the practice of “regulatory negotiation” or “negotiated rule-making” applied 
in administrative procedures in the United States. The concept emerged in 
the United States during the 1980s and was endorsed by the US Congress 
in 1990.220 It formed part of the alternative dispute-resolution movement, 
suggesting that prior negotiations of regulations that are acceptable to all 
would prevent disputes and court proceedings at later stages. The procedure 
220 See USDA, “What is negotiated rulemaking”; online: http://www.ams.usda.gov/
AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5089434 (accessed 17 Nov. 2013). See also: 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 4970 (1990) (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (2000)) (Funck 2009).
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of negotiated rule-making is not without controversy and has both proponents 
and opponents in governmental and academic circles in the United States 
(Funck 2009). We do not engage in the debate about the advantages and 
disadvantages of this approach (see, e.g., Harter 2001; Coglianese 2001), due 
to limitations of space, and refer this debate and the discussion on whether 
this approach is functional in the specific case of Indonesian investment 
law and policy to future research projects. We do, however, believe that this 
process is valuable, at least to a certain degree, in managing the interaction 
between international and national laws and regulations on investment, 
and in identifying policy space. UNCTAD has also suggested that dispute-
prevention policies, such as information-sharing, establishing a lead agency, 
state-state cooperation in dispute prevention etc., have some potential in 
reducing the likelihood of ISDS cases (UNCTAD 2010), without allocating 
explicit attention to the role of negotiated rule-making.
One of the main findings of this study is thus that there is not only 
international negotiation of investment rules, but also national bargaining of 
such rules, and both processes interact. The structure of international rules 
governing investment is largely a result of negotiation among treaty parties 
and has been widely discussed in the literature on IIAs and investment law. 
The assumption has often been that other government ministries only need 
to be informed or made aware of what the agency negotiating investment 
treaties is doing, attached with a warning about the potential implications 
that measures enacted by other agencies may have – with international 
arbitration as the worst-case scenario. But this study has illustrated that, 
in reality, domestic bargaining among ministries is actually a common 
feature in the development of domestic investment law – at least in the 
case of Indonesia – and potentially, domestic bargaining may even occur 
with stakeholders outside of the government. In other words, international 
bargaining of investment rules – that is, the negotiation of IIAs – and national 
bargaining of such rules are happening in parallel, but within very different 
contexts and in pursuit of different sets of objectives. Not only are there 
inconsistencies in formal regulations and rules on investment between the 
international level and the national level, but there are considerable levels of 
inconsistency between international bargaining (focused on the negotiation 
of IIAs) and national bargaining (focused on the development of domestic 
investment-specific laws).
We illustrate this in what we call the “bargaining triad”, which consists of 
negotiations at the inter-governmental level, inter-ministerial level coordination 
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and stakeholder consultations, as shown in Figure 6. Bargaining at the inter-
governmental level consists of the familiar negotiations of IIAs, in this case 
involving Indonesia and its treaty partners. Although countries can have an 
influence on the development of national laws in other countries, their focus 
is on the conclusion of IIAs through inter-governmental negotiations. Inter-
ministerial coordination and bargaining focus on the development of national 
laws, although ministries can have a considerable impact on international 
negotiations as well. Finally, consultations with stakeholders can involve 
national and foreign interests, which may seek to influence international and 
national laws and policies through the bargaining process.
Figure 6: The bargaining triad
Source: Authors
All members of the triad seek to influence the development of investment-
specific national laws, which, in Indonesia’s case, is akin to its interlocking 
law. Foreign governments have a larger influence on IIAs than on domestic 
investment laws, whereas national ministries have the strongest influence 
on their respective investment-related laws, with diminishing impact on the 
development of the interlocking law or the negotiation of IIAs. The impact of 
non-governmental stakeholders depends on their precise roles and nationalities. 
This power structure has to be managed by the national government in the 
process of managing the interaction between international and national 
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investment law and policy. A specified agency, such as the BKPM, can be made 
responsible for negotiating between these different sets of interests.221
4.4 Enhancing policy space
International commitments have been shown to limit policy space, but despite 
these limitations, there is still substantial scope for the state to manoeuvre 
and make use of its right to regulate. Most interestingly, it appears that IIAs 
concluded in line with the protection model of investment treaties may 
limit the amount of policy space more significantly than those concluded 
in line with the liberalisation model. Despite offering treaty coverage at the 
pre-establishment phase of an investment, IIAs drafted on the basis of the 
liberalisation model have a large variety of clarifications and limitations 
built into the treaty that potentially enhance the regulatory flexibility of the 
governments concluding the treaty. In line with this, an interesting finding 
of this study is that the newer, more elaborate IIAs with pre-establishment 
provisions are not necessarily the ones that result in the initiation of investment 
disputes. Indonesia’s experience shows that very old BITs negotiated on the 
basis of the protection model are being used to file a claim in international 
investment arbitration. This may be because – despite larger commitments 
on issues such as liberalisation and market access being made in newer 
agreements – these treaties also include more elaborate language with the 
purpose of hedging against risks and creating more regulatory flexibility.
The actual utilisation of policy space, however, occurs within the realm of 
domestic investment-specific or -related laws and regulations, and especially 
the relevant implementing measures. Policy space becomes a reality not 
through the mere existence of laws and regulations that seek to make use 
of available policy space, but through the ability to implement and enforce 
them in a strategic way. In other words, policy space is indeed present when 
laws are not only drafted but actually implemented and enforced.
An examination of how development considerations are featured in domestic 
investment law illuminates the discrepancies between the rules and laws 
in existence and actual implementation and enforcement in light of the 
221 Conceptually, the bargaining triad separates inter-ministerial coordination from the 
government entities making the ultimate decisions on investment law and policy, although 
this distinction is not that explicit in practice.
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interaction between international and national laws. This study has found 
that many development considerations are featured much more strongly in 
domestic law, illuminating the desire of the Indonesian government, but that 
they are practically absent from Indonesia’s IIAs. Table 10 provides examples 
of such development-oriented aspects that are emphasised much more in 
national law compared to IIAs. They appear to resemble an attempt by the 
Indonesian government to legislate investment matters in favour of economic 
development. But the dilemma may be that international commitments 
restrict the implementation and enforcement of these measures in practice, 
especially where the national law is more restrictive than the international 
commitments made, as in the cases of definitions, personnel and manpower, 
Table 10: Examples of discrepancies between IIAs and national laws
IIAs National law Nature of discrepancy
Broad definition of 
investment
Investment “for running 
business” (Law No. 25/2007, 
Article 1)
National law develop-
ment-oriented, but nar-
rower than in IIAs
Provisions on per-
sonnel are rare
Prioritisation of employment 
given to Indonesian citizens, 
requirement to “improve 
the competence” of Indone-
sian workers, requirements 
of “trainings and transfer 
of technology” (Law No. 
25/2007, Article 10)
National law requires de-
velopment-oriented ap-
proaches to employment, 
approaches that are not 
specified in IIAs
Investment promo-
tion is very limited
Wide-ranging “facilities” 
and investment incentives 
provided under certain 
circumstances (Law No. 
25/2007, Article 18)
More investment promo-
tion included in national 
law, along with develop-
ment considerations
No explicit obli-
gations, but also 
avoidance of pro-
hibiting the exist-
ence of obligations
Various requirements on 
manpower issues (Law No. 
25/2007, Article 10) and 
CSR (Law No. 25/2007, Ar-
ticles 15, 16 and 17) 
National law is more ex-
plicit on investor obliga-
tions and requirements 
in line with development 
considerations
Source: Authors
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and investor obligations. Policy space is broader with regard to facilitating 
measures, such as in the area of investment promotion, which Indonesia is 
also implementing more actively. Therefore, one possible conclusion may 
be that the utilisation of policy space should focus more on facilitating 
measures than on restricting measures, in particular as the former are likely 
to be much less contentious, and hence less risky for the government.
The risk of getting involved in ISDS cases depends in part on the degree 
to which laws in areas where discrepancies exist are actually enforced in 
practice. In particular, with respect to some of the development-oriented 
provisions in Law No. 25/2007, enforcement and implementation of 
regulations may actually be lacking, indicating a lack of policy space. In 
other words, the consequences of a law are not only dependent on the nature 
of the formal laws and legal texts – what is also important is the extent to 
which these laws and regulations are actually implemented in practice. It is 
possible to have many laws and a solid legal framework, but unpredictable 
levels of enforcement and implementation. This study suggested earlier that 
investors are likely to focus more on national laws and their enforcement 
rather than on international commitments. Therefore, a transparent and 
consistent approach to national legislation, together with appropriate 
implementation and enforcement of such rules, may be as important as the 
issue of consistency with international commitments. If the policy space is 
not there, both the laws and the implementing regulations should reflect this.
Similarly, disputes are unlikely to emerge directly on the basis of the 
interlocking law. This is because the law in itself has no significant effect on 
investors and their investments, as long as it is not followed up with relevant 
implementing regulations. It is likely that those implementing regulations – 
found in column 4 from left in Table 6 and in section 3.5 of this study – are 
the measures that could lead to an investment dispute.
Given this danger that implementing regulations might trigger investor-state 
disputes, and in view of the already existing disputes, governments may be 
deterred from legislating in the first place or from implementing already 
existing laws, resulting in a “regulatory chill” effect that could go against the 
achievement of public policy objectives. It might be possible to avoid such an 
effect by using available policy space and the right to regulate with caution 
and foresight. In developing the appropriate implementing regulations, the 
state can draw on inter-ministerial coordination and stakeholder consultations 
to better determine how far it can go with any new measures. This will allow 
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the state to adapt new measures as optimally as possible to its development 
needs, whilst taking potential consequences into account, such as the 
emergence of investor-state disputes. Through a process of “negotiated rule-
making”, governments can achieve greater certainty about the kinds of 
measures that still lie within the available policy space. Caucusing viewpoints 
among government ministries and domestic as well as foreign stakeholders 
– including the investors themselves or their associations – could help in 
avoiding inappropriate measures from being developed that might require 
readjustments at a later stage, or even lead to investor-state disputes.
Communication is key in this context, which includes communicating and 
explaining clearly the purpose and content of anticipated new measures 
prior to their enactment, and openly involving government agencies and 
other interested stakeholders alike in the development of the measures. 
The communicated objective of a measure should be in line with the public 
interest, such as addressing a development objective of the state. Appropriate 
reasoning, including plausible economic logic, should be behind a measure, 
and stakeholders should be allowed to contest measures where this is in doubt. 
Governments should make sure that measures are implemented after they 
have been fully developed, and the consequences and feasibility sufficiently 
examined, in order to avoid any backtracking or amendments. In other words, 
it is better to develop measures with due care and allowing substantial amounts 
of time than to backtrack on a hastily enacted measure. Finally, it is important 
to emphasise that governments should have the final say about a measure, and 
not become pressured by the stakeholders (or agencies) consulted. In the end, 
the government must remain the ultimate decision-maker.
5 Beyond the Indonesian case: general conclusions and 
recommendations
This study has provided detailed insights on how key IIA provisions and 
domestic laws and regulations interact. In order to undertake such an analysis, 
the study has focused on a case study of the Indonesian legal framework for 
investment, applying an innovative pattern-matching technique. However, 
for the purpose of drawing more general conclusions about investment 
policy-making, it is important to move from the particular context of the 
Indonesian case towards reconsidering the general lessons to be learnt 
from this study. It is important to consider whether the case of Indonesia, 
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examined in this study, constitutes an example of “best practice” or “good 
practice” that could be copied by other countries. We therefore conclude this 
study by highlighting some more general insights, policy recommendations 
and areas for further research. We emphasise four particular aspects: the 
interlocking law, the bargaining triad, identifying and managing policy 
space, and this study’s innovative analytical approach.
In Indonesia’s case, key IIA provisions were replicated in domestic laws 
and regulations in a very structured way, applying core elements almost 
one-to-one in the relevant national law – Law No. 25/2007 concerning 
Investment – which is why we have, within this study, referred to this law 
as the “interlocking law”. It is beyond the scope of this study to determine 
whether other countries’ domestic legal frameworks address this issue with 
a similar degree of structure and transparency, and we have not investigated 
whether other countries’ domestic legal frameworks on investment utilise an 
interlocking law.222 We may expect different set-ups in other countries, as the 
APEC-UNCTAD study on IIA core elements in domestic legal frameworks 
(APEC / UNCTAD 2011) suggests.
What this study does suggest is that the use of an interlocking law is an 
interesting and promising way of linking international commitments with 
national laws in a transparent manner, thereby dealing with the problem 
of complexity and possibly reducing the risk of ISDS cases, although 
more evidence on the latter benefit is still required. Other countries 
could consider replicating this approach in order to better organise their 
investment policies. However, further studies of other countries will be 
necessary to identify alternative approaches and confirm the feasibility of 
an interlocking law, especially for other developing countries that do not 
possess the governmental capacities of Indonesia. Similarly, it needs to be 
seen whether the Indonesian approach in IIAs to frequently and explicitly 
refer to domestic laws and regulations in general – and the interlocking law 
in particular – could be interpreted as a “good practice” to hedge against 
possible risks resulting from international commitments. Here again, 
looking at the practices of other countries on this issue would be necessary 
to determine the extent to which the Indonesian approach is unique, and 
to comparatively evaluate the appropriateness of the Indonesian approach.
222 The recent introduction of a Foreign Investment Act and the establishment of an Investment 
Ministerial Committee in South Africa indicate that other countries are implementing 
governance structures similar to Indonesia’s. 
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In general, rules should be defined in a participatory and transparent way. 
This study finds, however, that inconsistencies in legal rules are normally 
paralleled by inconsistencies in inter-governmental, inter-ministerial 
and stakeholder approaches to investment policy, illuminating the need 
for compromise. Based on this study’s findings, we think it useful for a 
government to consider the views of all members of this triad when 
developing investment laws, provided that it maintains its final decision-
making authority. A governance mechanism that takes account of various 
perspectives will likely be more effective in defining the appropriate content 
and wording of laws (including the interlocking law), in identifying available 
policy space and in preventing investment disputes. Partially as a result of 
this, the interaction between international and national rules and interests 
will be bi-directional. Involving the triad will also make the policy-making 
process smoother and reduce the likelihood that new laws and regulations 
have to be corrected shortly after enactment.
Because of the vagueness of the policy space concept, we did not have the 
ambition in this study to explicitly measure the extent to which international 
commitments on investment limited policy space. Rather, the important 
finding in this study on the issue of policy space is that governments have tools 
at their disposal to identify policy space, thereby avoiding the emergence of 
ISDS cases resulting from measures that have taken a step too far. These 
tools include involvement of the triad in the development of investment 
policy through a governance approach that provides the government with 
further clarity on the extent to which specific laws and measures are feasible 
or might pose risks of international arbitration. Involving the triad could 
also be used to identify areas where it would or would not be advisable for 
a government to make use of available policy space, with due consideration 
to issues of domestic economic development.
We also find that the newer IIAs that follow the liberalisation approach 
potentially offer more opportunities to maintain policy space than do 
many of the older IIAs that follow the protection approach. Host-state 
governments ought to watch their older BITs, and if too many cases emerge 
from them, devise strategies to ameliorate the situation – in particular when 
cases challenge legitimate public policy objectives. Such strategies may 
include renegotiation of treaties.
Given the interesting insights gained from the Indonesian case study, the 
findings of this study could be particularly useful for developing countries 
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that are just beginning to develop or reform their investment policy regimes, 
and are possibly starting to draft a national investment law while eyeing 
the possibility of negotiating IIAs. Another ASEAN economy – Myanmar 
– is currently a particularly notable example. With Myanmar’s current 
ambitions to open up its economy, it has been in the process of developing 
an investment legal framework and passed a new foreign investment law in 
November 2012 (Turnell 2013). This study has provided some insight on 
the considerations that matter for countries such as Myanmar that are in the 
process of developing a legal framework on investment.
This study, to the best knowledge of the authors, is the first to have 
directly juxtaposed national and international investment laws in greater 
depth. Our findings have important implications for research on national 
and international investment laws as well as for policy advice offered by 
international organisations to developing countries in the area of investment 
policy-making. It is worth highlighting that, by directly juxtaposing 
international commitments on investment with national laws and regulations, 
this study has ventured into a new field. The myriad of existing publications 
on IIAs as well as national laws and regulations on investment – including 
the many available investment policy reviews by UNCTAD and the OECD 
– have made important contributions to our understanding of both domestic 
laws and regulations as well as international agreements. However, the 
national and international dimensions have usually been treated separately 
and without direct juxtaposition.
Over the last few years, a new consensus has been emerging that calls for a 
reconsideration of IIAs and their contribution to sustainable development in 
host states. However, without a sound grounding of IIA analysis in national 
investment law – and more broadly, in national development strategies – it 
will not be possible to redesign IIAs in such a way that they contribute 
to sustainable development. From an analytical perspective, it is important 
for researchers as well as policy advisers to overcome the separation 
between national and international investment laws while moving towards 
a two-level logic by analysing international and national investment law in 
a more integrated way. Initial steps towards juxtaposing these two bodies 
of law were taken in APEC and UNCTAD (2011), although the findings 
remained quite general. UNCTAD’s recent publication “Investment Policy 
Framework for Sustainable Development” (UNCTAD 2012a) also discusses 
both national and international investment policies in some detail. However, 
these previous attempts remain incomplete.
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In fact, by making this juxtaposition, this study has developed a useful 
methodological blueprint – an innovative pattern-matching technique – for 
how to comparatively examine international commitments made in IIAs 
with national laws and regulations on investment. This method suggests a 
stepwise approach: first, the analysis should start with a mapping of all IIAs 
that a country has signed; second, these IIAs will be compared with national 
investment-specific and then investment-related laws through juxtaposition; 
third, individual and controversial measures should be considered in a bit 
more detail, and their potential implications discussed; and finally, the nature 
of inter-ministerial coordination and stakeholder consultations related to 
investment issues should be examined through empirical research, taking 
account of previous and current inter-governmental negotiations of IIAs. The 
value of this methodology is that it is more holistic in examining investment law 
and policy, and it can provide insights on issues such as consistency between 
domestic laws and regulations and international commitments; potential risks 
of inconsistencies; and implications for national policy space and economic 
development. We hope that future studies will use this methodology to 
undertake similar analyses of other countries’ legal frameworks for investment 
in order to overcome the separation between national and international 
perspectives that is endemic in the research and policy advice on the subject. 
The objective would be to build up a body of literature that examines this 
neglected area of inquiry in the field of investment law.
Future research should therefore examine how other countries replicate key 
IIA provisions in domestic laws and regulations. Eventually, comparative 
case studies of several countries should analyse the entire investment legal 
frameworks of these countries, including international commitments and 
national laws, and compare these frameworks with each other. This will 
allow for the identification of different practices in this area and lead to the 
possibility of discerning “best practice” approaches. At the same time, future 
research could focus on smaller parts of the investment legal frameworks of 
countries, such as individual IIA provisions and how these are replicated 
in national laws and regulations. For example, a study could just look at 
how “expropriation” or “transfer of funds” is addressed in various domestic 
investment laws. This will allow for a more detailed examination of relevant 
issues than was possible in this study, and allow for going deeper into a 
particular set of national laws and regulations. In other words, much work 
still needs to be done in this very new area of inquiry.
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